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
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

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HE UNIONIST HANDBOOK

The Truth about Home Rule

WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS
EDINBURGH AND LONDON

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

THE

TRUTH ABOUT HOME RULE

THE

TRUTH ABOUT HOME RULE

PAPERS ON THE IRISH QUESTION

BY

THE DUKE OF ARGYLL
THE EARL OF DERBY
THE LORD BRAMWELL
PROFESSOR VAMBÉRY
MR FREDERICK POLLOCK
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EDINBURGH AND LONDON
MDCCCLXXXVIII

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PREFACE.

THE object of this volume of Essays and Articles is to provide a text-book for those speakers, writers, and electors who wish to take a dispassionate but correct view of the novel dogma of Gladstonian Home Rule.

Liberal principles, Constitutionalism, and Law, find spokesmen in the Marquis of Hartington, the Duke of Argyll, the Earl of Derby, the Earl of Selborne, Lord Bramwell, and Mr Frederick Pollock; History speaks through Mr Lecky; while actual experience in Foreign Countries, in the United Kingdom, and in our Colonies, is dealt with by Professor Vambéry, Lord Basing, Mr Penrose Fitzgerald, M.P., and the Editor.

Some of the matter has been published before, but much is specially written for this volume.

G. B-P.

8 ST GEORGE'S PLACE.

NOTE.—Each author is responsible only for the opinions in his own contribution.



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INTRODUCTORY.

"THIS controversy, and even the recollection of it, will gradually die away with the certain triumph of Home Rule," — so writes Mr Gladstone in November 1887. At the same time he also exhorts the remnant of the Eighty Club, that "it will be highly useful to inform the country as to the history and circumstances of Ireland, as the most effectual means of promoting the Home Rule policy." But Mr Gladstone steadily refuses to give any definition of the term Home Rule as he would have it interpreted now. It is true that the only definition ever reduced to black and white is that which the uncontrolled genius of Mr Gladstone placed before Parliament in the twin Bills of 1886. But there is nothing to prove whether or no that scheme is or is not definitively repudiated or abandoned. All that is certain is, that no other scheme has as yet been substituted for it, and that therefore it holds the field as the only scheme as yet devised by the wit of any responsible statesman which is supposed to satisfy the Parnellite section of the Gladstonite party.

It is true Mr Gladstone has, somewhat querulously,

asserted that these Bills are dead: but then almost in the same breath, we are invited to the conclusion that the only alternative is Coercion. But these Bills enjoyed his ardent advocacy in 1886 just as Coercion Bills had in 1884; and it is therefore somewhat difficult to anticipate precisely which of the two alternatives will have his support in 1888. Six months of reflection in the shades of Opposition caused Mr Gladstone fully and finally to discard his old and well-tried servant, Coercion; may not sixteen months of the same chilling shade as easily lead him to discard his new and ruinous ally, Home Rule? At all events, if he is constrained to meet Parliament in 1888 still under the whip-hand of his Parnellite taskmasters, he must perforce devise and perfect some new scheme so far embodying that "Home Rule which is certain to triumph," as to satisfy the Parnellite section in the House of Commons.

There is indeed the alternative that Mr Gladstone should suddenly discover that England "blocks the way," and that "nothing can be done for Ireland until England's just grievances are remedied," and that, on this plea of postponement, he can shunt Ireland into a convenient siding, and again attach himself to the old and trusted principles of the Liberal and Radical parties. In so doing he will have virtually to sever his Parnellite alliance; and he may therefore be pleased to learn in the pages of this volume that the highest authorities in the land are rapidly convincing the people of the fatal errors into which any so-called Home Rule policy must land the entire nation.

It is well to remember that the "saving commonsense" of the nation, as represented in Parliament, rudely awakened by Mr Gladstone's sudden and crude

scheme of Home Rule, at once and forcibly asserted an independent but vigorous repudiation of so novel, so futile, and so obviously fantastic a proposal. The short breathing-space between the defeat of the Bills in the House of Commons by a majority of 30 and a general Election, fought out on this very subject, served only to increase the majority against such proposals to 120. Since then, and in spite of the serious but always unpopular necessity for greater stringency in the maintenance of law and order in Ireland, intelligent public opinion has steadily and surely rallied to the side of those who see nothing but evil in the crude dogma of Gladstonian Home Rule.

But in spite of the undenied growth of Unionist principles, there are many politicians who still believe in the Home Rule cry; and some of their number have been astute enough to sow broadcast the seeds of the pernicious fallacy that Home Rule means self-government, and that self-government means Home Rule—seed that may likely enough germinate in the hearts, if not in the brains, of that section of the British electorate whose generous sympathies are not always under the control of adequate knowledge. Consequently there arises the pressing necessity of showing, on the highest authority, that Gladstonian Home Rule is the very reverse and negative of self-government—a necessity all the more pressing the more we give credence to the rumours that Mr Gladstone is more than ever determined to raise the banner of his Home Rule scheme at the earliest opportunity in the coming session.

On the very threshold of the problem stands the necessity for some definition of Gladstonian Home Rule. Happily we can go to the fountainhead at once. Lord Thring, who has been named the wet-

nurse of the scheme, thus describes Mr Gladstone's twin Bills (page 204 of the 'Handbook of Home Rule'): "Absolute local autonomy was conferred on Ireland. . . . The Bill provided that, after a certain day, the representative Irish peers should cease to sit in the House of Lords, and the Irish members vacate their places in the House of Commons. . . . The legislative supremacy of the British Parliament was maintained, by an express provision excepting from any interference on the part of the Irish Legislature all imperial powers, and declaring void any enactment which infringed that provision; further, an enactment was inserted for the purpose of securing to the English Legislature in the last resource the absolute power to make any law for the government of Ireland, and therefore to repeal, or *suspend*, the Irish Constitution."

Place[1] this most authoritative description side by side with Mr Parnell's persistently declared policy, "to secure for Ireland, free of outside control, the right to direct her own course among the peoples of the world." It is at once evident how far it is true that the Parnellite party support Mr Gladstone's scheme, shrewdly regarding it as a stepping-stone to other things. They see that "as a practical scheme it is hopelessly impracticable"; they well know it would simply kill the existing body politic; and that citizens must pin their faith on the belief that out of their dead selves they may make stepping-stones to lead to higher things.

On the political side, Ireland is coolly asked to take a back seat, and to surrender all privilege of representation in that Imperial Parliament, which is to remain

[1] What follows I take, by the kind permission of the Editor, from my article entitled "Self-Government *versus* Home Rule," in 'Blackwood's Magazine' for December 1887.

more supreme than ever. But whether we give heed to the principles involved, or to the declared wishes of the Parnellite leaders, it is indeed difficult to see how, with Lord Thring, we can confer "absolute local autonomy" on Ireland, and yet retain for the Imperial Government, as Mr Gladstone's scheme retains, all control over the police, and, therefore, all responsibility for law and order. In this, as in the control of the land policy and many another matter, the self-contradictory rule is to prevail, that the Imperial Parliament, in which Ireland is not to be represented, is to remain supreme in a country which nevertheless enjoys "absolute local autonomy"; and Mr Gladstone very properly tells us that "the unity of the empire rests upon the supremacy of Parliament."

Again, in the matter of taxation, this same Parliament is to have full and free control over customs and excise, and thus, with a vengeance, to deprive Ireland of what Liberals were used to deem a cardinal principle —"No taxation without representation." Politically, then, Mr Gladstone's Home Rule scheme reduces Ireland to vassalage, by a grudging gift of a certain measure of local autonomy in return for an absolute surrender of national freedom, and of the highest prerogatives and rights of self-government, notably those of a voice and share in imperial counsels and control.

Mr Gladstone is proverbially blind to expressions of opinion that militate against the cause he may happen to advocate. Mr Gladstone remains in pitiable ignorance of what the "Parnellite paymasters" resolutely and consistently demand. It would be well if Mr Gladstone could be induced to read the following resolutions, accepted with enthusiasm last August at a great gathering of these "paymasters" in Chicago: "That

any measure of self-government proposed by the British Parliament, which refuses to recognise the independence from foreign control and dictation of the projected Irish Legislature, would be inadequate for the relief of Ireland, and ought to be rejected by the leaders of the Irish people. That we will cheerfully sustain by every means within our reach the struggle of the Irish people for liberty and independence, so long as the Irish people remain true to the cardinal principle of Ireland's right to be a free nation."

Another resolution recorded the conviction that, "The weak compromise of so-called Home Rule, proposed by Sir G. O. Trevelyan and apparently accepted by the Liberal leaders, . . . would lower the dignity of the Irish nation, and work great injury to the cause of Irish liberty."

Mr Gladstone has yet to learn that it is not only the wicked Unionist legislators but the good Clan-na-Gael paymasters who scout his pet Home Rule scheme, as insulting to Ireland, and as being impracticable, and, in its nature, an impossible compromise.

And yet this strange policy has attracted and continues to attract a large measure of purely *adventitious* support. Its impracticabilities have been proved to demonstration over and over again, and yet even reasoning men continue to support the scheme. Radical Gladstonites, who pin their faith on representative government, not less than philanthropic Liberals, who abominate all forms of political tyranny or autocracy, nevertheless support this scheme for the disfranchisement of Ireland. And the *causa motiva* is not far to seek. *Cherchez le nom*, and you have the whole story. It is all in a name. The phrase "Home Rule" bears upon the surface the meaning of local autonomy, of

local self-government; and the heedless world, forgetting the important limitation implied in the word "local," accepts without further question or query the creed that Home Rule means autonomy or self-government, and that self-government means Home Rule. So wholesale a fallacy gives to Mr Gladstone's scheme its chief strength and all the real power it wields. Mr Gladstone was indeed in luck's way when he happened upon, or, as his enemies wickedly say, purloined from Mr Parnell's vocabulary, a sounding title that in original intention contains another and a deeper meaning.

The phrase "Home Rule" means ruling your own domestic affairs. This may be a form of self-government, or it may be the very reverse. All depends upon whether or no there exists above you an Executive and Legislature in which you are not represented, but which none the less legislates and administers for you. If so, then your Home Rule means that you are a mere dependency, a subject community, inferior to, and governed by, some other community.

If we summarise Mr Gladstone's Home Rule, we find it involves that Irishmen are deprived of all voice in imperial affairs; taxed by a Parliament in which they are not represented; and their laws, in such matters as they have liberty to legislate upon, made liable to disallowance by an entirely external Legislature. Mr Gladstone would fain place Ireland in a status of vassalage and subordination such as no free people has ever willingly endured, and no dependent nation ever willingly accepted. In a word, Gladstonian Home Rule means the political degradation, the fiscal slavery, and the legislative subordination of Ireland to the Imperial Parliament.

But a generous public, mistaking Home Rule for self-government and self-government for Home Rule, for the moment ignores all logical and practical alternatives; and this illogical confusion of ideas still holds sway even in high places. In one single sentence, for instance, Mr John Morley explains the grounds of his Irish creed—a creed which has painfully puzzled the many who admire his genuine and brilliant literary abilities. He writes, on page 246 of the 'Handbook of Home Rule': "The business in hand is not a theorem but a problem; it is not a thesis to be proved, but a malady to be cured; and the world will thank only the reasoner who winds up, not with Q.E.D., but with Q.E.F. To reason that a patient ought not to take a given medicine because it may possibly cause him more pain than some other medicine which he has no intention of taking, is curiously oblique logic. The question is not oblique, it is direct. Will the operation" (of Home Rule) "do more harm to the constitution than the slow corrosions of a disorder grown inveterate?"

Possibly ere this Mr Morley has seen that, as it stands, this reasoning of his contains a fallacy well known to the schoolmen and even to schoolboys. Some of us have before now heard of cases of "undistributed middle;" and we naturally ask—Is there no third medicine which the patient may be willing to take in place of one of two given medicines? Is there no other operation besides that of Home Rule, which, doing not harm but good to the constitution, will stay and eradicate the "slow corrosions of a disorder grown inveterate"? To argue without this completed syllogism is to bring the reasoner perilously near to a conclusion that would in Euclid wind up, not with Q.E.D. or Q.E.F., but with Q.E.A.

As a matter of fact, there is an alternative. Just as Mr Gladstone's shibboleth is *Home Rule*, so is *Self-Government* the watchword of the Unionist statesmen. Self-government means that the residents in any and all parts of a nation's territory shall enjoy all the rights and prerogatives, perform all the duties, and bear all the *self-imposed* burdens which free citizens enjoy, perform, or bear. Among the most cherished and most essential of the rights and prerogatives is a voice in imposing and adjusting the necessary burdens; and among the highest and most necessary duties is the preserving intact these rights and prerogatives. Counsel, Control, and Contribution are the three C's of a free State. Mr Gladstone offers Ireland one only of the three, and reserves the other two for a Parliament in which Ireland is not represented. But self-government, which all Unionists would ensure, implies that Irish representatives shall retain full equitable voice in Imperial Counsel and Control, and especially in the adjustment of all Imperial Contributions. In regard to purely local affairs, the Imperial Parliament is nowadays only too willing to shift from its own shoulders the vexatious burden of local administration. Lord Thring and others have written learnedly on the distinctions between federal, confederate, and imperial forms of political union; but in one and all—whatever the liberties or prerogatives of localities—all localities must be equitably represented in the sovereign councils of the nation. This is the great feature that is lacking in Mr Gladstone's idea of Home Rule, and it is the leading feature in the Unionist idea of self-government.

Mr Gladstone's scheme is one for the despotic rule of Ireland by another country; and Mr Gladstone has gained the support of a majority of the representatives

of Ireland. But the reasons are not far to seek. Mr Gladstone, like many capable men, lives, moves, and has his being in office. Opposition to him is an atmosphere of suspended animation, and an atmosphere in which he breathes with difficulty. The general election in 1885 proved to Mr Gladstone that the Liberals were powerless against the Conservatives and the Parnellites combined. Accordingly he determined to engineer a split, and by attaching to himself the Parnellites, again to succeed to power. But in order to achieve this, he had, perforce, to steer between the perplexing Charybdis of Liberal secession and the obstructive Scylla of Parnellite refusal. He escaped Scylla, but became engulfed in Charybdis. Stanch Liberals sided with Conservatives to withstand this degradation of Ireland. Weak Liberals thought there must be something good behind this apparent degradation, or the Parnellites would not accept it. There was indeed something behind; but was it good?

The Parnellite idea is supported by three among other classes of persons, each class honest and determined in its own policy. One class has high-flown ideas as to Irish independence; the second seeks to discredit and damage the British Empire; and the third seeks, if we speak bluntly, an easy livelihood. Each class leads honest dupes in its train; and the three may be known by the titles—Separatists, Fenians, and, for want of a better word, Dollarites. Separatists regard Home Rule as a stepping-stone to independence; Fenians and Dollarites unite in rejoicing at the political degradation for Ireland involved in Mr Gladstone's scheme, for the common reason that there is thus created a new and great grievance for Ireland. The Dollarites are shrewdly clear on the point that the

political agitation, which alone brings them dollars, can only thrive on some tangible grievance. The old grievance of religious tyranny has been disestablished, and there is serious prospect that the wicked landlord will soon cease to trouble. "Rackrenting" and "evictions" have for long been the "open sesame" to the hoarded earnings of the farmers in Ireland and of the servant-girls in America. Mr Gladstone speedily devised a system of dual ownership of the soil in Ireland, whereby that growth of freedom, "private property," which permits a man to own land and even to allow others to use it, was to be declared null and void. Mr Gladstone persuaded Parliament to enact that in Ireland those who were allowed by the owners to use other people's property were to become part owners of that property. This created turmoil and trouble, specially gratifying to the grievance-mongers. But now Parliament seeks, so far as may be possible, to make amends for its misdeeds and put an end to this dual ownership; and it needs no prophet to show that in so far as this task succeeds, in so far an end is put to "rackrenting" and "evictions."

But the Dollarite must live, and he can only live by sowing some fresh crop of grievances.

The Dollarites and Fenians at once saw that Mr Gladstone's specific, even in its treatment of customs taxation alone, offered to Ireland all the right of rebellion and separation, once asserted with success by the United States. It was equally evident that in its treatment of police and defence questions, the scheme would absolve Ireland from all responsibility in repelling foreign invasion; and, in its denial to Ireland of any voice in the control of imperial affairs, it would justify Ireland in sullenly standing aloof in grave national

difficulties, and holding that, with no constitutional part in treaties or declarations of war, she had a right to remain neutral, even if not to become the active friend of an enemy. In addition, at every turn of the tide of material prosperity Ireland would with force throw all blame on her exacting mistress. In brief, Ireland would have a stock of material and well-founded grievances sufficient to win the sympathy of all civilised nations, and to fill the pockets of the Dollarites for centuries to come.

How soon such a system would bring Ireland to industrial and commercial ruin, or lead to political separation, it is not my present purpose to determine. But, taking it at its best, it is obvious that Gladstonian Home Rule, being the very antithesis and negation of self-government, would be the greatest curse with which Ireland could be saddled.

There is another point too often overlooked. Mr Gladstone, frequently defeated as to details of his Home Rule scheme, at once seeks to cover his retreat in the confusing assertion that all he requires is that "the Irish should manage Irish affairs in Ireland." This is a well-rounded period; but if we analyse its terms we shall find ourselves at a loss as to its meaning. Before such a problem can be brought into the arena of practical politics it is necessary to define what Irish affairs can be managed by the Irish in Ireland. As a matter of fact, the most important Irish affairs are inextricably mixed up with English affairs, and can be best managed by common action between English and Irish in some one common Parliament and Government. In foreign policy, defence, taxation, maintenance of law and order, loans, credit, and other leading political matters, it is obvious that Irish affairs

cannot be successfully separated from English. These are matters in their very essence common to the two islands, and they must accordingly be dealt with by some common authority.

And as in political, so in commercial affairs—in trade, investments, land legislation, railway control, harbours, fisheries, and so forth—there is a close network of mutual action and advantage which ties England to Ireland and Ireland to England, and which can only be cut away to the abundant injury of both. It is a network which has become more than ever possible and essential, in consequence of the more intimate and closer intercourse that follows as steam and electricity disestablish distance and time. There remains, indeed, a residuum of purely Irish and a residuum of purely English affairs, which can best be controlled and managed by Irish and English in Ireland and England respectively. But this is a phase of the local government question which is to be dealt with next session, and which does not involve either the degradation or the separation of Ireland, but merely the reform of existing administrative machinery.

It is useful to remember what manner of self-government Ireland at the present enjoys. To state the case briefly: Ireland has, in the first place, even more than her fair share of representation in the sovereign Parliament of the nation. In the second place, the Irish in Ireland to a large degree manage local Irish affairs in Ireland. The cities and towns and harbours, and the county poor-law affairs, are managed by elected bodies; while, in other matters of county government, the nominated county cess system is the successful counterpart in Ireland of the quarter-sessions system in England.

In Ireland there is, indeed, more centralisation in

regard to control of local administration than there is in England; and the control of the police and responsibility for the maintenance of law and order rests essentially with the central authorities. Thus the problem fines itself down into possible improvements of Castle control and police management.

We will not here discuss either reform; but they will, no doubt, receive adequate and full consideration in that general Local Government Bill for the whole United Kingdom, which is to be a main work for Parliament. It is probable that much may be done by throwing on localities a more direct and full responsibility for the local maintenance of law and order. But it may not be forgotten that much of the Castle control of local administration arises out of the fact that Government financial assistance, by way of loans and advances on the imperial credit, is far more general in Ireland than it is in England. For instance, to the five million inhabitants of Ireland fifty-two millions sterling have been advanced in local loans, whereas to the thirty million inhabitants of Great Britain there have only been advanced fifty-five millions. It is also to be borne in mind that whereas eleven millions of these loans have been remitted to the five million Irish, only one and a half million have been remitted to the thirty million inhabitants of Great Britain; so that the Irish owe a debt of gratitude of, at the least, some eight or nine millions sterling to the taxpayers of the United Kingdom.

Ireland always has been, is now, and, we fear, will continue to be, the battening-ground of agitators, who can only batten on grievances. But the agitators commit a great error in forcibly withstanding the law, though probably their error is less suicidal than that of

Mr Gladstone in indorsing such conduct. The British people retain an ineradicable pride in their system of representative government, that is now so many centuries old; and the backbone of this system is the hitherto unchallenged rule, that all laws made in Parliament by the representatives of the people must be obeyed. It is strange to have to restate so elementary a truism. But it is one quietly ignored by Mr Gladstone in his latest phase of faith, and yet it is one that lies at the very root and foundation of parliamentary representative government, and it is one which the British nation will never abandon. The Blunts and O'Briens and Grahams may determine that the great majority is wrong, and that the law, being obnoxious to their superior intelligence, must and may be broken. But the majority, thinking otherwise, deal with them as with all law-breakers, and the will of the great majority of the people is a power not to be lightly interfered with.

Thoughtless people have asked how it is that Mr Gladstone, an ex-Prime Minister of England, continues to agitate and declaim just as though the elected representatives of the people had not decisively declared against his Home Rule scheme,—a decision emphatically indorsed by the electorate at a consequent general election. The real reply is that Mr Gladstone had, just before, emphatically laid down the law on the subject: "We have no right to question for a moment in this free country, under a representative system, that the vast majority of the representatives speak the mind of a decided majority of the people." The time had therefore arrived, in due course of his guiding "policy of reversals," for Mr Gladstone to act in diametrical opposition to the principle he had him-

self enunciated. Vast majorities in Parliament, speaking the mind of a decided majority of the people, cannot for one moment be allowed to block the way to the hasty ideas of one man. The cherished sanctity of the union of Church and State, or the authority of political economy, are conveniently forgotten or banished to remote spheres if they obstruct the views of one man; and under the same provocation a similar fate awaits that corner-stone of the Constitution—representative government. Traditions, experience, polity,—all must yield to the political whims and exigencies of one individual citizen, if only the nation would allow. Happily for the nation, although it can forgive and forget a great deal, it cannot forgive and forget all; and the time arrives, and indeed is now come, when the nation is alive to the dangers that threaten, and will boldly decline to abandon its Constitution or again to intrust its destinies to one who would, without compunction, substitute for representative government one-man rule. At bottom, the British nation is true to itself and to its brightest traditions; and the poet of the British nation, in portraying the best British type, paints the true character of the nation:—

> "Self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control;
> These three alone lead life to sovereign power:
> Yet not for power (power of herself
> Would come uncalled for), but to live by law,
> Acting the law we live by, without fear."

Thus we see clearly that the Unionist cause, regarded, and rightly regarded, as the full contrary of Gladstonian Home Rule, means complete as opposed to emasculated self-government. As such, the Unionist

cause will commend itself without fail to the robust citizenship of the British nation. It is true that to the weak-kneed,—to those who lack moral fibre—to those who seek in politics some high priest on whom they may lean with as much emotional fervour and as little intellectual conviction as a Southern *señora* on her father-confessor, or an American Indian on his gyrating medicine-man,—to these the emasculated form of self-government, perfected by Mr Gladstone's self-deceiving ingenuity, may well commend itself. But, unless it has reached its dotage, the British public, as a whole, is morally too robust and politically too vigorous to bend the knee to any such degrading idolatry; and in the long-run it will burst all bonds of misrepresentation and hero-worship, and declining to abandon those political traditions and principles that have enabled it to attain its present condition of well-ordered freedom and widespread prosperity, the nation will assert with increasing force the rights and powers of its representative institutions, and its unalterable determination to repel with consistent and triumphant vigour all proposals that assail or endanger the integrity and unity of its great empire.

GEORGE BADEN-POWELL.

SOME INCONSISTENCIES OF GLADSTONIAN HOME RULE.[1]

BY THE

DUKE OF ARGYLL.

THE whole Anglo-Parnellite alliance has been cautious, because disunited, on the subject of the inclusion or exclusion of the Irish members in the Imperial Parliament. They have pretended to treat this question as one of detail. Yet nothing can be more clear than that almost everything turns and depends upon it. If the Irish members are to be kept as and where they are, then their so-called separate Parliament can be nothing but some provincial body possessing little more than the powers of a great town council or a great county board. This is absolutely inconsistent with the whole tone and language of the demand made by the Parnellite party, and seconded with fervour by their new Anglican ally. If, on the other hand, the

[1] An extract from 'The New British Constitution and its Master Builders.' By the Duke of Argyll. David Douglas: Edinburgh. 1888.

Irish members, being kept as they are in numbers, are to be restrained and limited as regards the subjects on which they are to be allowed to vote, then the whole scheme must be reconstructed from top to bottom, and a task must be undertaken which Mr Gladstone had declared to be beyond the wit of man. If, again, as a third alternative, Ireland is to be represented at Westminster by a limited number of representatives, sent as a delegation from its own separate Parliament, or from its separate constituencies—then we are landed in a federal constitution which is absolutely different in its nature from the proposal actually made, and as widely different from the ancient constitution of the United Kingdoms.

Is it possible to retain any respect for the political judgment and knowledge of a group of men who play fast and loose with us upon such a subject as this—and who, manifestly, are not agreed among themselves on the fundamental principles on which the new British constitution is to be framed? One prominent member of the party (the Earl of Rosebery) has lately spoken with ridicule and contempt of the very notion that the Irish members can be retained in the Imperial Parliament after they have been established in a separate Parliament of their own, and asks whether they are to be summoned like waiters by the ringing of a bell when some question arises on which they are allowed to vote. Another member of the party, again, treats this kind of difficulty as a mere invention of the enemy, and intimates that the problem which passes the wit of Mr Gladstone is quite easily to be solved by the genius of Mr Childers.

Such exhibitions as these cut deeply into any trace of confidence which might have been left in the know-

ledge and capacity of those who assume to guide us through a tremendous experiment. But there are other facts affecting quite as deeply our trust in them touching matters which, to us, are matters of honour and of conscience. For many years we have been consentient with them in recognising as a fact that the Irish party did not seem to be bound by the accepted doctrines of civilised societies in respect to property and personal freedom in the transactions of ordinary life. This was the only meaning and the only defence of such speeches as those delivered by our then leader in 1882. It was the only meaning and the only justification of the Bills he then brought in for the repression of crime and the protection of liberty; of the repeated testimony he bore to the urgent necessity which demanded them; and of the strong action which, during three years, he took in the exercise of their powers. It was in continuous support and illustration of this fact, and of the terrible evidence which proved its truth, that Sir George Trevelyan and his successor in the Irish office were engaged night after night in the House of Commons, down to the very close of Mr Gladstone's Government in 1885, in exposing the tyrannies and crimes of the Irish Land League, and in exposing also the close connection between the political action of Irish members and the more conspicuous outbursts of crime.

It was our absolute duty to remember these, among other facts, when the same Ministers come to present us with a new constitution, breaking up the Imperial Parliament, and setting up a separate Parliament and Executive for Ireland. It is always open to all men to change their opinions. But it is not open to any man to suppress facts when he undertakes a public

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of property in Ireland to a government animated by the morality of the Land League. But this was exactly what it did not suit the rest of the Minister's plan that he should acknowledge too distinctly.

To this, and to another circumstance, we doubtless owe the extraordinary speech which ushered in the proposal. There was an interval of eight days between the introduction of the new Irish Government Bill and that of the Irish Land Purchase Bill. This interval had been long enough to show that Irish landowners generally were not disposed to be "bought out"—to desert their country, or to live in their old houses reduced to villas, and connected with nothing but some covers, some pleasure-grounds, and a garden. They could not be brought to believe so suddenly that this was really the only alternative left to their choice. The homes they loved and had lived in for generations, the property they had inherited, and all the associations connected with them, they clung to still. Every consideration of justice and generosity demanded that this feeling should be recognised and respected. It was at least natural, if indeed not actually meritorious. The obvious policy of any Minister, too, if he had a single eye to the success of his proposal, was to argue in the same spirit—to point out how much had been done to deprive ownership of land in Ireland of all that could operate hardly on the tenant-class, and that a high and honourable obligation lay on Parliament to protect owners in the enjoyment of what remained. Instead of this, the speech of the Minister was little more than one long raking up of all old sores against Irish landowners, just as if every alleged grievance were still as operative as ever—just as if he himself had never introduced and carried any Land Bill, com-

pletely removing them, whatever else it did. Formally indeed, and in words, the proposal was founded on "serious convictions both of honour and of duty;" but no argument was used to make clear wherein that obligation consisted, or whence it flowed, except, indeed, the offensive argument that the Imperial Legislature was *particeps criminis* in all the alleged evils of Irish landed property, and that Irish landowners were to be regarded as "our garrison" in a foreign country. Yet some better argument than this was imperatively demanded to overcome the natural and inevitable objections which rose up from many sides against a proposal so large in itself and so revolutionary in the confessions it involved. If the speech had been specially directed to rouse a spirit hostile to the measure instead of favourable to it, no argument more ingenious could have been devised. And in addition to this tendency of the speech as regards its whole texture and direction, Irish members connected with property could not help feeling that the speech was delivered in a tone of great bitterness against those who refused to sacrifice their country and their homes.

Then there was another feature in the handling of this matter, against which we protest firmly, as involving assumptions of power and of right on the part of political leaders, in which it would be absolutely inconsistent with our honour to have any share. I refer to the passage in an address to the electors of Mid-Lothian, issued May 1, 1886, in which the owners of property in Ireland were warned that "the sands were running in the hour-glass." Prophecy may be legitimate to political leaders, but not prophecy of the kind which involves a threat. A mountaineer may warn a traveller in the valley beneath him that rocks or

avalanches are on the move. But if that mountaineer is a man who stands with cartridges and levers in his hands to loosen the stones and bring down the snow, then his prophecy becomes a threat. This is and must be the position of a political leader who tells the owners of property that unless they do something that he bids them they will be ruined and despoiled.

Some of us were consentient with Mr Gladstone in proposing, and we are all now in the position of having acquiesced with him in carrying, the most fundamental changes in landed property in Ireland. He did, indeed, just passingly, allude to these measures in his speech; but he alluded to them as a subject on which he would not dwell, as "it was beside his argument." That, indeed, was true. It was beside his particular argument. But it was not beside the question to which that argument applied. It was strictly relevant to that question, and it condemned the relevancy of the argument he did employ, and the justice of the reproaches he levelled at the victims of his new policy.

Nothing could induce us to be parties to the use of language implying such threats under the guise of prophecies. We do not assume the right to accuse others of any anxious violation of justice or duty. But we are firm in declaring that for ourselves, and in our own consciences, we never could be parties to the use of such language, or to the policy which it implies. We deem it contrary to our duty to propose or to vote for any constitution which exposes private persons to plunder, and the loss of all individual freedom, with no other escape than the acceptance of evils and of commutation in money. All the dexterities of language by which the nakedness of such a proposal

was disguised, are devices with which we could not be associated even in the smallest measure.

But if we protest against the manner in which this proposal was made, we protest, if possible, even more strongly against the manner in which it was withdrawn. If it was a proposal, once, or ever, made "under serious convictions both of honour and of 'duty,'" it must remain an obligation in spite of any amount of reluctance or opposition on the part, either of those to whom the offer was made, or on the part of Parliament. There is always one single and obvious alternative open to a leader and a party who makes a proposal of this acknowledged character, and find themselves unable to carry it. They may relinquish a scheme which is thus deprived of a condition essential to its justice and its honourable character; or they may themselves cease to strive for office, or for the retention of office, when it can no longer be held except on the terms of abandoning such an obligation. But neither of these courses was the one actually taken. In making the proposal, words were used which seemed to proclaim that it was an inseparable part of the whole scheme. But this meaning was hedged by other words which reserved an outlet of retreat. The inseparability was cautiously declared to be "in our own minds, and for the existing juncture." Such, at least, is the account given of it since. But this is no inseparability at all. Such words conveyed no pledge whatever; and accordingly, the moment it became clear that Irishmen, such as the Fitzgeralds, and the Butlers, and the Hamiltons, and a thousand others, were loyal to the Union, and were not prepared to abandon their ancient position in their native country, the proposal of purchase was

ostentatiously withdrawn, as if with the exultation of men to whom an opportunity has been happily opened of shaking themselves free from an acknowledged but inconvenient obligation. It is now declared to have been "swept ruthlessly off the field of present action." "The twinship" of the two Bills is denounced as "having been for the time disastrous to the hopes of Ireland," which means disastrous to the hopes of the Parnellite alliance. Therefore, it is added emphatically, that this twinship "exists no longer."

But a new bargain is advertised. The twinship of the two Bills being dissolved, the author of them is free to make another twinship, more close and intimate —the twinship, namely, between his own party and the party of Mr Parnell. Let Home Rule be granted without any such clog on its operations. Let the owners of property who have opposed the Purchase Bill look out in future for themselves. It will, Mr Gladstone confesses, need all their vigilance for the purpose of preventing the adoption of schemes of land purchase founded on principles very different from, and indeed opposite to, those of the Bill lately consigned to the limbo of abortions.

What can this mean? Who are the men from whom this danger is to come? Is it from the proposed separate Parliament in Ireland? Then are we to understand it to be now confessed that property in Ireland is to be left to the doctrine of spoliation? And how is this warning threat to be reconciled with the declaration that the safeguards for minorities which had been proposed were not provided in consequence of any mistrust entertained by Mr Gladstone, but only "in consequence of mistrust entertained by others"?

What are we to believe? Is there, or is there not, just cause for apprehension to the owners of property if they be left to be dealt with by a separate Irish Parliament? Is it true, or is it not true, that danger to them would be so real that our honour and our obligation demanded the most onerous, the most unusual precautions? Or is it true, on the contrary, that all such precautions were merely "contributions to disarm honest, though unfounded, jealousies"? Or, lastly, is it true that one at least of these unfortunate minorities is only too probably to be exposed to the obscurely worded but darkly foreboded dangers shadowed forth in this angry passage?

We dare not follow any leader who leads us thus. We dare not dissever the duty of devising special measures for protecting individual freedom and property, and all the privileges of British subjects, when we are devising other measures which, as we know and confess, will expose them to special dangers. We have a right to know what is meant by all this language of menace against men whom, along with all other men, it is the absolute duty of responsible statesmen to protect in all their just and legal interests; and we ask whether it has indeed become part of the creed of the reorganised Liberal party that, when any class of men exercises its right to judge and act freely on great constitutional proposals, they are to be thus threatened, and, if possible, bullied into acquiescence.

Then there is another feature of the conduct and language of the new Parnellite alliance on this subject, which is indeed less offensive, but is very little more worthy of respect. They do not openly deny, or pretend to deny, that an Irish Home Rule Parliament would so act, or would probably so act, as to endanger

property and attack the fundamental principles on which it rests. Yet they do not like—it does not suit their game—to say so openly. They fall back upon the device of representing the whole land question as one too heavy to be thrown on the shoulders of the new Irish Parliament. In pure charity and kindness we ought to take it off their hands before we start them on their way. This is one of the methods of expression adopted in Mr Gladstone's first speeches on the subject, and it is one by which Lord Spencer has been frequently of late escaping from inconvenient avowals. But here, again, we cannot ourselves consent to employ these evasions. If the new Irish Parliament cannot be trusted to deal with this subject, it must be because they are not expected to be bound by the ordinary laws of civilised society. And if this be true of this particular subject, what confidence can we have that it may not be equally true of their probable attitude on many other subjects? Moreover, as agrarian questions are the main questions affecting Irish society in all its phases, what guarantee can be given—what reasonable hope can be held out to us—that the new Irish nationality, with its new Parliament and its new Executive, will acquiesce—except for some purpose of their own, and for the moment—in its exclusion from powers of "Home Rule" over that very branch of legislation which interests and excites them most?

Not only, therefore, the proposal of the Land Purchase Bill, but all the circumstances attending it, and especially the language attending its withdrawal, prove to demonstration that our former leaders who undertook to draw up a new British constitution in sixty-six days, have not only completely broken down in the attempt, but that they have exhibited a character in

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not maintained? The pretext that this arose from the "foreign character" of the law, was a pretext which suggested changes in that law to suit ideas which, by contrast, might be native. And what were these? The ideas of the Land League? Let the ghastly spectacle reply of that old man in the wilds of Kerry, who was lately nursing a small farm for his daughter's husband, and who for this crime has been murdered in the most cruel and brutal manner,—his limb shattered by repeated shots, left in agony where neither doctor could reach him to relieve his body, nor priest have access to soothe his soul, until death put an end to his misery with his life. Such deeds as these are deeds that have a significance far beyond what is called "ordinary crime." Irishmen are accustomed to boast sometimes that in Ireland "ordinary crime" is small. But the crime which is common is precisely that which affects the character of large portions of the people, because of its indicating either a wide prevalence of popular sympathy, or else a wide submission to tyranny and terror. But both of these are precisely the conditions which sound the most warning of all notes against the safety of intrusting to the rulers in such a community the lives, liberty, and property of their fellow-subjects.

And this brings me to one feature in Mr Gladstone's course which may well inspire us with special distrust. We have seen that when he proposed his own Prevention of Crimes Bill, he emphatically declared that it was less the murders and outrages perpetrated on the wealthier classes, than the sufferings of the humble and the poor under the tyranny of the Land League, which had induced him and his colleagues to apply for special legislation. This description of the facts



independent as any such vote can be said to be. The impulses under which the masses can be got to vote away the liberties of others, and their own, are impulses as numerous as they are unsafe. But in this particular case of Ireland there are a multitude of very special circumstances which detract from the value and significance of the popular vote. In the first place, a very large part of the voters are extremely ignorant, and had only just been admitted to the franchise. The exercise of such a power for the first time by a people wholly unaccustomed to, and unfitted for, deliberate thought upon the deepest questions affecting society, must be an exercise peculiarly liable to error. In no country in the world, perhaps, certainly in none of the old countries of Europe, would it be reasonably safe to be guided by such a vote in such matters. But in Ireland, we know as a fact that this class is now widely under terror—dominated by secret societies which visit all who are honest and independent with violence, outrage, and persecution. We know that a very large percentage were so ignorant that they even belong to the class formally declaring themselves to be "illiterate," and unable to sign their names. We know that the votes of all these men were under the direct control of agents of the Land League, who attended at the polls to keep them in obedience.

Under such conditions, even if the vote had been much larger and much more unanimous than it was, it would be absurd in any rational statesman to quote it or describe it as a deliberate decision of the people of Ireland, on the strength of which we are to unsay all that we have been saying, touching questions of duty and morality, or to enter into a conspiracy of silence on facts which we had all been quoting as equally in-

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indeed on such a total. The remaining number is made up of more than 145,000 votes given for the Unionist candidates, and the enormous number of 145,361 votes not given at all—owing to the intimidation exercised on the voters. The total majority over the Unionists, and over those who did not dare to vote, has been stated on good authority at the quite trifling amount of 4823. Nothing but the most reckless passion and fanaticism could represent such a vote as this—given under such conditions, and amongst such a population—as one which we must instantly accept as expressing the deliberate decision of the whole Irish people, and as compelling us to break up our Parliament and to rebuild our constitution.

This wilful and passionate determination not to look, even for a moment, behind the polls in the Irish elections, when it is notorious that undue influences were powerfully exerted there, stands out in marked contrast with the equally passionate determination to analyse in the most hostile spirit the electoral returns from Great Britain, which were at least immeasurably more honest and more independent. And this is all the more significant for us when we note the purpose or intention with which these contrasted modes of dealing stand in very clear connection. The return of some forty-five Parnellite members more than had been returned before is the ostensible ground, and the only one, upon which our invertebrate leaders defend their great change in the recognition both of duties and of facts. We do not deny that the existence of such a large party in the House of Commons, which is bent on breaking up our Imperial Parliament, is a serious and dangerous evil. But we do deny that it throws any new light whatever on the ultimate aims of that party,

or on the methods which it employs. On the contrary, all the circumstances connected with its operations confirm our former estimates of that character and of those methods. Superior force or insuperable difficulties may compel us to change a policy, but it cannot justify us in following men who, without one particle of evidence, retract all that they and we have been saying for years on matters of fact and on principles of moral obligation. It is quite intolerable alike to our perceptions of truth and to our sense of duty, that on the mere fact of some forty-five men being returned by a very ignorant population, under the most violent pressure and the most immoral guidance, we should not only cease to fight, as we have long done, against the breaking up of Parliament, but that we should pretend to absolute conversion, and become the close associates and intimate allies of those whom we have so justly and so constantly denounced.

ARGYLL.

PLAIN PRINCIPLES OF LIBERAL UNIONISTS.[1]

BY THE

EARL OF DERBY.

WHETHER we look at it from the point of view of numbers, of the variety of classes and sections which it represents, or of the determination and unanimity which has prevailed and now prevails among the members of the Liberal Unionist party, it is itself an answer to the often-repeated fiction that the defenders of the Union are growing fewer in numbers and feebler in conviction. Exactly the contrary, in my view, in this case. In the constituencies, especially in Scotland, there is an undoubted gain. There has been no appreciable loss of parliamentary power, and that is something, for the well recognised tendency of parliamentary majorities, on whichever side they may be, is to diminish as time goes on until a new election brings a fresh shuffle of the cards. The constituencies were

[1] Extracts from a speech delivered in London at the Liberal Unionist Conference, December 1887.

appealed to last year, they gave a decisive answer, and there is absolutely nothing to show that when they are appealed to again, their answer will not be in the same sense.

There is only one real danger ahead as far as I can see. It is that the public may become so utterly wearied and disgusted with the subject that they will say, "Settle the Irish question anyhow—only settle it somehow, that we may hear of it no more, and have leisure to mind our own affairs." Well, I think that is not a purely imaginary risk. And I see only one way of meeting it. That is, to make people clearly understand that the simple concession of an Irish Parliament would be no settlement at all, but only the beginning of a fresh agitation quite as troublesome as that which we now have to deal with. Is there to be an Irish Parliament subject to the control of the Imperial authorities? Why, that is exactly the state of things which even in the last century Irishmen rebelled against as intolerable. Is it to deal with legislation only—that is one proposal—and not have the Executive responsible to it? Why, that is exactly the system which formerly prevailed in all our leading colonies, and which was the subject of constant complaint till it got itself abolished. If you want to satisfy the feeling of Irish nationality, you must at least put Ireland on the footing of Canada or Australia. Those are the lowest terms. You cannot buy Irish content at a cheaper price. But that is going far beyond Mr Gladstone's proposals of 1886, and unless you mean to go that length, which, as far as I can see, nobody does, what do you gain by a change? I do not believe that the existing discontent will be perpetual. People very soon cease to cry out for what they know to be out of

their reach. Look at the Southern States of the American Union. They are pacified; they do not mean to break out again. Were they pacified by getting all they wanted? No, but by finding out that they could not get it, and that they must go without it. Why should the Irish be harder to convince, if—and there is the question—only we in England are equally sure of our own minds?

I will not rehearse at length the commonplaces of this question. If majorities have any rights, it needs no argument to prove that thirty-three millions have a right to overrule three millions in a matter which concerns them all. If local feelings are to be considered, Ulster has as good a claim to protest against being governed from Dublin as Dublin has to protest against being governed from London. If we have been right in thinking, as we have thought for two hundred years, that parliamentary government was the best guarantee for freedom, it surely cannot be wise to weaken the House of Commons by practically taking from it the control of the Executive in Ireland.

And more, remember that what you do for Ireland you may be called upon to do, probably for Scotland, certainly for Wales. Are you prepared for that? Are you prepared to have four local Parliaments instead of the one we know, with perhaps a Federal Council over all? That seems to me the most extraordinary and the most suicidal idea that Liberals can possibly take up. I do not suppose there are many absolutists left among us. I mean by absolutists people who think that the Crown ought to be the dominant and supreme power in the Constitution; but that is exactly what our Home Rule friends are leading us to. Destroy the present House of Commons, turn it into a body dealing merely

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Look at it another way. Our friends say they are going to give the Irish a Parliament which is to be strictly subordinate to that which sits at Westminster. Do they mean that or not? If they do mean it, can they—can any one who reads Irish papers and listens to Irish speeches—suppose that a big vestry of that kind will be accepted by the Irish people as a settlement of their claim? And if they do not mean it—if they perfectly well know that the restrictions, the limitations of power, the appeal to the House of Commons, would all vanish into air when their reality came to be tested—is it quite fair to ask us to accept a scheme which will not and cannot work; to offer it as a settlement when they must be well assured in their own minds that it is no settlement at all—that it is only a device to induce England to make concessions which, once made, cannot be withdrawn, and which necessarily involve larger concessions in the immediate future? I do not know what others may think, but I at least will speak plainly. I believe that if you allow any set of men calling themselves, or being called, a Parliament, to meet in Dublin, no matter how restricted you may intend their functions to be, that body will be accepted as the only body capable of making laws that shall be binding on Ireland, and then all control from this side of the water is gone. Now, we do not mean that that shall happen if we can help it; at any rate, we can make sure that it shall not happen without the English people understanding thoroughly what is proposed. The decision rests with them; but they might justly reproach us if they came to a decision without full knowledge of what they were doing, and under the

influence of misrepresentations, whether intentional or not.

Now, let me say one word on a part of the question with which English Home Rulers are very fond of dealing. They tell us, "You have no right to govern a people except by its own consent: you are governing Ireland by coercion, and not by consent." Well, I suppose we should all agree that it is very desirable that government should carry with it the good-will of the largest number possible of the governed. But when our friends lay it down as a general and indisputable law that every people, or fraction of a people, shall have the form of government it prefers, I think they are proving too much for their own purpose. Look at it in this way. They disclaim, very vehemently, the name of Separatists. They are indignant at the idea that they favour separation. But suppose the majority of the Irish people desire separation? It is not at all clear to me that they do not. At all events, I should be very sorry to test it by a *plébiscite*. Would our friends defer in that case to the wish of the majority, or would they not? If they would, what becomes of their assurances to us? If they would not—they say so, and we are bound to take their word for it—what becomes of their principle? They are not fighting, by their own admission, for whatever the Irish people may think best, but for what they think best for the Irish people. Well, so are we. The principle of action is the same in both cases; the difference is in the application. They would not yield to an Irish demand for a separate army, a separate navy, a separate diplomacy. We think a separate Legislature just as dangerous, and that in the end it will lead to all of these.

Then we come to the old plea, "Irish opinion is all

but unanimous against you." Well, I admit that the state of Irish opinion is the strong point of the Home Rulers. They have not many strong points, and we can afford to give them one. But there are two considerations which we ought to bear in mind. One is this—even in these democratic days you cannot assume an absolute equality of importance among all voters. We admit that Irish Home Rulers have on their side a numerical majority; but it is far less than it appears from the parliamentary representation, because our system ignores the local minority in each constituency. I believe the real numerical proportion to be under, certainly not to be above, two to one. But I cannot ignore the fact that among the minority are to be found nearly all the elements, except simple numbers, that make the greatness of a country. Lord Hartington, with his recent Dublin experiences, can tell you more about that than I can; but, after all, when you have three-fourths of the capital, of the intelligence, of the culture, of the industrial enterprise of a country on your side, that is at least something to set off against a hostile majority in the least instructed and most prejudiced class.

But there is another way to look at it. Why are we to assume that what is now the case must always be the case? Why are we to give up even the Irish peasantry as irreconcilable? Why, the changes of the last twenty years amount to a social revolution. No man, whatever he thinks of their merits, can treat them as slight or unimportant. The ascendancy of the Church was complained of, and it has been swept away; the land system was complained of, and it has been dealt with in a spirit more favourable to the tenant than would have been shown by any Legislature in Europe,—and are we to

suppose that these changes will produce no effect on popular feeling? You may ask, "Why have they produced none as yet?" I answer, partly because they are lost sight of in the prospect of much larger changes; partly because, as we all know, it takes time for a population to realise a large alteration in their condition. The sea continues to run high long after the wind which raised it has gone down, but we know that if no fresh storm springs up it will calm in time; and, for my part, I refuse to believe that when every tangible grievance has been removed, the dream of a separate nationality which has no historical existence will continue to influence Irish minds. We do not in England allow enough for the worship of force and success—the desire to be on the winning side, which exists, I suppose, wherever human beings are found, but which is stronger in Ireland than in most parts of the world. English support has made many Irishmen believe that Home Rule is winning, and they have rushed over to what seemed the strongest party. Let them see that they were mistaken in their belief, and they will fall back, the great majority of them (I do not say all; I admit that there are among them many sincere fanatics), as quickly as they came on.

There is one other point which I cannot pass over. We hear a great deal of the wickedness of coercion, by which, of course, is meant the exceptional legislation of last session. Well, I do not care to argue a merely personal question, and it is hardly worth while to point out—because it has been done so often—that the coercive measures of 1882 were a good deal more stringent than those of 1887. That is only by the way. But when I hear coercion denounced, I am reminded of the man who, when the question of capital punishment was

discussed, said, "I am all for doing away with the death penalty; but let the murderers set the example." I suppose we all dislike needless coercion, though coercion in some form is only another name for civilisation; but is there no other coercion than that of the law? What about the coercion of the League? I believe that to the bulk of the quiet and peaceable inhabitants of Ireland what is called coercive legislation has brought, and is bringing, not restraint, but freedom—freedom from the daily and nightly fear of violence; freedom to sell to whom they please, and associate with whom they please; freedom to dismiss a workman or a servant, or to enforce the payment of a just debt, without danger of secret and savage revenge. Of this I am sure—no Government can allow a system of anarchy to go on, and the Government of a popular and democratic State less than any other. We are accustomed to quote the United States as the typical democracy of the world; but if in New York or New England disturbances like those of Ireland had been attempted, depend upon it they would have been put down far more roughly and summarily than they have been here.

I do not wish to weary you, and I will not add more than one word on that difficult and important question of land purchase. We have not as yet formulated any policy in regard to it, and I hope we shall not be in a hurry. The difficulties are immense. You cannot pledge English credit, because Parliament will not let you. You will not easily find an Irish security on which so large an amount of money will be advanced. And even if you succeed, it is a questionable experiment to have the State for sole landlord or sole creditor, whichever you call it, and the whole body of the tenantry for debtors. Personally, I lean rather to the

opinion lately expressed by Mr Bright, and I should like to see, before trying such a gigantic operation as buying out all the landlords, whether less costly and ambitious measures may not answer as well. My belief is, that the facilities given by Lord Ashbourne's Act are likely to be taken advantage of much more than they have been, if once you can drive out of the mind of the tenant the idea which is now fixed there—that he can get the land without paying for it. Of course, till that delusion is dispelled no Act will be of any use. They will not pay for that which they expect to get for nothing. When they realise the fact that we do not mean to commit robbery, or to allow it, they will come forward as buyers, and then it will be time enough, in my mind, to see what larger facilities they require. There are parts of Ireland which may require special treatment —what are called the congested districts. Well, treat them specially; give your medicine to the sick, but do not force those who are not sick to take it too.

It is often said by Home Rulers that we are not entitled to the name of Liberals, because we hold the opinions which the whole party held up to 1885. Well, it seems eccentric, to say the least, to deny the name of Liberals to Mr Bright and to Mr Chamberlain, not to mention our friend Lord Hartington. But I do not believe our Home Rule friends, whatever they may say, will try to read us out of the party. They would lose too much. They would be cutting off their noses to spite their faces. We remain what we have been from the first—an independent section, prepared to defend the Union, but abandoning no principle which we have professed. We are for free trade, for peace, for economy. We support the present Government as against Home Rule, but we support them as allies, not as colleagues.

I end as I began. Our destiny is in our own hands. Once let the English public really master this question, and we are safe. It is not an accident that, in a matter which does not specially concern any class, the overwhelming majority of educated Englishmen are on our side. The masses will be so too when they know the truth. It will be a sharp struggle, but it will not be a long one. We have a leader whom we trust; we have zealous friends; we have a good cause: and if with these advantages we do not win, the fault will be our own.

DERBY.



WHAT HOME RULE [illegible]NS.

BY

LORD BRAMWELL.

BEWARE of phrases. They are dang[illegible] In [illegible] age of inspectors it might be well [illegible]o ple[illegible] should be allowed currency till [illegible]t undergone [illegible]spection, and been certified to b[illegible]r use. "H[illegible] Rule" is an instance. Home [illegible], why a k[illegible] hearted and generous disposition natur[illegible]ys at "Oh, certainly, we must have rule. [illegible]s trou[illegible] some. It prevents people do[illegible] they like, that is necessary, because otherw[illegible]ne people w[illegible] do wh[illegible]ther pe[illegible]disliked. But [illegible] have [illegible] rule [illegible] and d[illegible] home, and it [illegible] be [illegible] and [illegible]n a wa[illegible]st agreeable to [illegible] Well [illegible]Irish h[illegible]ot this home ru[illegible] the law an[illegible]ation a[illegible]made and don[illegible]reland, but [illegible]where. Therefore give them Home Rule." This very good-natured and plausible but it is nece[illegible]

have the facts. The first and most important to bear in mind is, that England no more rules Ireland than Ireland rules England. Neither England, Scotland, Ireland, nor Wales, nor any two or three of them, rules or rule the others or other, but all rule the whole—just as much as England, without Yorkshire, and the other three countries do not rule Yorkshire. The rule is by the whole of each of the four countries. Now of this there is no doubt. And not merely is it true as stated, but it is true that the voters in Ireland have a larger share in the constitution of the legislature of the four countries which make up the United Kingdom, and therefore in its rule, than the voters in the other three countries. The members returned by Ireland are out of proportion to its population, wealth, and every other matter with which they might be reasonably compared, and in excess of Ireland's share. But it will be said that if the size of Ireland and the number of its representatives is compared with those of Great Britain or England alone, that it is overwhelmed, that there are five times its number of representatives from the other parts of the United Kingdom, so that its voice cannot be heard. Rather a strange complaint after the last session! It is true, however, that if the other parts of the United Kingdom chose to unite against Ireland, they could have their way against its unanimous voice. But if that is a reason for a separate rule for Ireland, see what are the consequences; follow out the argument. It is equally an argument for Home Rule in Ulster. I am not supposing Ulster people want it; but I say if they did, the argument is as good for them. Ulster might be outvoted in an Irish Parliament by Leinster, Munster, and Connaught — therefore Home Rule for Ulster. But further, Donegal, on this reason-

ing, might claim Home Rule for Donegal. And I suppose there may be some district in Donegal that would want a Home Rule for itself separate from the rest of the county. Yorkshire might claim Home Rule from the rest of England. So also the Isle of Wight. I am by no means sure that that little island might not do very well apart, except that some foreign nation would snap it up. Rhode Island, in the United States, may, with one or two others, outvote New York; but New York does not want a separation. In brief, this is then an argument which forbids a nation—an argument which would isolate every village in a country and every home in every village. But it may be asked, Has the small country no remedy, if its laws are ill made by its associates which can outvote it? Must Ireland have bad laws made for it by those who do not know or even care for its wants? To this there are two answers. If the case is that the interests of part of a State are wilfully disregarded by the other parts, then it is idle for the first part to ask the others for an alteration. Of course they will refuse it. The same despotism which makes the bad laws will oppose the remedy. The only remedy, whether it is in Ireland, Yorkshire, or the Isle of Wight, is rebellion, which should only be undertaken when sure to be successful.

But there is another and a much better and more agreeable answer. We are dealing not with an academic but a practical question. The other parts of the United Kingdom do *not* join in a conspiracy to outvote Ireland. They never have, they never will; and for this most cogent reason, they have no motive for doing so. They have nothing to gain by it. It is not a high-minded reason, it is a selfish one—but not wrong, and

therefore may be relied on. The rest of the United Kingdom is interested in the prosperity of Ireland as much as in the prosperity of Yorkshire or Kent. Look at the number of members of the House of Commons at present supporting Irish notions. Look at the legislation since the Union. I defy any one to point out a measure passed in relation to Ireland that was meant for the benefit of the rest of the kingdom to the hurt of Ireland—one that was not meant for her good. If proof were needed, it would be found in this,—those who call out for Home Rule can point to no wrong that requires a remedy; no grievance, unless as to the land, —which I will deal with presently,—to be redressed! When a reason for Home Rule was wanted, all that could be suggested was, that the law for Ireland should have an Irish garb. What was meant no one knows — probably not the speaker. Probably the words represented no definite idea. I say no practical grievance is brought forward. But the law—well, I admit, I agree—I think if there was Home Rule the law would be changed. The landowners would be robbed of their property. I think that is the Home Rule question. That there are other reasons influencing some of those who wish for Home Rule I admit. There is that irrational hatred of the English—not a hatred of the present generation for what that has done, but a hatred for what past generations have done, or been charged with. There is also the desire for power, position, and the profit thereof in Parnell and his gang. But the main desire—the desire of the multitude—for Home Rule, is the plunder of the landlords,—that is, the transference of landed property from those who own to those who occupy it. This is the object of the great bulk of the Home Rulers. Little would they care for Home Rule,

or the garb of their laws, if they could get their land rent free. Probably they would be only the more anxious for a closer union with Great Britain as a market for their produce.

Let there be no mistake about this. The object of the Irish farmer is to get the land free of rent—to get it at prairie value, and to get it for himself—not for the people at large, but for the particular present occupier, and for no reason. I do not deny that there is distress in Ireland; but it is a distress Home Rule could not cure. I doubt not that the small tenants in the West, with holdings under three acres, are distressed—many of them at least—but so they would be if they had their holdings rent free. The remedy, the remedy that was operating till Mr Gladstone's wretched Land Laws, was the natural one. Five men were starving on five small holdings; four left, and the fifth got a living. Not so now. The operation of the new Land Laws and of the National League Laws is that all five continue to try to live there. No plunder of the landlord will remedy this. An Irish landlord said to me, speaking of some of these small holders, "I get no rent, I ask for no rent, though I am not sure I am right. If I got my rent, they would starve at Christmas; as it is, they starve a month later. To be sure, that is a month less of starvation."

But there are occupiers of larger farms who call for a reduction of rent. I do not say that these men have not suffered from the low prices of agricultural produce —many of them have. But I wholly disbelieve the great outcry that is made as to their cases. It cannot be true. It cannot be that the tenant's interest in farms would fetch that price they do, if the holding of them were as ruinous as is alleged; it cannot be. Men

do not give premiums to be ruined. Besides that, it is not true, as is shown in other ways. Deposits in banks and in savings-banks, commodities consumed, and other signs, all show an increase in wealth. But it is needless to go into these matters. Farms are at a premium, therefore worth having, therefore not ruinous. I ask, then, should Home Rule be created that the landlords may be plundered? There are some persons who would care but little if they were. This is a great mistake. I will not discuss the question now. I will refer to the speeches of the Duke of Argyll, and his work, 'Scotland as it was and as it is.' But I will ask any one of those who love the landlords but little, whether it would be endurable that when two men have saved a small competence for old age, the man who has bought railway stock should be protected and the other who has bought land should be plundered. For myself, I believe it would be most disastrous that the present set of landlords should be extirpated. For them would be substituted the present occupiers, an inferior race in every particular, and they would be the landlords—I say they would be the landlords. Infinite nonsense has been talked about landlordism. Rent exists in the nature of things, and cannot be got rid of. If a farm produces with the same capital and labour £10 a-year more than another farm, that £10 a-year is rent for the first farm in excess of any rent that may be right for the second. Give the farm to the occupier, he is his own landlord, and keeps the £10, not as a reward for his labour and capital, but as rent.

I say, then, that Home Rule should not be created to get rid of the present landlords. Does any one think it would be right for the Imperial Parliament to pass such a law? Would any one, does any one, advocate

it? Has even Mr Gladstone, with his "undeveloped conscience," persuaded himself it would be right? Far from it! When he brought forward his unhappy project of Home Rule he foresaw the danger, and guarded against it by his second Bill. Whether the Bills are dead or alive is doubtful. I think them dead enough to forget their details; but I believe that the United Kingdom at first was to find £150,000,000 (not in the Bill), then much less, with a power of increase, to be applied in preventing the plunder of the landlords. Well, but is Ireland to have no exclusive part in its own government? Is it to go to London to the Imperial Parliament for the regulations of the streets of each town, and the support of its poor, and similar matters? Certainly not. Ireland—its counties, towns, and parishes—should have the same Home Rule, the same local government, as to their affairs as exists in England and Scotland as to their counties, towns, and parishes, as far as it can be trusted. I put in this qualification, because it is certain that as to some matters of local government Ireland cannot be trusted. There can be no doubt that its elected poor-law guardians, and other elected boards, have deliberately violated their duties, and done what they knew was contrary to law. Nay, if asked, they probably avow and glory in it. The demoralisation of the country is such that the people have come to the conclusion that violation of the law is meritorious; that those who, obeying the law of the land, perform their contracts, but disobey the law of the League in their neighbourhood, may properly be put to death. They have somehow got over the sixth commandment, as well as other considerations to the contrary. Their parents do not correct them. The three men hung at Manchester for the murder the most

cruel murder, of a policeman, doing his duty in taking them to prison, are called martyrs by an archbishop. It is well to talk of trusting these men with power. They would misuse it. They would use it, not to suppress but to commit the crimes it should be used against. With this qualification, every man must be desirous to give Ireland the same self-rule, the same local government, that exists in other parts of the empire. But is this what would content them? Would they be satisfied with what satisfies England and Scotland? Certainly not. It is not easy to know what is asked for by them. It is a wonderful thing that the ringleader, Mr Gladstone, will not say. He says the question put to him is a trap. His proposal is that we should agree with him—that is, with his plan—without knowing what that plan is. Is not that a trap?—a trap to catch all silly enough to trust *him*, however they might differ from each other. Is there any one of his followers who knows what he would have to agree to? Is there any one who is satisfied that Mr Gladstone himself knows? Is it the scheme in his two Bills? Are they dead or alive? If that is the scheme, I say that the Irish can only accept it as a stepping-stone to something else. The first Bill, that relating to legislation and government, was of so offensive a character that no Irishman of ordinary spirit could have submitted, could have agreed, to its passing, except as a step to something else. It would have justified rebellion; it would have put Ireland in the condition of a conquered and subordinate country. But there are some simple-minded, credulous people who say, Agree to the general principle of Home Rule; vote for the bill on hearing its title; never mind about details—they must be settled afterwards; no harm is meant—nothing like

separation: see how moderate Mr Parnell is! how he accepted Mr Gladstone's moderate proposals! &c. Whether Mr Gladstone believes this, I cannot tell. If he says he does, we ought in charity to believe him, however silly his belief may be. No one can believe that Mr Parnell believes it. He knows well that if he did his best honestly to work any plan of Home Rule short of separation, he would fail—not only because it is not what he wants, but because it is not what his associates, his paymasters, want. Has he not said, though he has denied it, that he could not rest till the last link was broken that united the two countries? Is it not natural that he should wish to be King of Ireland, or President of an Irish Republic? Have not his associates said the same thing? protested their undying and unextinguishable hatred of this country and its people? I say, a measure of Home Rule is either separation or a step to it. Ay, and not merely a separation of the two countries in other respects, but also in the sovereignty. The Queen of this country is not to be Queen of Ireland. Can this be doubted? The Gladstone-Parnell men refuse the decent civility of receiving the Queen's name with respect. "God save Ireland" is substituted for "God save the Queen."

One of the last things said in America by a Nationalist is, "Allegiance lasts only till it can be thrown off." But it is needless to argue about it. Separation must follow Home Rule. The Irish will never be content to be inferiors to the rest of the empire. I cannot blame them for this. But if there are two Parliaments, with equal powers in their separate jurisdictions, separation must follow. The executive is responsible to Parliament, though nominated by the Crown. Parliament, therefore, is sovereign. Agreement between two sover-

eign Parliaments is as hopeless as between two sovereign men. In time, more or less short, there will be a difference, which is separation. Take the possibility of war between Germany, Austria, and Italy united, and France. English sympathies might be with the former, Irish probably would be with the latter. Where, then, is the union? Oh, but it is said that is not what Home Rulers, Mr Gladstone or Parnell, mean. I should be glad to be sure of that. But whether they mean it or not, others do, and would, as I have said, accept any measure of Home Rule only as a step to separation.

Unless, then, we are prepared for an entire separation of the two countries, we must refuse Home Rule, and every measure that would strengthen those who desire it. The question, then, is—Are we prepared for separation? I say no—a thousand times no. We must look at the present and future. The past is past and gone. Mr Gladstone says the Union was brought about by all sorts of shameful means. But it was brought about nearly a century ago. It cannot be undone, so as to place the two countries as they were before it. If it works injustice, show it; and if that cannot be cured, dissolve the Union. It is idle to talk of the means by which it was brought about. The thing that strikes me on reading Mr Gladstone's efforts to show that the legislative bodies and others in Ireland at the time of the Union were bribed and corrupted, as he would have it they were, is that it is a good thing they were got rid of anyhow.

Shall we consent to separation? I say no. In self-defence, in self-preservation, no! Whether right or wrong on any other ground, it would be wrong simply as a matter of self-defence and preservation. See what the condition of things would be. Within a few hours

of us, opposite to some of our principal ports—the Clyde, the Mersey, and the Bristol Channel—within short distance of our arsenals at Milford Haven and Plymouth, would be a hostile nation. It is idle to deny it. They loudly proclaim their hatred of us. Why should we doubt them? Now, I do not argue that this would be the ruin of Great Britain. We are too strong and great. We should subdue them, and treat them as a conquered country, a Crown colony,—perhaps the best thing for both countries. It would involve horrible expense and bloodshed. But it would have to be, and would be done. We could not, with two-thirds of our breadstuff coming from foreign countries, permit a hostile Ireland to exist and prey on our commerce. Besides, if one can fancy anything so shocking as a war with any maritime power, Ireland would be an ally for it, which would add greatly to its power. Self-preservation, then, must make us forbid a separation, and everything which is a step to it. But there is another consideration—I own to my mind, or, perhaps, I should say feelings, which is stronger. Autonomous Ireland means the plunder and oppression of the minority now in favour of the Union. The well-to-do, the orderly, the educated, the Protestant. It is in vain to deny it. Whether meant by the leaders or not, this would follow separation. Subject indeed to one proviso—viz., that the majority was strong enough—which I doubt. I doubt very much whether, if it came to blows, that side would not win which has on it all that is best in the country — wealth, position, education, intelligence, against mere numbers, headed by a set of men with no qualification but a power of lasting talk, who, but for this agitation, would remain in the obscurity from which it has drawn them.

One word more. I have spoken of separation as it would affect Great Britain, and as it would affect our loyal friends in Ireland. One word as to the other part: I believe a separation would be most disastrous for Ireland. I believe that if it took place, if landlord and rent were abolished by murder, confiscation, or other means,—if the present occupiers became owners,—it would be the worst thing that could happen to Ireland. She would lose those most capable of setting an example; fittest to carry on local government. She would lose those who now have an interest in keeping the land in order. The consequence would be an infinite division of the holdings, and an enormous increase of a pauper population. Each small holder would consider his own case only, and marry early, and divide his holding among all his offspring. But I cannot do better on this head than refer to the letter of Mr Bright to Lord Kilmorey.

Why is this Home Rule to be conceded? What good is it to do? I declare I have a difficulty in believing that those who advocate it are serious. They talk about bygone wrongs and grievances, and demand justice. But what present wrong or grievance do they show? None. A noble earl, one of the ablest of Mr Gladstone's followers, who could make the best of a decent case, can only laugh and joke over a question which his chief formerly called an attempt at the disintegration of the empire. In a report of one of his speeches in the 'Times,' I counted twenty-three "laughters" in a half column. Are they in earnest? Is this real? That Parnell and his Irish and American followers and masters are in earnest, I believe. I do not believe the English Home Rulers are. Not one wishes Home Rule as a good thing. They are only for

it because they think it unavoidable, or because it may help them to office.

I say, then, Home Rule means separation, and must be resisted,—in the interest of Great Britain for self-preservation and defence; in the interest of the loyal minority, which desires the continuance of the connection; and, as I most firmly believe, in the interest of all Ireland.

BRAMWELL.

FAILURE OF HOME RULE IN CROATIA.

BY

PROFESSOR VAMBÉRY.

WITHIN the past two or three years Hungary has been frequently complimented by England upon her political connection with Croatia, referring to it as a contrivance of exalted wisdom. In the meantime Hungary herself is by no means proud of this her political creation, the experience of but a brief space of time having sufficiently shown that in spite of the great sacrifices made by her in establishing the present political organisation, it failed to secure peaceable political development and permanence to her national existence.

In February 1848 Lamartine told a Hungarian deputation calling upon him to pay its respects, "Gentlemen, I do not understand your constitution." No wonder that circumstances in Hungary are understood abroad as little now as they were then. Nearly fifty years have since elapsed, and by the side of the changes wrought during this period these circumstances are

even more complicated—sinning against all accepted political theories, without being accompanied by adequate practical benefits.

How came the territory between the Drave and Save under the dominion of Hungary? This country owned already King Stephen (St Stephen) as its master, but some portions of it were temporarily occupied by the Greek. The victorious arms of King (St) Ladislas resumed the conquest of that country, and the final subjection of Croatia and Dalmatia was completed by the genius of his energetic successor, King Coloman, who, as a mark of his glorious rule, had himself crowned as King of Croatia and Dalmatia at Zaravecchia in 1102. Never since did any Hungarian king cause himself to be crowned King of Croatia, the crown of Hungary being looked upon as the emblem expressive of the power of the King of Hungary in all the countries belonging to it. It is therefore by the right of conquest that the Hungarian nation acquired its title to Croatia. In our own age this title may smack of illiberality. But in times of old no other title was ever acknowledged; and it may be predicted that in future, too, title by conquest will always leave the deepest traces in history.

Of late the Croatians have taken pains to prove that their country has passed under the sceptre of the Kings of Hungary by treaty of succession, but the sources from which they draw their assertions are apocryphal. For the matter of that, however, William the Conqueror and his brave Normans occupied also England under a claim of hereditary right, and after the battle of Hastings he had himself crowned King of England. Most wars of conquest were carried on under the cover of some hereditary claim; but after all, conquest was the outcome.

Croatia never had any cause for regretting its annexation to Hungary. From the very first, and during all the succeeding centuries, it shared fully, equally, and unimpaired all the liberties and rights enjoyed by the Hungarian nation—nay, in some respects it may be said to have been specially favoured. Thus, in consideration of the inferiority of the Croatian soil, a much more lenient standard of taxation was applied to Croatia than to Hungary. In another instance the Hungarians made allowance for the aversion of the Croatians to Protestantism, in suffering the Protestants living in Croatia to be deprived of the right of acquiring land, of holding offices, and of building Protestant churches.

Politically the constitution of the country was common alike to Hungarians and Croatians, and therefore also identical and uniform in its application to the country beyond the Drave. The Croatians contributed to the development of the constitution, and shared in its benefits. The country beyond the Drave, now miscalled Croatia, was divided territorially into counties like the rest of Hungary, and both were subject to a common legislative body. Up to 1848, when the ancient order of the estates gave way to a representative Parliament, each of the counties took part in the legislation by two deputies. The Croatian counties, if I may use this expression, just like the Hungarian counties, sent each two deputies to the Hungarian Diet. A deviation from this practice occurred at the time when Moslem conquest spread more and more, especially in the southern portions of the country. Owing to this Turkish occupation, only fragments of the territory of some of the southern counties remained subject to the lawful government; and these alone were in a position to continue their intercourse with

the mother country. But this fragmentary portion could lay no claim to participation in the work of legislation. As a consequence, the (Croatian) counties beyond the Drave which had been thus territorially reduced by the foreign conqueror sent altogether two deputies to the Hungarian Diet, this practice continuing, however, long after the Moslem rule had passed away and the country had been purged of all its invaders.

In more recent times, however, the Croatian Opposition prefers to ignore altogether this historical course of development, and boldly asserts that the Croatians are represented in the Hungarian Parliament nationally only, and not by counties,—the meaning of such assertion being that the territory beyond the Drave is not Hungarian soil divided into a certain number of counties, but a country which as such alone is represented in the Hungarian Parliament.

As to the constitution of the Upper House, its members were composed of the bishops, the magnates, the highest dignitaries of the State, and of the lords lieutenant of the counties. The nobility was composed—in a political, and not in a national sense—of Hungarian nobles alone, no other nobles being known to the constitution. The bishops were Hungarian bishops, even though their dioceses were lying beyond the Drave. The King of Hungary—as such, and not in his capacity of King of Croatia—appointed them to fill the high ecclesiastical dignities; their patents of appointment bore the seal used by the sovereign as King of Hungary.

In conferring the highest dignities of the State, no one ever thought of discriminating between Hungarians and Croatians. The exalted dignity of the Palatine

was filled by Croatians, and Hungarians were appointed to the office of the Banus beyond the Drave, neither party cavilling at this arrangement. All of them felt they were citizens of the Hungarian state.

How does it happen, nevertheless, that such a conspicuous current of separation has taken hold of the Hungarian territory beyond the Drave?

One of the first causes of this tendency may be traced to the dynastic policy of the House of Árpáds (1000-1301), which habitually appointed one of the sons of the reigning king to rule over one-third of the country, a policy which was warranted neither by the constitution nor by law. In most cases, but not invariably, the country between the Drave and Save was selected for this purpose, and it became, as it were, the training-place and the great school of public life for the future king. Certain privileges which attached to the person of the royal duke reigning in these lower parts of the country were calculated to enhance his dignity, and in the course of centuries the people began to look upon the establishment of a separate princely court in their midst as an emblem of a separate kingdom. The territory between the Drave and Save, whenever a royal duke stood at the head of its government, was styled a "ducatus" or dukedom, otherwise it was styled a "banatus" or banate, for its government then passed into the hands of the Banus.

This system ceased with the occupation of the Hungarian throne by the kings descended from the Hapsburg dynasty, no Austrian archduke having ever assumed the government of Croatia on the one-third system, as had been done by the Hungarian royal dukes. The formula of the designation of one-third of the country, as occurring in the royal diplomas, must

not be taken literally. The area of the countries belonging at this time to the Hungarian crown comprises a territory of 5600.44 Austrian square miles. Of this, Croatia-Slavonia, including the former military frontier, covers an area of 717.85 Austrian square miles. This proportion has been stated by the Hungarian State Commission of 1886 in the following manner: "The territory of Hungary proper contains 279,800 square kilometres, with a population of 13,749,000; that of Croatia-Slavonia 42,516 square kilometres, with a population of 1,893,000.

Towards the end of the last century the Hungarians began to discard the Latin language, then generally used in public life, and to introduce in its place their own national language, which they also cultivated in their literature. In Vienna this national awakening was interpreted as aiming against the German language and government, and was therefore opposed in every possible way. The Croatians stood up in defence of the Latin language.

This gave, so to say, the first impulse to the splitting of the Hungarians and Croatians into two parties, and the intestine feud caused thereby continued up to the end of the first half of the present century, at which time the Croatian opposition was openly and secretly countenanced and sustained by the Austrian Government and the Court circles.

Hungary was not the mistress of her own destiny. All she could do was to stand up for her virtual rights against the encroachments of Austria, but she was in no position to restore harmony amongst her citizens of different nationalities—a harmony which, besides, was distasteful to the policy then prevailing in Vienna. The events following in 1848 found the Croatians en-

listed in the service of the Viennese reaction. Jellachich, their sad hero, was a ready tool for the subjugation of the people. Free institutions, the national language, the independence of his country, inspired him with no enthusiasm — he was only an Austrian general.

After a heroic struggle the Hungarian revolution was put down by the combined armies of Austria and Russia. The nation was bleeding at every pore, and could only secretly nurse the hope of a better time coming.

But Hungary, even in its very prostration, had to be taken into account. Its impotence crippled Austria. The Austro-Prussian war, fought on Bohemian soil, signally proved this.

The conviction of the necessity of a reconciliation between the dynasty and the Hungarian nation was ripened by disastrous experience, and gained ground in the highest circles. The nation, too, felt that a veil must be drawn over the past. In 1861, after an intermission of twelve years, Parliament was convened again for this purpose. The most influential voice in that assembly was Francis Deák's voice. If there ever was a man predestined for acting a great historical part, and capable of bringing about a reconciliation, it was Francis Deák, with his classical repose of mind, his rigorous sense of right, and his unselfishness. Subsequent events showed that it was beyond the power and means of the Emperor Francis-Joseph to reward Francis Deák for his pre-eminent services—for the great man steadily refused to accept any distinction or recompense. In the diet of 1861, Francis Deák stood up for the principle of legal continuity, maintaining that existing laws, unless modified by other valid laws,

continued in force. He therefore urged that the laws of 1848—although suspended for the time being—should be acknowledged by King Francis-Joseph. Not until this was done would the Legislature agree to enter upon the revision of the constitution with due regard to the changed circumstances. Owing to the tenacity with which Parliament defended this principle, the Diet was dissolved.

It may be said in truth that "*victrix causa diis placuit, sed victa Catoni.*" The principle of legal continuity, penetrating into the lowest strata of the people, became the universal watchword, and there was not a man in the country willing to give it up.

The Parliament convened in 1865 found the ground well prepared for its conciliatory work, and its labours resulted in the arrangement brought about between the nation and the dynasty. On the 8th of June 1867 Francis-Joseph was crowned as the constitutional King of Hungary.

Croatia was neither represented in, nor summoned to, the Parliaments convened in 1861 and 1865, an omission which the Hungarians complained of as a grievance requiring to be remedied. But this circumstance, as well as the attitude maintained by the Croatian press, show that the Croatians have not in any manner co-operated in bringing about the restoration of the constitution, kept in abeyance since the revolution, and the arrangement between the dynasty and the Hungarian nation. Indeed the results achieved were more than once jeopardised by the exaggerated demands of the Croatians.

This circumstance does not prevent, however, the Croatians from calmly sharing in the benefits secured without their assistance. They even went so far as to

advance the interesting doctrine, that any new constitutional rights acquired by Hungary under the arrangement belonged also *eo ipso* to Croatia.

The constitutional sense of the Croatians shone out in a much brighter light in the beginning of the present century. Austria being threatened in her very existence by the victorious armies of Napoleon I., the Austrian Emperor was compelled to cede to France, under the terms of the Peace of Vienna (1809), those portions of Croatia which were lying towards the sea, together with Istria and Carniola. Austria succeeded, however, in recovering these ceded territories in the beginning of 1814; but the Croatian portions belonging to the Hungarian crown were not restored to Hungary, but incorporated into Istria, and governed from Laibach. The Croatians felt this very sorely. They applied to the King in remonstrances and addresses, declaring that they did not want to be subjected to German laws, but wished to live and die under the constitution of the Hungarian crown. In spite of all their efforts, it was as late as 1825 only that the wish of the Croatians was gratified, and their joy knew no bounds when Count Ignatius Gyulai, the then Banus of Hungarian nationality, communicated to them the royal decree by which they became again Hungarian citizens. It was on this memorable occasion that the statues of the Hungarian kings were crowned by the Croatians, and that Jellachich, the future Banus, then only a lieutenant, wrote his poem entitled "Croatien's Jubel" (Croatia's rejoicings).

For about fifteen years after the revolution Hungary had to stand aloof from Croatian affairs, which were administered directly by the Viennese authorities. This era was characterised by the following phrase then in vogue: "Croatia got as a reward what Hungary got as

a punishment"—namely, the absolute administration of Vienna.

It may be asked, Why did not Croatia, after the treatment it had experienced, hasten to reoccupy its ancient historical place in the Hungarian constitution as a country belonging to the Hungarian crown. It certainly did not omit to do so because the Hungarian constitution is not sufficiently liberal—for its free institutions can abundantly satisfy the claims of a nation standing even on a high level of culture, and still more amply those of a people which so readily enlisted in the service of reaction, and raised no protest against the domination of Austrian absolutism, or of the German language. But times seem to have changed: the Croatians, who, in the first quarter of this century, zealously and enthusiastically exerted themselves to return under the protection of the Hungarian constitution, have become in the last quarter of this century a prey to the hobby of exaggerated national chauvinism and conceitedness. Thus it happened that the Hungarian nation succeeded with less difficulty in effecting an arrangement with the Austrian dynasty in 1867 than with the Croatians in 1868.

The Hungarians were always ready to make the utmost concessions compatible with the constitution and the unimpaired integrity and unity of the State: they were particularly solicitous that every citizen of the country should feel that he is a free man. In the Parliament of 1861, Paul Somsich, one of its most prominent members, declared on the 18th of May, in the course of the debates on the address, "We wish to effect a new arrangement with Croatia, and to reserve for it a *white leaf* in our constitution."

It was only a phrase, to be sure, but it is truly won-

derful that whilst so many other phrases have sunk into oblivion, this one was doomed to tenaciously survive, and to rise almost to the dignity of a law.

It is curious, too, that for the last two decades the authorship of these winged words was attributed not to Somsich but to Francis Deák. On this and the other side of the Drave, and on this and the other side of the Leitha, the idea that Francis Deák had promised the Croatians a *white leaf*, was the theme of continual discussion. The phrase did not occur in the constitution, nor could it be found in the laws, and yet it became the leading thought of many a statesman, who imagined to be able to prove by it the practical turn of his mind.

But what was the meaning of the *white leaf* in relation to the constitution? It meant nothing else but to make *tabula rasa* of the existing laws—the very reverse of that principle of legal continuity, the manly defence of which, coupled with his wonderful logic, has done so much to render the name of Francis Deák famous.

Legal continuity came out victorious from the negotiations which led to the arrangement with the dynasty, but it was discarded in the course of those transactions which brought the Croatians back within the trenches of the constitution. It is a fact which cannot be contemplated without a feeling of melancholy.

Finally, the arrangement, as embodied in the law of 1868, was also concluded with the Croatians.

Previous to this arrangement, the Hungarians and Croatians frequently met for the purpose of preliminary discussions. Francis Deák was the soul of these deliberations. The Croatians came forward with demands which dumfounded everybody. They behaved as if every one of them were a Brennus, who had but to cast his heavy sword into the scale, and exclaim, "*Væ*

victis!" Francis Strossmayer, Bishop of Diákovar, went furthest in these intemperate demands. His provoking language disturbed even the philosophical equanimity of Francis Deák, so that, on one occasion, irritated beyond measure, he burst from his seat, and pushing aside his chair, prepared to leave the meeting, and wanted to put an end to all further discussions. It was only at the instance of several of his friends and admirers that he finally calmed down, and consented to resume the deliberations.

The arrangement which has been ushered into the world with such throes is in every respect a most thankless contrivance. It works incalculable political mischief to the Hungarians, and is apt to exasperate any man with a well-ordered mind.

It is true that the law embodying the arrangement declares Hungary and Croatia to be an indivisible State constituting a political community which can be neither dissolved nor divided; but it concedes at the same time a ministry of internal affairs, of justice, and of education to the Croatians. Accordingly, the Croatian Diet has the right of legislating as to all matters relating to these branches of public life. The ministries of national defence, of finance, of commerce, and of communication are styled in the law as common ministries, and the Hungarian Parliament, to which the Croatians also are to send representatives, is equally styled the common Parliament. The word "common" is repeated throughout *ad nauseam*, aping in this the political connection subsisting between Austria and Hungary. The law provides that 45 per cent of the revenues of Croatia shall be applied first of all to meet the expenditure of its internal administration, the balance to be applied to the expenses incurred about the common affairs. If

45 per cent of the entire revenue proves insufficient to cover the expenses of the internal administration of Croatia, Hungary agrees to supply the deficiency. The practical result of this is, that since 1868 Hungary, in the matter of postal revenue alone, had to make up the deficiency of the Croatian postal revenue to the amount of 2,077,552 florins. Accordingly Croatia can never be in the position of being saddled with a public debt. A Croatian ministry, where Croatians only can be employed, which is at the side of the Hungarian central Government, is being organised. Hungarian officials are not employed in Croatia. The official correspondence of the Croatian Government and authorities is carried on in the Croatian language, and the answers given by the Hungarian Government are not given in Hungarian but in Croatian. The Croatian representatives may use the Croatian language in the Hungarian Parliament, or in its delegation. One of the sections of the law declares that the people of Croatia-Slavonia are a political nation, possessing a separate territory. In conclusion, it is declared that the present arrangement is exempt from the jurisdiction of the respective Legislatures of the contracting countries, and can only be changed by the mutual consent of both parties to the agreement.

The absurdity of the last provision has been already proved with regard to Fiume. This seaport city and its district stand only temporarily under the Hungarian Government, and this temporary state may last for ever, for Croatia will certainly never consent to Fiume's being annexed to Hungary, notwithstanding that Fiume itself desires the annexation.

If the Croatians joined the ranks of the reactionaries because they did not want the liberal and constitutional

Hungarian laws, then the logical inference would be, that no matter how they had managed to shake off these laws, they would, once freed from them, wish to revive the former *status quo.* This would be the logical conclusion. But the Croatians had other views. The arrangement of 1868, which lacks every historical foundation, and represents no development from the past, is to the Croatians only a preparatory step towards the contemplated future separation. Prior to 1848 Croatia had no separate Legislature, not even with regard to special matters, but it had statutory rights like any other Hungarian county. That is, it could provide detailed regulations in conformity with the Hungarian laws, but these regulations had to keep strictly within the spirit of those laws. Their provincial assemblies at Zágráb (Agram) could appoint provincial officials, but chiefly county officials; they had the right of properly apportioning among the counties beyond the Drave the taxes imposed by the Hungarian Diet; they could give instructions to the deputies sent to the Hungarian Diet; but they could enact no legislation, for the Hungarian laws were in force in every country belonging to the Hungarian crown.

One might imagine, however, that a law of this kind, which has no warrant in history, and deeply offends against the principle of State-unity, would at least be hailed with unalloyed satisfaction by the Croatians. But this was not the case. The Croatians always looked upon the arrangement with Hungary as a payment on account only, and as a starting-point for fresh claims. The Hungarians could hardly imagine that there was anything left yet for the Croatians to ask of them, but they were mistaken. The Croatians were not long in coming forward with new grievances, and well

might the Hungarians look about in bewilderment in search of something to satisfy the insatiable Croatian Moloch, after they had given to it all they could possibly give.

Thus the Croatians asked for the revision of the law relating to the arrangement. The pretext for this request was that the Hungarian Government had infringed upon several of its provisions, but their real reason was that they hoped thereby to render the connecting State ties more lax. The Hungarians, deeming it proper that the complaints should be heard, agreed to the revision. On the 5th of March 1885, Minister President Coloman Tisza introduced a resolution in the Hungarian Parliament to the effect that it should send out a Commission for the purpose of communicating with the Croatians on this subject. Both parties nominated their commissioners, and their discussions soon brought to light the Croatian aspirations. They wished that complete parity should be established between Hungary and Croatia, that the Croatians should be represented in the foreign missions, and that, out of consideration for Croatia, the diplomatic title of the monarchy, which is now "Austria-Hungary," should be changed to that of "Austria-Hungary-Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia." In addition, they asked that in every Hungarian Ministry there should be established a Croatian department, and that the Hungarian Government should spend more on the Croatian roads of communication, and on the regulation of the rivers in Croatia. The last demand was made in the face of the fact that, with the exception of the Croatian share of the expenditure for common affairs, the whole of the Croatian revenue remained at the disposal of the Croatians.

In the course of the discussion of these new demands

not a single voice was heard among the Croatians indicating their sense of solidarity with Hungary, or that they had any obligations with regard to Hungary.

But at that very time a Croatian representative gave vent to the following declamation in the provincial diet at Zágráb: "Croatia will never be free until the clatter of the horse-hoofs of the first Cossack will be heard along the streets of Vienna."

This, then, would seem to be the unavowed programme. I am fully convinced that there are men in Croatia who entertain constitutional sentiments, are law-abiding, and feel friendly to the Hungarians, but I cannot help being astonished that there should be any class of men who had ever enjoyed the sweets of constitutional liberty, and yet would long for a Russian state of things.

The labours of the two Commissions led to no results. Already, on the 12th of October 1886, the Hungarian Commission replied with a polite but firm "No" to the Croatian demands—the first instance of a Croatian rebuff in the history of the last years. It was the best thing the Hungarian Commission could have done. The event showed that, by declining to accede to Croatian pretensions, the equilibrium of the world has been by no means disturbed. The Commission felt convinced, and managed to convince others, too, that the famous *white leaf* had been long ago fully filled up by the Croatians with all sorts of propositions incompatible with the preservation of State-unity. It made clear another thing, that Hungary was always the one that gave, and Croatia always the one that received, and that it has never been the other way. The elucidation of this one fact proved conclusively that there can be no parity between Hungary and Croatia.

In conclusion, let me add a few words as to the

effect produced at home and abroad by the example set by Hungary in agreeing to the Hungaro-Croatian arrangement. It has become the fashion in Europe to regard Hungary, next to England, as the home of constitutional life. Hence the great sympathy shown to the Hungarians in their struggle against absolutism in 1848-49, and the friendly interest which continued after they had been struck down on the battlefield by overwhelming forces. They again attracted attention while struggling in the political arena to regain their independence, and people then already began to speak admiringly of the political virtues of the Hungarian nation. History will record it in golden letters, that the Hungarians claimed not only the restoration of their constitution, but also stipulated that Austria, too, should receive a constitution. The arrangement with Austria was praised as an act of wise moderation. But the arrangement effected with Croatia is hardly known abroad, and if known, it is not likely to be praised. Yet in many parts of Austria the latter arrangement became almost an object of envy. In Bohemia especially, utterances were not unfrequent that the Czechs would be happy if they could enter into the same relations with Austria as the Croatians with Hungary. But this wish of theirs cannot be fulfilled. Whatever is conceded to the Czechs will have to be also conceded to the Galicians, with whom the sentiment of nationality is quite as strong. Where is the movement to stop? There is no doubt that dualism is the last conservative stage; departing from it must lead sooner or later to federation, and federation is nothing else but dissolution.

The Czechs, who thought so highly of the Croatian arrangement as to declare it to be the *ne plus ultra* of their own political wishes with regard to Austria, encour-

aged, nevertheless, the Croatians in their opposition to Hungary. In doing so, they committed a political mistake. Bohemia is a rich and cultured country, and, consequently, deserves a much greater measure of independence than Croatia, which cannot maintain itself by its own strength. If the Austrian Government has, nevertheless, declined to reproduce there a copy of the Croatian state of affairs, the refusal had been dictated most likely by the fear of federal consequences, which might have placed a powerful monarchy in such a position as to be swallowed up piecemeal by one of its neighbouring States, which is in the habit of appealing to the arbitrament of brute force.

Or there might be a repetition of the incident related by Jules Verne, in one of his novels, of a traveller who, anxious to get to the moon, placed himself into a projectile, and caused it to be projected from a huge cannon, calculating that beyond a certain distance the moon would begin to exert its attraction upon the projectile. Russian sympathies are not wanting in Bohemia, and if the influential Viennese circles will allow Bohemia to enter into as lax a political connection with Austria as the one subsisting between Croatia and Hungary, there can be hardly any question as to which moon Bohemia is likely to gravitate to.[1]

It is in the nature of things that autonomy extended beyond certain limits, so far from engendering affection for the mother country, only tends to increase the incentive to complete separation.

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[1] For the data contained in the above paper I am indebted to M. Frederic Pesti, the learned secretary of the historical section of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

HOME RULE AND IMPERIAL SOVEREIGNTY.

BY

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In the following remarks I shall endeavour to show how and why the question of Home Rule for Ireland is not an ordinary question of domestic policy, nor even a domestic question of constitutional policy, such as Parliamentary Reform, but one involving by its nature much wider issues and consequences. And in so doing I shall at the same time show the grounds on which I think that any serious and effective working out of the idea of Home Rule would import not only a new constitution for Ireland, but a new constitution for the British Empire, and a revolution in the existing relations between the British colonies and possessions and the Imperial Parliament. I do not profess to disclose new facts or urge new arguments. It appears to me that we are in far greater danger of neglecting plain facts and broad principles in this matter than of overlooking any facts not generally known, or reasons not

of general validity which are likely to be material to a sound decision. Our business at this juncture is to insist on essentials, and to insist on them with repetition even to weariness rather than let them fall out of sight. My aim will be to make use of facts which are notorious, and inferences from them which are simple.

I.

The territories collectively known as the British Empire are not only scattered over the world, but are subject to the ultimate dominion of the Imperial Parliament in many different ways. We have in the first place the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, whose people are directly represented in Parliament. We have a few possessions of the Crown which are geographically adjacent to Great Britain, but are extra-parliamentary (if one may use the word) for historical reasons. They enjoy their ancient local laws and privileges, which are practically guaranteed by the Imperial Parliament. Only the trifling area and population of the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man as compared with the United Kingdom have made the continuance of this state of things practicable. Then we have the colonies founded by English settlers who carried with them the law of England and the rights of British subjects. Lastly, there are the colonies and dependencies acquired at various times by conquest or by cession, or partly in one way and partly in the other, sometimes from native rulers, but more often from princes or rulers who, whether European or not, were themselves conquerors or represented some previous conqueror. Among this class of dependencies there are many and important differences of laws, institu-

tions, and government, but the details of these do not concern us here. What does concern us is that directly or indirectly the Queen, with the advice and consent of the estates of the realm—in other words, the Imperial Parliament[1]—has admitted and unlimited authority over all these dominions. The legal origin and theory of that authority are not the same in all cases, but that again does not now concern us. No one disputes its existence. It is exercised in various forms and degrees. In some cases it is manifested by direct and frequent interference. In many it has been exercised by framing or sanctioning a constitution, under which government is carried on by persons and bodies who may be said to be delegates of the Crown or of Parliament; the direct interference of Parliament remains possible, but is exceptional. In some cases not formally distinguishable from the rest — I mean, those of the self-governing English colonies — there is an effectual though undefined understanding by which such interference is limited to matters touching Imperial and not merely local interests.

Now the local institutions through which, outside the United Kingdom, government and the administration of justice are regulated (subject always to the ultimate control of Parliament) may be classified as follows :—

[1] Some British subjects may be in strictness under the government of the Crown merely by virtue of its general prerogative; I say *may be*, because it would be at least rash to assume that there is any part of the British dominions of which the government has not been affected at some time by some Act of the Imperial Parliament. But the Crown can of course do in Parliament whatever it could do without Parliament; and inasmuch as it can do nothing save through Ministers responsible to Parliament, the control and supremacy of Parliament are for practical purposes the same.

They may be institutions imported from England, and more or less modified to suit local circumstances.

They may be institutions imported from some other civilised country, and preserved for one or another reason under British supremacy. Thus we have held ourselves bound, ever since the period of military occupation immediately following the conquest, to maintain the laws and customs which the French population of Lower Canada had derived from their mother country.

Or they may be native institutions—that is, non-European; for we need not now attend to the distinction between such as are truly indigenous, and such as may have been imposed or imported by non-European conquerors before the commencement of English or European dominion. And these likewise may be maintained as a matter of express promise, of general good faith and equity, or of simple expediency.

These different elements do not always exist simply or separately. On the contrary, they are found in various and more or less complex combinations. In India the same courts administer for different purposes English law to Europeans, different systems of native law to different races and classes of Asiatics, and English law, modified by special legislation, to Asiatics and Europeans alike. Again, the maintenance of the French institutions of Lower Canada, side by side with the English institutions imported by the English settlers of Upper Canada, led to very grave political troubles. After the failure of other methods, including that of a single autonomous government, Canada was endowed by the British North America Act of 1867 with an elaborate federal constitution, the invention of Canadian statesmen. Considered as a compromise this has worked well, but it must not be

supposed that it works without friction.[1] In other colonies, such as Mauritius, the competition of English with non-English institutions and customs has been a source of difficulties which only the relatively small scale of the whole affair prevents from being seriously felt in England. The relations to the mother country are simplest in the case of the Australian colonies, where English population and institutions have taken an undisputed possession. Even there, however, they are less simple than they look, for there enter into them in fact, though not in law, the tacit understandings which have been already mentioned.

II.

Ireland is at present a part of the United Kingdom. The advocates of Home Rule say it ought to be something else, but still a part of the British Empire, and they say that the principles of such an arrangement are easily laid down, and the execution in detail not more difficult than that of any other considerable political reform. So much, I think, they have undertaken (and must undertake) to make good—unless, indeed, they will admit that Home Rule does carry with it known and unknown dangers of grave extent, but, admitting this, nevertheless will support Home Rule on the ground that even a desperate remedy cannot be worse than the present disease. This, the argument of despair, is not of the kind that rouses a cheerful courage in a man's constituents and political friends, nor can it be agreeable to the better sort of Irish Home Rulers. We therefore hear little of it in public, yet we may

[1] A conference of delegates from the Provinces of Canada has lately recommended material amendments in the Confederation Act.

suspect that, with the more thoughtful English Home Rulers, it has weight—more, perhaps, than they acknowledge even to themselves. To return, however, to ideas and plans of an Irish constitution, whether proposed as a good thing in itself or as relatively tolerable. In one direction the choice is clearly limited. Ireland has not any native form of government or political institutions which can at this day be preserved or restored. There is no possible form of Irish constitution outside the variation and development of elements which are English in substance and in fact. Irish Nationalists complain that their lawful liberties are violated by the executive authority in Ireland. Those liberties — the rights of free speech, of public meeting, of political association, of trial by jury—are of English name and growth. They are the liberties of Irishmen, not because they are Irish, but because they are British subjects. Even if we regard these liberties, or some of them, as deducible from universal principles of natural justice, England has come very much nearer to the supposed ideal of natural right than any other part of the civilised world, and Ireland has derived from British thinkers her share in the ideal, and from the laws of England her share of practical approximation to it. I say nothing here of the merits of any particular controversy, or of any method of controversy. I merely note an evident fact. Cæsar is denounced as a tyrant, but it is to Cæsar's laws and Cæsar's courts that Brutus and Cassius appeal against Cæsar. Still less do I wish to go back upon historical speculation. It is likely enough that the troubles of Ireland are due, in large measure, not to the introduction of English institutions in itself, but to that introduction having taken place without due regard to fit

causes and occasions, and without any settled purpose or continuous policy. It is merely idle to discuss whether the English conquest of Ireland were more or less justified than the English conquest of Britain, or the prehistoric conquests of both Britain and Ireland from tribes of long-forgotten name and speech, themselves perhaps the supplanters of a still earlier race. Perhaps it would have been well if Edward I. had given his strength to a real conquest of Ireland, instead of an illusory conquest of Scotland. Perhaps it would have been better if some Elizabethan statesman could have had the genius and perseverance to deal with Ireland as the East India Company dealt with province after province, and kingdom after kingdom. But it is too late now to regret that Ireland was not settled like Wales or like the Punjab. It is also too late to regret the extinction of whatever distinctively Irish civilisation existed at any time. So far as the desire for Home Rule includes a longing for the real or apparent restoration in Ireland of political institutions not of English mould, it is a desire which cannot be satisfied by any political or legislative measures whatever. Sentimental grievances, as they are called, can be dealt with only by remedies of the same kind. I use the term because it is convenient and understood, and not with any meaning of disparagement, for sentiment is the moving force of human action. Men are moved by things as they appear, and they act on their emotions. It is one of our national defects to underrate the value of the first impression of things, and to spoil even good deeds by an ill manner of doing them. That we have paid and are paying dearly for this fault in Ireland I have no doubt. It has been committed even in our recent dealings with the land question. I

will give another example of what I mean, though at the risk of being thought to trifle. I verily believe that if there had been a regiment of Irish Guards at Waterloo and in the Crimea, there would be several regiments the fewer at this day in Ireland. It is not my province to inquire how far the mischief done in this kind can at this day be undone by public or private exertions. One thing is clear, that it will not be mended by the clauses and provisos of a Home Rule Bill, be they drafted never so skilfully. There is a harder thing than to make and execute good laws: it is to revive and foster that spirit of trust and affection in the people which executes the law without an officer. The law must be a terror to evil-doers first, but we shall not be content with that. If I believed that the people of England would rest with no higher aim; that they were devoid of justice, of generosity, of patience (for the task will need firm and even justice, abundant generosity, and unfailing patience); that they would renounce the noblest and most arduous duties of government, declaring themselves, and thereby proving themselves, unfit for empire;—then I should accept the argument from despair, and acquiesce in Home Rule for Ireland if I could not support it. But I should acquiesce in it as a fatal symptom that English political supremacy had outlived the English genius for politics, and must ere long follow it to extinction, to be revived (if at all) in some younger and happier branch of our stock.

III.

At present we cannot say in any definite terms what the relation of Irish Home Rule to the Imperial supremacy of Parliament is intended by its advocates to be,

for there is not any authentic definition. Home Rulers, including Mr Gladstone, profess themselves not bound by the proposals which Mr Gladstone's Ministry introduced (we must presume, after the consideration befitting a measure of such importance) in 1886. It is true that we are not thereby deprived of much guidance, for among the many omissions and ambiguities of the Government of Ireland Bill, not the least striking was its extreme obscurity as to the position of the new Irish Executive, as between the Irish "Legislative Body" on the one hand and the responsible Ministers of the Crown on the other.[1] If Lord Thring's lately published interpretation may be accepted, the general intention was to assimilate Ireland, with certain exceptions, to a self-governing colony of the Australian type. I shall not stop to consider whether the exceptions were not really such as to frustrate that intention. The time for minute criticism has been, and we Unionists hope it may not be again. It is enough for us now that any scheme of Home Rule must aim at satisfying the demands of Irish Home Rulers. Home Rule means at least the power of local legislation for Irish affairs, as distinguished from those which touch Imperial interests; and that, as I shall show, a practically uncontrolled power. The lines of distinction must be laid down in the Act of Parliament establishing the new Irish constitution, and worked out as occasion requires by some judicial authority of imperial character and dignity. Now all this machinery would be of no value if the Imperial Parliament were habitually, or on any

[1] This statement is made from careful reading of the actual text of the Bill, notwithstanding Lord Thring's sweeping assertion that "Bills are never read by their accusers."—('Handbook of Home Rule,' p. 71.)

common occasion, to interfere in anything outside the departments which had been expressly reserved. As matter of law, Parliament could interfere when it thought fit, or could alter or revoke the constitution it had given—or, at any rate, it is a matter of skilled workmanship to prevent legal doubts from arising on this head; though even so, to leave no room for reasonable doubt is not the same thing as to prevent doubts from being raised, or from leading to grave trouble, when judgment is obscured by interest and passion. As matter of practice, Parliament would be expected not to interfere: such is the case with the self-governing colonies, and Ireland would expect no less. Habitual interference for the purpose of overriding the local legislature would not be acquiesced in. It would be resented on more plausible grounds than exceptional legislation for Ireland is resented now, with at least equal determination, and with much better hope of success. But the thing would never be attempted. Not only the Irish legislative body and the Irish executive would expect to be left alone within their competence, but the British House of Commons would expect Ministers not to trouble it with Irish affairs. We must take it that nothing short of overwhelming necessity would induce Ministers to do so. Not that Unionists are concerned to deny that such necessity might occur, and sooner rather than later. But I now try to conceive the case as it would stand if Home Rule were decided upon, and all English parties, being bound by that final decision, were content to give it a fair start.

Habitual non-intervention of the Imperial Parliament, and of the Crown as advised by its Ministers responsible to Parliament, must therefore be the rule.

We are told that in the Australasian colonies and in Canada this is found to answer, and no prejudice ensues to the supremacy of the Crown and of Parliament. Why should it not be the same in Ireland? One must not be afraid of repeating simple things; and I shall repeat here what has been already well said, and may have to be said many times again. Why should not two and two make five? Because two is not three. Why should not colonial self-government flourish in Ireland as in New Zealand or Victoria? Because Ireland is not New Zealand or Victoria, and St George's Channel is not two oceans and a continent.

Let us see what are the conditions that make the relation of colonial dependence permanently compatible with the habitual non-intervention of the supreme power. Two seem to me of the first importance.

First, the dependent community, and every considerable part of it, must frankly accept self-government with all its consequences. It must be plainly understood that a defeated party is not to appeal to the mother country for relief against anything done within the powers of the local constitution. Moreover, disputes as to what is within constitutional powers must be decided in the regular course of justice, either by the local tribunals, or, at need, by regular appeal to the Crown in its judicial capacity. All such communities are provinces of one empire, and may call upon Cæsar to protect them against foreign enemies. But in their own matters they shall appeal to Cæsar according to the terms of their own covenant, and not otherwise. Their covenanted liberty of self-government implies an equally binding duty of settling internal disputes with their own resources, and not throwing them back on the mother country.

Secondly, the dependent community must be content to preserve its connection with the Empire of which it is part—nay, it must be more than content; there must be active willingness to suffer some particular inconvenience on some occasions for the sake of maintaining the connection. The occasional sacrifice of apparent local interest to the interest of the Empire as a whole is demanded as the price of Imperial citizenship. The demand is not great, nor is it often made, but when made it must be satisfied. A colony which did not set a positive value on the Imperial connection would soon go to work to convert its autonomy into formal independence, if not restrained by fears of revolution or foreign conquest. The value which our colonies in fact set on their connection with the mother country is happily a very high one; it is perhaps higher in the present generation than it has been at any former time, —it is certainly better understood and appreciated at home. In part it depends on considerations of material convenience and security, but in some part—I think in no small part—it is a matter of sentiment.

Are these conditions present in Ireland? It is fairly certain that the first of them is not, and the best we can say of the second is that it is doubtful. As to the first, Ireland is divided by bitterly hostile parties, and each of them has vehement partisans in this country. Any Home Rule constitution settled by the Imperial Parliament would, by the nature of the case, aim at compromise between parties of whom neither has shown much of the spirit of compromise, and each of them would find matter of offence in some part of it. There is no reason to suppose that either Nationalists or Orangemen would abstain from working on public opinion in England to procure modifications of such

parts of the new Irish Constitution as were offensive to them, or even interferences by special exercise of the ultimate supreme power of Parliament. As to the second point, it is at least unproved that the local governors of Ireland, under a scheme of colonial autonomy, would take any trouble to preserve the connection with England. So far as we can trust the evidence of public utterances—of nearly all public utterances at times and places where there is not an English audience to be conciliated—the prevailing sentiment of active Irish Nationalists is the other way. Either many prominent Nationalists have been using strong words without any meaning at all, or they have been obtaining the support, both moral and material, of their Irish and Irish-American hearers under something very like false pretences, or they would not stir a finger to prevent Home Rule from being made a stepping-stone to entire separation. They have declared themselves enemies not only of this or that principle, this or that individual concerned in English government of Ireland, but of the English government and connection altogether. Such is not the language of political controversy among fellow-citizens; it is the language of men who put themselves outside the ties of common citizenship, who lack not the will but the power to be rebels, and who meanwhile use their rights as citizens only for a weapon against the commonwealth itself. If any one thinks I exaggerate, let him look to France, where the division of parties is far more deep and bitter than in England. Let him ask himself whether he can imagine a French Monarchist, of however extreme opinions, speaking of Republican France as a foreign and hostile nation, and rejoicing in her difficulties and misfortunes. It cannot be imagined. A Bonapartist

who dared to express good wishes for insurgents against French authority in Algeria or Tonquin would be hooted down by any Bonapartist audience. But this thing which, to the credit of Frenchmen, is impossible in France, would be no more than Irish Nationalists have done. Notwithstanding that many valiant Irishmen share in whatever good or ill befalls British arms, men professing to speak in the name of Ireland have rejoiced in our real or imagined defeats. They have exulted in our real or imagined troubles in every part of the world. They have spoken of England as an enemy, and of the enemies of England as the friends and allies of their own cause. Not all Nationalists, I am aware, have done this. But some, and those not the least active and conspicuous, have done it; and I am not aware that those of their colleagues who pass for moderate have uttered any word of protest. Moderation, or more than moderation, has been conspicuous in the attitude of the leaders towards these over-zealous followers.

All this may be, for anything that affects the present argument, legitimate and even laudable from the Nationalist point of view. I care not whether the persons who have uttered such sentiments in speech and writing were or were not members of Parliament bound by a voluntary oath of allegiance to the Sovereign of the British Empire, or, if they were, with what conscience or sense of honour they regarded the obligation of that oath. I simply point out that the temper of these utterances is not the temper by which either the express or the tacit conditions of Imperial union between Great Britain and an autonomous colony can be successfully observed. And I further point out that we must look not only to the temper of the speakers and writers of the Nationalist party, but to the temper likely to be

begotten in their hearers and readers by a continued course of such matter. Say that this violence were but an imprudent ornament of Irish rhetoric, or the unskilled outpouring of a loyal desire for Home Rule, and nothing but Home Rule: the mischief wrought upon an ignorant multitude remains exactly the same. Besides, the maintenance of good relations under any scheme of Home Rule will need discretion as well as good faith on both sides. If this be the loyalty of Home Rule leaders, who shall answer to us for good faith? If it be their prudence, who shall answer to us for discretion? It is true that some of the Nationalist orators have taken, late in the day and in a coarse fashion, to flattering the English democracy, or rather a minority of all conditions of the people of England which they choose to call the English democracy. There is no reason from their point of view why they should scruple to foment revolution, or fears of revolution, in England, if they may thereby further their ends in Ireland; and to that extent I can very well believe that these flatteries are sincere. They are perfectly consistent with that ill-will to the commonweal of England as a whole which is still abundantly expressed when it is thought to be agreeable to the audience.

But we are told that these things are of no account, for an autonomous Ireland would be too prudent to seek for independence; the superior power of England is too obvious. Why, is the power of England to maintain the Union, if England be resolved to maintain it, less obvious now? And has it prevented an agitation for Home Rule from being planned, matured, established in the heart of English politics, and seeming for a time to be within sight of triumph? Twenty years ago Home Rule was as far from the practical con-

[redacted] of English statesmen as separation is at this [redacted]ht. Irish Nationalists may not sup[redacted] hat [redacted]land can be compelled by force of arm[redacted] ant [redacted]pende[redacted]ce, unless it were in some great conjunct[redacted] [redacted]rouble such as none of them have ope[redacted] deprec[redacted]nd some of them have openly de[redacted] But if Engla[redacted]d cannot be compelled, English con[redacted]ties may [redacted]majoled and English Ministers wor[redacted] The mea[redacted]C[redacted]red Home Rule would be effectual[redacted] procure separ[redacted]also in good time. Home Rule co[redacted] not have a more solemn appearance of finalit[redacted] the Union had; why should it have more of the [redacted]ce? So it might plausibly seem, at any rate, to a thorou[redacted]h-going Nationalist. And a movement towards separat[redacted] in Ireland would be a wholly different thing fron[redacted] movement towards separation in any of o[redacted]lish colonies. In the latter case an inevitable [redacted]ion, however much to be regretted, might conceivably [redacted] accomplished with decency and dignity, and with[redacted] bloodshed. In Ireland such a movement would [redacted] born in internal dissension; it would prob[redacted]pen in civil war, and the ultimate result would [redacted]ili-tary reconquest. But let us suppose the resolut[redacted] of England not to grant independence to be unc[redacted] stood, and her power respected — what the[redacted]? Why, for the result of all our elaborate devices [redacted]ome Rule we should have Ireland still attache[redacted] the Brit[redacted]mpire [redacted]rcion [redacted]e degree remo[redacted] — s[redacted] source of stre[redacted] but of weakn[redacted] in our tro[redacted] abroad [redacted] not a credit, but a re-[redacted]ach, to[redacted]lish ca[redacted] for governmen[redacted] We [redacted]uld be [redacted] no better position than we now are, or may be, by a firm and just administration of the exist-ing plan. Home Rule, not frankly accepted for its

own sake, would make things worse for England and no better for Ireland. Prove to us that Home Rule will content the people of Ireland, and that is one material point made good. But if you tell us that, whether they are content or not, we shall always have the strong hand, then we say that, if it must come to the strong hand, we prefer using it to maintain the Union.

IV.

The truth is, that the difficulties—the insuperable difficulties—of maintaining a just equilibrium between Irish Home Rule and the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament, arise from the peculiar conditions of Ireland. They are not disposed of by telling us that under other and different conditions other arrangements of a more or less similar kind have been found practicable. If Ireland were, like Hungary,[1] an ancient sovereign state, with ancient national institutions; or if it were, like Victoria or New Zealand, a colony settled by a uniform and like-minded population,—the problem of Irish government would be a much simpler one to deal with, or rather would not have arisen in its present form. But Ireland has neither a stock of ancient institutions nor such internal unity as will suffice for the peaceful development of new ones. It

[1] The relations of Ireland to England have never been at all like those of Hungary to Austria. If Charles I. had first made himself absolute in Scotland, and then subdued English liberties by a combination of Scottish and Irish troops with aid from France (a plan of which all the elements existed, at one time or another, in the counsels of the Stuart dynasty), there would have been something like a parallel to the subjection of Hungary in 1849, but with Scotland in the place of Austria, England in the place of Hungary, not of Austria, and Ireland in that of Croatia.

ness to pretend that conditions exist which notori-
do not exist. Not one of the usual
commonwealth capable of single and
lf-government can be truly applied to Ireland. T
ntial unity in religion, in breeding, in
ners, allegiance to any one person or
The one thing certain about any scheme of Rule
tu on the establishment of a single Irish Legis-
lat I is that it would be strongly disli
and pposed minority of the people of Ireland
siderable in numbers alone, and considera ond
the proportion of their numbers in wealth try,
and general ability.

It is time we should plainly understand that
monwealths are founded, and institutions establish
not with pens and ink but with men. The
of the United States has been often and jus sed.
And I would abate no whit of the praise given to
men who framed that Constitution, and procured
adoption in the face of the utmost difficulties. But
there is praise to be given elsewhere too. k of
the founders would long since have come ght
without the good will, good faith, and good s
applied by the people of the United States to
handling of it in practice. We have the n a
powerful and zealous party submit to a deci hich
they felt to be unjust, and believed to be illegal, rather
than anger ability e federal comp
The ty cont in high decisions, howe
authoritati freely sed; but all parti gree
the la ared a ounded by the au-
ity must in every case be obeyed. A much less
skilfully framed constitution would become a good

such men as have made the Constitution of the United States a document of universal importance to students of politics. A much more skilful and elaborate one would fail in a community wanting the elements of political training, and the conditions of harmonious political action. South America is strewn with the wrecks of republican constitutions, which inquiry would probably show to look on paper full as well as the Constitution of the United States. Learning, reflection, and skilled expression must all go to the framing of a good constitution; but if it is to be born alive, the first things needful are good faith and good will. English supporters of Home Rule believe, no doubt, that a sufficient majority of good citizens would be found in Ireland to apply good faith and good will to the working out of a Home Rule constitution under the imperial sovereignty. But they believe it on evidence which appears to Unionists not only to be insufficient, but to point strongly the other way.

This, however, is not all. In a scheme of this kind minorities have to be thought of. Minorities also are composed of human beings capable of action and passion, and are not to be disposed of by a sum in subtraction.

One thing which we may learn from our own colonial history is the power of a compact party, working on sentiments of race[1] and religion, which go deeper than ordinary party divisions, to paralyse the working of a scheme of autonomous government which fails to secure their rights, or what they consider to be such, against a disliked and distrusted rule. This was shown in Can-

[1] Sentiments of race may exist, and may even be artificially created, whether there is much real distinction or not. For politics the question is not one of actual ethnology. What people believe about themselves is often more important than what they are.

[illegible]uring the generation beginning ap[illegible]ately [illegible] the Queen's accession, which came [illegible] the insurrection of 1837 and the federal con[illegible]n of 1867. [illegible]he French Canadians failed in armed re[illegible] [illegible]nder the constitution of 1840 they succe[illegible] in ma[illegible]g it impossible for the English p[illegible] first barely equal to them in numbers, but aft[illegible] the m[illegible] to [illegible]k a centralised form of Home Rule. U[illegible] British North America Act of 1[illegible] they obtain[illegible]egislative autonomy for the Prov[illegible] of Quebec, and they have ever since e[illegible] an influence in the affairs of the Dominic[illegible] enjoyed a practical power of getting their own [illegible] which many English Canadians regard as exces[illegible] Now the position of Ulster in Ireland is by no m[illegible] unlike that of the Province of Quebec [illegible]nada. There is a Protestant and Teutonic mino[illegible]ce to face with a Catholic and Celtic majority, whil[illegible] Canada the numbers are the other way. In [illegible] respects the scale and proportions of the t[illegible]s are fairly comparable. If the Unionist minorit[illegible]eland be less numerous and compact than the Fren[illegible]ority in Canada, we must bear in mind that it is they [illegible] lean on the English connection, whereas in Canada [illegible] advantage was on the side of the Englis[illegible]ority. The minority is in both cases a thriving a[illegible]rous one.[1] I do not see why Ulster can be expected to sit

[1] [illegible]Canada i[illegible] rich cou[illegible]t French Canadian[illegible] the [illegible]riving o[illegible]. As to the numbers, Ulster has in [illegible] [illegible]nbers 1,7[illegible] out of 5[illegible]). If there are non-[illegible]ists in [illegible]ter, ther[illegible]nionists [illegible]re in Ireland. Th[illegible]nce of [illegible]bec has [illegible]00, out [illegible]l of about 5,000,[illegible], [illegible] which 1,925,000 belong to the Province of Ontario, formerly Upper Canada.

down under Home Rule in the hands of a Catholic and anti-English majority, any more than Lower Canada was willing to sit down under the government of an English and Protestant party, or the English settlers, on the other hand, were willing to tolerate French Canadian ascendancy. The chances of success would be at least as good for Ulster as for the Province of Quebec. I say nothing here of the claims which the men of Ulster, and others settled in Ireland on the faith of English laws, may urge, on grounds of morality and political justice, to be provided with safeguards for their religion and usages as effectual as those which the Imperial Parliament has provided for the people of Lower Canada. Right or wrong, the French Canadians have gotten their own way; right or wrong, Ulstermen would surely endeavour to get theirs. I believe they would succeed in the long run, but at a cost both to Ireland and to England which it is the duty of the Imperial Parliament not to suffer.

These last considerations may be thought to point to the endowment of Ireland with some sort of a federal constitution analogous to that of the Dominion of Canada, by which the rights and usages of Ulster might be secured through provincial autonomy, somewhat like those of the Province of Quebec. And I am indeed apt to think that in such an arrangement might be found the least bad form of Home Rule. But we are now considering what is practicable, not what is imaginable: and we are met with the fact that no party in Ireland has expressed a desire for anything of the kind, or even a relative willingness to acquiesce in it. This makes it needless to show at length that such a plan would need far more delicate adjustment than anything yet proposed, or to dwell on the doubt, which

[illegible] grave, whether a majority not strong[illegible]ched [illegible]e English connection would evince [illegible]ame [illegible]atience and loyalty as the English po[illegible] of [illegible]nada [illegible]th regard to the guaranteed rights of [illegible]

V.

[illegible]re we [illegible]nfronted in every direction [illegible] diffi-cul[illegible] [illegible]reat as those of maintaining [illegible] Union. Ho[illegible]ule might put off for a season [illegible] day of grappling with those difficulties. Li[illegible]end-thrift's note of hand, it might purchase a [illegible]pres-ent ease and accommodation upon usurious terms. On the other hand, it is more than possible that it w[illegible] not procure us even that. Whatever scheme [illegible] adopted, there would be a new constitution [illegible]and, creating a new set of relations between Irel[illegible] the Imperial Parliament. If Ireland, having an aut[illegible]mous legislature at Dublin, continued to be represe[illegible] at Westminster, these new relations would be [illegible] unlike those now existing between Parliam[illegible] any British colony or possession. In any case [illegible]ould be need of interpretation and development. We [illegible] expected to assume that this process would be qu[illegible] carried on in a civil and judicial manner, t[illegible] the means appointed for that purpose by the ne[illegible]stitu-tion and that the subject would be excluded [illegible] com-mo[illegible]sent fr[illegible]nglish [illegible]mentary debate [illegible] pol[illegible] contro[illegible] We s[illegible] have lightly ca[illegible] [illegible]r impe[illegible]ties, a[illegible]land and Irish [illegible]tions, the cy[illegible]hrase [illegible]ain Home Rule [illegible]cates, would be out of the way. Having regard to the course of affairs in the past, from which alone we can reason-ably foretell the future, I see no reason whatever why

the expectation should be fulfilled. I have already indicated to some extent the reasons for which I think it would not. Instead of troublesome questions of executive government and special legislation in Ireland, we should have questions of constitutional competence and imperial discretion which might or might not be debated with greater decency, but which would hardly require less time and attention. Parliament could not refuse to entertain them, and politicians would certainly not abstain from making use of them.

There is one way, and it would seem only one, by which a fair chance of growing and taking firm root could be secured for any plan of Home Rule. This would be to make the new Anglo-Irish constitution as difficult to alter as the federal constitution of the United States or of Switzerland. But to do this would be to introduce a wholly new element in our institutions. We know nothing of statutes which the Queen and the estates of the realm cannot repeal or amend in the ordinary form of an Act of Parliament. The succession to the Crown, the government of our Indian Empire, the constitutions of our self-governing colonies, all depend on Acts of Parliament indistinguishable in manner and form from the Margarine Act, or the last Act which may have been passed to remove doubts as to the validity of three or four marriages celebrated in some remote British consulate. To make a formal distinction between organic or constitutional and ordinary legislation is to destroy the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament, as it at present exists and is understood.[1]

[1] It is possible that the framers of one or both of the Acts of Union with Scotland and Ireland supposed themselves to be framing unchangeable organic laws. Whether they supposed this or not, no competent constitutional lawyer would now maintain that such was the legal effect in either case.

And therefore (which is more) it is to make a new constitution not only for Ireland and Great Britain in their mutual relations, but for the British Empire. Canada, Victoria, New Zealand, would not submit, and could not be expected to submit, to the supremacy of a Parliament that had made itself incompetent to legislate for Ireland. Some kind of new Imperial Parliament or Council would have to be formed for dealing with affairs of common concern. The Parliament at Westminster would become a local legislature for Great Britain, or perhaps for England alone. England herself would cease to be an imperial state, and would be one among many federated states—the first among equals, but nothing more.

It is not necessary to assume, nor do I assume, that this is in itself an impossible or absurd result. We cannot tell what the state of the British Empire may be a century hence, and the possibility of some kind of federal constitution being found practicable by our children is fair matter of speculation. It may be pointed out, for instance, that sooner or later the present constant apprehensions of European war must come to an end, either by a settlement following on a warlike trial of strength, or by some peaceable means as yet uncertain. Whenever this happens, one grave objection to a federal system for the British Empire—the executive weakness of such a system in foreign policy—will become of much less importance. But though it be rash to predict absolutely what a later generation may or may not find expedient, there is no rashness in holding that, if the British Empire does ever become a federal union, this will be a transformation greater and more arduous than has yet been accomplished in the history of political societies. An achievement of such

scope must be the product of ripe occasion and experience. No good can come of attempting to force it on before its time. And it is certain that the problem of imperial federation, whenever it is taken up seriously, will for more than one or two years leave us but scant leisure for domestic reform. There are a few thinking persons, I believe, who accept Home Rule for Ireland because they find in it a stepping-stone to imperial federation. It seems to me that, on their own principles, they are beginning at the wrong end. They would embark on a vast enterprise under conditions not only unfavourable but perverse. The British Empire does not exist for the sake of Ireland, still less for the sake of one party in Ireland. Home Rule must be Irish and Nationalist, or it is nothing; federation must be imperial and impartial, or it is nothing. Given a federal system, it might be possible to admit Ireland as a constituent without danger; but to work out a federal system by starting with the single and exceptional case of Ireland is a notion exceedingly remote, for both external and internal causes, from any reasonable expectation of success.

It all comes round to the same issue. By whatever ideas known to politicians or lawyers we test the shadowy presentment of Home Rule which seems to beckon us to a land of peace and concord, we find nothing but a fool's paradise, with an infinite wilderness beyond it. The Parliament of the United Kingdom is called on to abdicate the sovereign power and responsibility in these realms, not in any clear and settled view of good to come, but in sheer weariness and despair. The British Empire was not so made, and it cannot be so maintained. If we do not know how to govern Ireland, we must learn. It is a duty we cannot shuffle

off. Remissness in this duty gives the demand for Home Rule its only real strength. The cry is, "You cannot, or you will not, perform the office of rulers in Ireland; you have only perplexed matters with legislation, and instead of being firm and gentle in administration, you are violent and feeble by turns. Let an Irish Parliament make what it can of the task you have failed in. If it does no better, it can do no worse." A just and high-minded nation, a nation that has achieved what England has achieved in the most various undertakings of government, will not be so abject as to give way to such a cry. We cannot in honour abandon our office if we would. Our worst faults, in their effects, have been those of indifference and ignorance. There has been indifference—perhaps culpable indifference—in the public, and ignorance—perhaps culpable ignorance—where knowledge was to be looked for. But these faults are not invincible. Englishmen have overcome them before, and can do so again; the first of them is overcome already. Our people have a mind to be just; and the will to be informed, that they may do judgment with knowledge, is not lacking. To delegate the whole burden would be a strange, and, methinks, no worthy way of repairing what is amiss. I have tried to show that such a course would fail even of its own half-hearted purpose. The way of strenuous and patient justice, turned aside neither by evil nor by good report, will seem the more arduous, as it is the worthier. But the truth of things will not be escaped, and the nobler way is the only safe one at the last.

FREDERICK POLLOCK.

HOME RULE AND THE FORCES BEHIND IT.

BY

R. U. PENROSE FITZGERALD, M.P.

It is proposed to demonstrate in this article—(1) That Gladstonian Home Rule is not self-government, but the absolute negation of all self-government; (2) That the force or motive power behind, which has given to the present movement a strength and popularity never attained by similar movements in the past, has been the tempting offer to the present occupier of land in Ireland—that if this attempt was successful, the property of the landlord should be confiscated, and the land given rent-free, or nearly so, to the present occupier; and (3) That most of the Parnellite party at home, and all those in America, who have accepted Mr Gladstone's Home Rule, have done so only because they believe it to be a step towards the attainment of ultimate and total separation.

It is possible that there are some Irishmen who hold that the absolute, complete, and total separation of

[redacted]try from England is the best, if not the only, [redacted] for all the ills of Ireland, and yet wh[redacted]nd [redacted]been unable either to sanction the doing[redacted]ve methods, or countenance the associates of some [redacted]f [redacted]re[redacted] parliamentary representatives of the cou[redacted]. [redacted]e can be no doubt that there are hu[redacted] dreds of other Irishmen loyally devoted to [redacted]el- fare [redacted] prosperity of their country, who [redacted]at tota[redacted]tio[redacted]uld be a heaven-sent boon as co[redacted] pared [redacted]h th[redacted]cal degradation, the fiscal slaver[redacted] and the legisla[redacted]ve subordination which was [redacted] Ireland by the Government of Ireland Bi[redacted]Mr Gladstone. Strong words these last, but true[redacted]at Bill would have left Ireland with no voice in the I[redacted] perial Parliament; it left her without a Foreign Offi[redacted] with no right to make treaties or alliances [redacted]er nations, without control over her police [redacted]u- tive, without an army and without a navy; [redacted]th an obligation to pay a heavy annual subsidy for ev[redacted] to the Imperial Parliament, in which she was not [redacted] be represented. Taxation without representa[redacted]th a vengeance! Why, what was it brought [redacted]he Declaration of Independence by America? What w[redacted] the chief grievance the American States had again[redacted] Britain? Was it not that they were taxed by a Parli[redacted] ment in which they were not represented? [redacted]at was the very essence of Mr Gladstone's Bill? [redacted] it not t[redacted]land, b[redacted]regards[redacted]ms and excise a[redacted] tribu[redacted]s to be [redacted] by a I[redacted]ent in which s[redacted] was [redacted] to be represented? [redacted]nd if Britain was force[redacted] eld to [redacted]stice [redacted] claim of the Am[redacted]an [redacted]ies, by [redacted] right [redacted] with what jus[redacted] ill she be able to refuse to Ireland the same measure of absolute and total independence when once she has

placed her by a law made in the Imperial Parliament in a precisely similar position? Shall it be said that it was not justice but force that made Britain submit to the independence of America, and that, though Ireland, under the same circumstances, would have the same claim for justice, she would not have the necessary force? If this be so, then we may fairly ask, Was it justice that made Parliament, at the dictation of the professional Irishmen of to-day, agree to measures for the ruin and spoliation of one class of natural Irishmen in Ireland, and that the class that was known to be hostile to the political degradation of Ireland—a degradation which would certainly be caused by any such measure as the late Home Rule Bill? The proposed Bill, in fact, robbed Ireland of all that is most essential and most dear to free citizens of a free country. It was a scheme for the despotic rule of Ireland by the free Parliament of the rest of Great Britain. "No community which is not primarily charged with the ordinary business of its own defence, is really, or can be, in the full sense of the word, a free community."—(Mr Gladstone.) Surely, if anything can, this state of things would have given to Ireland the right to rebel—possibly the reason why the Bill was accepted by some of her representatives. And what said the United Irish National Societies of Chicago to the late Home Rule Bill? Did they accept it as final? Did they express themselves satisfied with its provisions? And, after all, he who pays the piper has a right to call the tune. In their Address, read at Chicago on the 14th August 1886, are the following words: "We distinctly declare, that until a majority of the people of Ireland shall have clearly announced that such an infinitesimal measure of justice or redress as was lately proposed by

[redacted]stone's Bill will be acceptable to them as a [redacted]ettlement of the great debt of justice [redacted] is [redacted]rom the British Crown to the Irish [redacted] we [redacted]l regard the offer or pledge of any parliamenta[redacted] [redacted]ve of Ireland to accept such an inadequ[redacted] [redacted]ession in full satisfaction and final sett[redacted] ment of [redacted]er just demand as unauthorised, a[redacted]la- tion [redacted] is sacred trust." And in the 'Irish [redacted] of No[redacted] 12[redacted], is the following:—

"[redacted] talk [redacted]finalities is the more foolish as t[redacted] past history of the Irish question shows it t[redacted]. . . . Finality as a plea has two uses. One i[redacted]ort pledges of content from a people surprised [redacted]ti- tude by half a loaf where they expected nothing. T[redacted] other is to bring people to do justice from policy, wh[redacted] they should do it because it is justice. In eit[redacted]ect it is unworthy of Mr Gladstone and the Englis[redacted]als. And in neither should it receive any countenance [redacted]om any friend of Ireland. There is no finality except j[redacted] tice, and Mr Gladstone's Home Rule plan is but a sm[redacted] instalment of justice to Ireland. . . . A p[redacted] to give them a Parliament, which shall have n[redacted] the of the power of that which they were robbed of, a[redacted] to keep this Parliament permanently under the st[redacted] motherly oversight of England. . . . The original p[redacted] posal which Mr Gladstone made was meagr[redacted]gh. It debarred the Irish nation from dealing w[redacted]es- tions [redacted]igion a[redacted]l, with[redacted]matic and milita[redacted] matt[redacted]d with [redacted], taxes [redacted] duties on impo[redacted] It bo[redacted] them for ever [redacted]e throne of the dynasty [redacted]ing in Britai[redacted] nade them an app[redacted]ge [redacted]e mili[redacted]nd di[redacted]c policy of th[redacted]ish Empire. It forbade them to create an army of their

the British army. It debarred them from fostering any Irish industry by the indirect method of taxation on imports."

The second-mentioned class of Irishmen, to whom reference has been made (well knowing that it is impossible to have two Parliaments in any one State co-equal and co-ordinate—for one must be sovereign and the other subordinate—and holding, as has been said, that total separation, however strongly they may object to it, would be better than the state of vassalage and subordination which the late Bill would have imposed upon Ireland) hold, and hold emphatically and consistently, that the only other alternative is the maintenance and strengthening of the Union on equal terms between Great Britain and Ireland. And for holding this opinion they have been condemned by the laws of the League to bankruptcy and ruin—a sentence which appears likely to be, if it has not already been, carried out with the assistance of some recent laws of Parliament.

In this paper we shall have but little to say of either of the above classes, not because they are not deserving of attention, or, indeed, of respect, but because they are not the classes who have given any support to the Parnellite or Home Rule movement of the present day. Our object is to inquire by what means the majority of the electors of the three southern provinces—men chiefly of the farming classes—have been persuaded to return as their representatives men who, as a rule, are not agriculturists, and who in many cases do not hail from the district they represent, but who are pledged to vote for Home Rule for Ireland, and who, while in their speeches in the House of Commons and their meetings and speeches in England, declare that they

ask for nor desire absolute separation, but are
d with an alteration in the constituti he
ples of the late Bill, for the purpose, as th of
sing "union of hearts," and binding Ireland m
Great Britain, declare with no less certa
voice o ry platform in Ireland and Am hat
nothing will satisfy them short of total on
fro t Brit in. Was it the spontaneous, unan-
imo reaching sentiment in favour
Home Rule animated those provinces? or w
there some other forces behind that were u her
to seduce or to terrorise them into acquiesc ith
that sentiment? In other words, Is it true that Irish
unrest is due far more to a desire for change in t
land laws than to passionate longing for national
dependence, or for that which was suppose e a
stepping-stone to national independence? It ost
remarkable circumstance that all previous attempts
get up agitation for the repeal of the Union ha
after short and turbulent lives, died a natural death
inanition from want of support and vitality ice
the movements of Mr O'Connell, Mr Smith —
and later, of the Fenians and Mr Butt. Now it is nec
sary to show, in the first place, that the attack on
landowners in Ireland is part of a deep-laid
for rousing the enthusiasm of the tenant-cl an
appeal to the worst sentiments of private g nd
publ der, a linki cry with the
man repeal,' total tial, to cripple
bega ar the s of la a means for facilitating
ultimat real ol namely, separati the
owning being regarded, rightly or wrongly,
as the first or main barrier to separation. We find so
far back as 1848 the force necessary to have behind a

movement for repeal, in order to make such a movement strong, as far as numbers are concerned, was discovered and explained by Mr Fintan Lalor in a newspaper published by him in that year, named 'The Irish Felon.' In the numbers of this paper of June 24, July 1, and July 8, 1848, is to be found fully and clearly stated the whole programme of the Land and National Leagues of 1879 and 1887; and though this programme practically lay dormant between 1848 and 1879, it was precisely the same means advocated by Mr Fintan Lalor in 1848 that were adopted in 1879 by the leaders of the Land League movement. In the 'Irish Felon' of June 24, 1848, Mr Lalor indicated the means by which the doctrine of "the land for the people" might be made to bring about or assist the movement for Irish national independence. In this declaration, Mr Lalor says: "The entire ownership of Ireland, moral and material, up to the sun and down to the centre of the earth, is vested as of right in the people of Ireland. The soil of the country belongs as of right to the entire people of that country —not to any one class, but the nation,—one condition being essential, that the tenant shall bear true and undivided allegiance to the nation whose land he holds, and owes no allegiance whatever to any other prince, power, or people, or any obligation of obedience or respect to their will, their orders, or their laws. No one has a higher respect for the rights of property than I have, but I do not class among them the robber rights by which the lands of this country are held in the grasp of Irish landlordism." This declaration was afterwards quoted by Mr Davitt on 23d January 1887, in a speech at New York as reported in 'The Irish World' of 29th January of the same year. Mr Davitt

...nded: "These, ladies and gentlemen, are the ...ples, these the convictions and this ... lu-...on, which presided over the birth of the La... ...rue ...veme..."

...ing to the paper from which Mr Dav... quoted, ... to the two following numbers, ... as-sages are found: "I mean to assert this, *th... ...nd qu... ...ontain ... and the legislative question does not ...* ...ls from which victory is manuf... ...tured; it is ... former question, and not on ... latter, that we must take our stand, and hu... ... to England our gage of battle. This island is ... ...nd have it we will." In the second number of the '... Felon' Mr Lalor further develops the scheme. ... denounces repeal of the Union as impracticable ... absurd, and points out that the operatio... ...nst England must be defensive. "The force of ... ...d," he says, "is intrenched and fortified. You cannot ganise or train or discipline your own force to ... point of efficiency. You must therefore ... ...ise and untrain and undiscipline that of the en... You must make the hostile army a mob, as you... will be; force it to act on the offensive, and oblige it ... undertake operations for which it never was ... structed. Nothing of all this could you do ... ...al.

"There is yet another class of means an... ...e of force, better founded in moral right, and more ...ent in a... ...han ei... ...itation ... ...litary insurrecti... Its ... may ... ...iefly st... ...s founded on ... ...ory of ... ... law— ...very distinct com... ...nity ... ation ... ... is ow... itself, and can ... ...r of ... t be b... ... to submit to be governed by another people. The practical assertion of the right consists of

"1. Abolition of British government.
"2. Formation of a national one. The mode of action which this country might have recourse to, consists—
"1. In refusal of obedience to usurped authority.
"2. In maintaining and defending such refusal of obedience.
"3. In resisting every attempt to exercise such usurped authority and every proceeding adopted to enforce obedience.
"4. In taking quiet and peaceable possession of all the rights and powers of government, and in proceeding quietly to exercise them.
"5. In maintaining and defending the exercise of such rights and powers should it be attacked. . . . Strip, then, and bid Ireland strip. Now or never—if, indeed, it be not yet too late to achieve independence. There is, I am convinced, but one way alone, and that is, *link repeal to some other question,* like a railway carriage to the engine—some question strong enough to carry both itself and repeal together. *And such a question there is in the land*—one ready prepared. Ages have been preparing it. An engine ready made; one, too, that will generate its own steam without cost or care—a self-acting engine, if once the fire be kindled. *Repeal had always to be dragged.* This I speak of will carry itself as the cannon-ball carries itself down the hill."

With regard to No. 4—"taking quiet and peaceable possession of all the rights and powers of government," &c.—any one who has studied the proceedings of Irish

failure of Mr O'Connell, of Mr Butt, and of the
us to arouse any real enthusiasm on th ion
national independence or Home Rule, de ted
erfection that the national movement could
lf—to use the straightforward language
Ir La nself, "it had to be dragged," an es-
tion of the land was the engine to which ck
wh s supposed to bear the national aspirations of
Ire cessity be linked. Is it necessary
it possible, to ish more clearly the identity of
two schemes and the methods of operation? ans
foreseen by Mr Lalor in 1848, by which al hu-
siasm in the cause of national independence could
excited, was "the land"—the means adopted by
Land and National Leagues were the "No-Rent"
"Plan of Campaign" manifestoes.

And now let us look for a moment at wh the
true sentiments and opinions of the leaders of the Ho
Rule party, when they openly speak their minds t
sympathetic audience other than the Hous of Com-
mons. Have they ever accepted as final Mr G e's
measure? have they ever failed to acknowle l to
express the opinion that *the land is the motive power*,
ruin of the landlords the means, and total separation
end at which they aim. In this, the means, the the
landlords, they have been assisted by a we ing
but certainly ill-advised Legislature, who, with all the
inte o do ju have, a ictation and thre
of tl y of se on, don most desperate
ice. T l and t ans the Parnellit ave
essed i uage f e easy of compr ion,
less ambiguous, than Mr Gladstone's. They have
consistently preached in Ireland and America a doc-

of their speeches, of which the following paragraphs are extracts:—

Mr Parnell, President of the Irish National League.—"Deprive them" (the landlords) "of the position of an English garrison in Ireland, and then the last knell of English power and government in Ireland would have sounded. . . . Let us see, as in 1782, one hundred thousand swords, both Catholic and Protestant, leaping from their scabbards, and . . . it will not be a question of chicanery or of Acts of Parliament, or of anything that can possibly interfere with the rights of our own people to make their own laws on the soil of Ireland."—Speech at Liverpool, November 30, 1879; 'Irishman,' December 6, 1879.

"If they" (the Government) "prosecute the leaders in this movement, it will not be because they wish to preserve the lives of one or two landlords—much the English Government care about the lives of one or two landlords—but it will be because they see that behind this movement there is a more dangerous movement to have a hold over Ireland; because they know that if they fail in upholding landlordism here—and they will fail—they have no chance of maintaining it in Ireland, because they know that if they fail in upholding landlordism in Ireland, their power to misrule Ireland will go too. . . . I would not have taken off my coat and gone to this work if I had not known that we were laying the foundations by this movement for the recovery of our legislative independence." — Speech at Galway, October 24, 1880; Official Report, Queen *v.* Parnell, &c., p. 165.

"Organise yourselves against the landlord system; and, believe me, the day is dawning when we shall have taken the first great step to strike down British misrule,

noble dreams of Grattan, Emmett, and Lord
d Fitzgerald, and of every Irish patric , at
times to be brought to a triumph and real —
ech at Beaufort, May 16, 1880; Official Rep
rnell, &c., p. 435.

Mr. Dillon, M.P.—"In the county of Ma ,
where the organisation is pretty strong, we ny
a far ving idle, from which no rent can wn,
and 'b ll lie; and if the landlord shall
cattl n the cattle won't prosper very much."
Speech at Ki are, August 15, 1880; Offic ort,
Queen *v.* Parnell, &c., p. 287.

"This is a cause which the Irish Nationa go
into, because its object is to break down and de
the English garrison which holds this country for E
land. Its object is to clear the path for Ir on-
ality by emancipating all the people of Irelan the
control of English landlordism."—Speech at Hollyr
October 17, 1880; Official Report, Queen *v.* Parnell,
p. 493.

Mr. T. M. Healy, M.P.—"We believe that l ism
is the prop of English rule, and we are work ake
that prop away. To drive out British rule from Irel
we must strike at the foundation, and that founda
is landlordism. We seek no bargain with Engl
As the Master said unto the tempter when ered
Him the kingdoms of heaven, 'Begone, Sat we
will unto t Begon on!'"—Speech
Bos Irishm ecembe 881.

Mr. A. O'C r, M.P. "e land agitation was only
eans to d, and end was the re- lish-
nt of th ple as an independent nation the
destinies of the country in their hands; so that they

that attempted to dominate the country, 'Hands off! we can manage our own affairs!'"—Speech at Maryborough, October 7, 1883; 'Freeman's Journal,' October 8, 1883.

Can anything show clearer than the above that total separation is the real object, and that the speakers, having arrived at the same conclusion as Mr Lalor did in 1848—namely, "that the land question contains, and the legislative question does not contain, the materials from which victory is manufactured"—have used the engine of the land temptation to drag the truck of total separation, the truck being labelled "Home Rule"?

We are examining as to what force or forces there were behind the movement for Home Rule. The land was one; was there no other? Was the elector allowed to vote and act according to his own views and ideas, or was he terrorised by the very real fear of pains and penalties and outrages to life, limb, or property? Earl Spencer says in his preface to the 'Handbook of Home Rule,' page 17: "It is absurd to say that these results are caused by terrorism exercised over the minds of the electors by the agitators in Ireland" (alluding to the number of votes accorded to the said agitators at the last elections). On what grounds Lord Spencer, who in 1881 (a period when he may fairly be supposed to have had an intimate knowledge of the doings of the agitators) used these words:—

"There exists a body of men who have not for their object, or at all events for their principal object, the advantage of the Irish tenant, but who are pursuing schemes of political revolution. The land agitation in their hands is not merely a constitutional agitation to redress land grievances, which is perfectly justifiable; it is an agitation whose object is to destroy the Union

of the empire, and to overthrow the established government of the United Kingdom. Mr Parnell admits now that what he wants is not 'fair rent,' he wants no rent at all; he wants to get rid of the landlords in order that he may get rid of the English Government, *and for this object every kind of intimidation has been employed to deter honest men from doing their duty* and fulfilling their obligations."—12th November 1881.

And again these words: "The deeds of those men to whom I have referred will, however, be as futile as they are dastardly. They will not terrify the English nation. The statesmen of the nation and the nation itself will face their enemy with a determination not to be beaten, and they will not give up one point or idea which they consider necessary to maintain the United Parliament of England and the sovereignty of the Queen. I say this not only to the English and Scotch nation, but I say it to the Irish nation."

On what grounds he now says that it is absurd to think that terror existed over the minds of the electors, we know not, and would much like to know. For one thing is quite certain—namely, that for years before the elections of both 1885 and 1886 the terror of the laws of the League was complete. The sentences for disobedience to those laws were severe and their execution certain. What were all the murders, leg-shatterings, maimings, and mutilations that took place between 1879 and 1886? They were not murders of police or landlords or bailiffs, they were the execution of sentences passed against members of the tenant-class, who had disobeyed the law of the League, and the very number of these murders, the severity and frequence of these sentences, shows how hard it was to drive the masses of the people into dishonest courses and obedience

to the unwritten law. "Absurd to say that the results were caused by terrorism"? Why, for years the country had been under the heel of the most tremendous despotism, which had long been able to show that its word was law, and that to break that law was to incur certain, swift, and severe punishment.

In an article such as this there is not space for all the quotations from judges' charges, newspapers, &c., which go to prove this statement; but surely Sir George Trevelyan knew something of the country in 1885, and what is his evidence?

"The poor, the helpless, the uninfluential, the farmers and labourers throughout the south and west of Ireland who, at a terrible risk to life and limb, insisted on fulfilling their legal obligations; the smaller and humbler officers of the law, who did their duty through the bad times, will now be left to the mercy of those who have not concealed their intention of paying them out whenever they can get a chance."

"It is not only landlords and red-hot Orangemen who feel apprehensive, it is every one who has asserted his legal right to work for whom he likes; every one who takes any part in bringing to justice those whom the organs of the new administration and party regard as victims and martyrs, every quiet citizen and every member of that minority, which would not be a minority if both parties would join in determining that law and order should no longer be trifled with any more than it is trifled with in Yorkshire and Somersetshire."

"The inquisition into the conduct of jurymen at an Irish trial has always been most searching. One very well-known gentleman in the south of Ireland sat on a jury on an agrarian crime. He was among those who were for a conviction. The jury disagreed; the prisoner

was not punished; but this gentleman was none the less a marked man, and he was murdered."—Sir George Trevelyan at Hawick, May 5, 1886.

From the nature of the case it is evident that to get witnesses to give their names in such times is an impossibility; and to any one who knows Ireland, and whose mind is not warped by party or political motives, it is notorious that the elections were obtained by widespread and perfectly organised terrorism, by undue influence, and other flagrant violations of the Ballot Act, and, when they did vote without intimidation, it was, as Professor Goldwin Smith has said, "because the people were simply voting for freedom from imperial restraint to complete the spoliation of the landlords."

The following evidence of unsuccessful candidates, collected just after the elections of 1885 and 1886, shows how right Sir George Trevelyan was in saying that the people considered that it was at a "terrible risk to life and limb that they fulfilled their legal obligations." A candidate for one of the divisions of Munster writes: "Many said they would be afraid to vote for me, and would not vote against me, and this was borne out by the fact that nearly 2000 did not vote at all." Another candidate writes: "Personally I was treated with great respect, and not a word was said against me; but the National League had its ramifications in every townland, and the organisation is perfect, as the dread of being boycotted has completely cowed the people." The candidate for one of the divisions of Connaught writes: "Shopkeepers said to me when canvassing, 'Go away; I will vote for you, but don't be seen talking to me.' Such a state of abject fear was never before known in a civilised country. The organisation is now simply perfect, and is as cruel, as relent-

less, as far-seeing as the old Inquisition." A candidate for one of the boroughs in the south writes: "The most remarkable feature in the contest was the abstention of 2240 voters, notwithstanding the greatest pressure of the Roman Catholic clergy and organised canvassers. I attribute this to a general want of confidence in the secrecy of the ballot, and the dread of separation from England in the minds of comfortable farmers and independent small shopkeepers." A candidate for a division of Leinster writes: "As far as I can judge, the respectable farmers are getting very tired of the National League, and I got many letters promising support from Roman Catholic farmers, but I was not to tell any one, as they were afraid of being boycotted." The agent of a Roman Catholic candidate for one of the divisions of a midland county writes: "Over a thousand votes were not recorded. These were principally loyalists, who were prevented, I believe, from going to the poll for fear of consequences which might ensue to them. Nearly every voter on the other side was polled."

Since the time the above was written, it is quite true that Mr Gladstone has changed his opinion of the mode of action of the Separatist party; for, speaking at Derby on the 20th of October 1887, he is reported to have said: "It is commonly said, gentlemen, that I am now engaged in co-operating with those who, on a former occasion, I denounced as propounders of plans that signified rapine and meant the dismemberment of the empire. It is quite true that in the year 1881 I did describe in that strong language the policy which the Nationalist leaders of Ireland seemed to me at that time pursuing. . . . My belief . . . was that the intention of that party was not simply to seek equita-

ble adjustment between the tenants and the landlords of Ireland, but to destroy the essence of landed property in that country, and thereby to break up social order and the essential conditions on which the empire is united. . . . I find no such purpose entertained by the Nationalists of Ireland. As they have obtained greater power their moderation has become conspicuous. As they now command an overwhelming majority, so all grounds of suspicion for a desire to destroy the landed property of Ireland has disappeared."—'Times,' 21st October 1887.

Let us see what the evidence of this "conspicuous moderation" is. Mr Justice O'Brien, at the opening of the Kerry Assizes in March 1887, used these words: " . . . The law is defied—perhaps I should rather say has ceased to exist. Houses are attacked by night and day, even the midnight terror yielding to the noonday audacity of crime. Person and life are assailed. The terrified inmates are wholly unable to do anything to protect themselves, and a state of terror and lawlessness prevails everywhere. . . . And to all those evils we have to add another, and perhaps the worst of all—that of which you are all conscious, and of which experience and observation reaches you every day in all forms of social life, a system of unseen terrorism, a system of terror and tyranny that the well-disposed classes of the community ought to detest and abhor, and of which, on all sides, I have heard, in this country and other countries, one universal expression and desire in reference to it—that some means should be found to put an end to it." And Mr Justice Johnson, at the Cork Assizes of March 1887, spoke thus in his charge: " . . . Is it possible, then, that people living in isolated houses, subjected to attacks of that kind, can

be expected to do any duty in the interests of the public? can they discharge their duty as ratepayers, as poor-law guardians, or as jurors? As long as the law is not maintained, as long as the law of violence and midnight marauding is allowed to exist, there can be no peace or security in the country." And the same judge at Limerick, at the March Assizes, 1887, says: " . . . I found here that in no less than nine cases parties of armed men, frequently disguised and under other circumstances which have enabled them to avoid detection and be made amenable, have gone deliberately roaming through the country for the purpose of wreaking vengeance on the unfortunate inmates of peaceable homes, sometimes in the number of thirty, sometimes in the smaller number of from two to thirty; sometimes accompanied by cases of brutal violence. I have a case before me in which a peaceable family were dragged from their beds at night, and even the woman of the house was dragged from her bed and brutally beaten. There is another case where a son, because he had the courage to stand up for his father, was shot through the thigh."

Yet all this was in 1887, after they " commanded an overwhelming majority." And Mr Dillon, one of the most outspoken of the party, in a speech at Dublin on the 23d August 1887, showed his " conspicuous moderation " in these words: " I am alluding now to combination amongst tenants, known as the ' Plan of Campaign.' Now let me say this, that, if there be a man in Ireland, and I do not believe there is, if there is a man in Ireland base enough to back down, to turn his back on the fight now that Coercion has passed, I pledge myself in the face of this meeting that I will denounce him from public platforms by name, and I pledge myself

to the Government that, let that man be whom he may, his life will not be a happy one either in Ireland or across the seas. And I say this with the intention of carrying out what I say."—('Freeman's Journal,' August 24, 1887.) And the same speaker at Castlereagh, County Roscommon, on December 5, 1886, is reported as follows in the 'Freeman's Journal' of December 6, 1886: "And I warn the men to-day, who take their stand by the side of landlordism and signalise themselves as the enemies of the people, that in the time of our power we will remember them. And I warn you that in the day of struggle you are going into this winter, your enemies have a day of reckoning at hand." And again the same speaker at Dublin, on the 23d August 1887 ('Freeman's Journal,' 24th August), said: "I want to say plainly that, so far as I go, I intend to practise the same form of intimidation in spite of all proclamations or persecutions they can enforce. If the operations of the League in the past can be correctly described by intimidation, then I say I intend to practise them and preach them." And previous to the above date, but after they had commanded their overwhelming majority, Mr Dillon is reported in the 'Freeman's Journal' of Monday, 24th January, speaking to a meeting at Glenbeigh, as follows: "I will show Mr Roe, if he has any stomach for such work, men who can pay and won't pay, because I tell them not to pay. I will show him men who avow that they can pay and refuse to pay, because they are in the Plan of Campaign. I challenge Mr Roe to come and face me in Mayo, Tipperary, or North Kerry, and I will teach him a lesson there that will last him his life."

Can any one reconcile these statements with that

"conspicuous moderation" which Mr Gladstone has found in the Separatist party since the last election? and can any one deny in the face of this evidence that, in the first place, Home Rule, as offered by Mr Gladstone, is not self-government; in the second, that the motive power behind the demand for Home Rule was the greed to possess the land of others; and, thirdly, that the Home Rule party have simply used that cry as a stepping-stone to total separation? Was Mr Gladstone right when, in 1882, he spoke of Mr Dillon in the House of Commons thus: "The hon. gentleman comes here as the apostle of a creed, which is a creed of force, which is a creed of oppression, which is a creed of the destruction of all liberty and of the erection of a despotism against it and on its ruins, different from every other despotism only in this that it is more absolutely detached from all law, from all tradition, and from all restraint"? And, if so, where are the evidences of Mr Dillon's conversion to "conspicuous moderation"? And was Sir William Harcourt right when he used these words of Mr Dillon in the House of Commons on March 3, 1881? "We have heard the doctrine of the Land League expounded by a man who is an authority to explain it. The doctrine so expounded is a doctrine of treason and assassination. . . . To-morrow it will be in the hearing of the *civilised world*, which will pronounce its judgment on this vile conspiracy. I knew that these were the objects of the Land League."

R. U. PENROSE FITZGERALD.

SEPARATIST DEMANDS AND UNIONIST REMEDIES.[1]

BY THE

MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON.

NOVEMBER 1887.

I SHALL attempt to enlist your attention for the short time during which I can be permitted to address you on that greater subject which underlies all these temporary phases of the Irish question, on that question which, though it may for a moment be slumbering, will undoubtedly at some not distant period be revived, which appears in all probability to be the question which will be the dividing line between parties in the Parliament of Great Britain, and which, for Ireland and for Irishmen, has larger and wider and greater and deeper issues at stake than any which can belong to merely political or party issues. Therefore, in what I shall say to you to-night, I propose to speak on the

[1] Extracts from speeches delivered in Dublin, November and December 1887.

subject of the future of the government of Ireland, on that question which is known to us as the Home Rule question; and I propose to examine as shortly, and, I hope, as calmly and temperately as I can, some of the bearings on that question, and to consider what portion of the Irish people it is that desires to support the Home Rule measures of the late Government, and why they support them, and also what portion of the Irish people are opposed to and dread that policy, and on what grounds they dread it. This is a question which comes home to Irishmen in a sense different from that in which it presents itself to us in England. For us it is a question affecting the continued greatness of the empire. For us it is a question how it will work upon the position of Great Britain in the world, on its estimation in Europe, on the opinion of foreign nations, what effect it will have upon the allegiance and respect of our colonies, and what effect it may have upon our great Indian empire. For us it is a question of the maintenance of our Constitution as it at present exists. For us it is a question whether parliamentary government, the supremacy of Parliament, as we have hitherto known it, can survive the blow which is sought to be inflicted upon it; whether our parliamentary institutions and our parliamentary system of government can survive this commencement and introduction into our system of the principle of disintegration. For us it is a question of honour whether it is competent to us—the Parliament of Great Britain—to abandon engagements on which we have deliberately entered, and to intrust to others the fulfilment of engagements to which the honour and the credit of Parliament is pledged. For us it is a question of duty whether we are entitled to abandon to the care of any other or inferior assembly

the lives, the liberties, and the property of subjects of the Queen who have obeyed the laws of Parliament, and who have shown themselves as loyal and devoted citizens of the British empire as any who are to be found in the remainder of the United Kingdom. To us all these questions present themselves, and you also in Ireland who are proud of the title of British citizens, who are not willing to surrender any of the rights which you possess as British citizens, you, no doubt, will also look on these questions from the same imperial point of view as we strive to do it. But Irishmen would be something more than human if they were to neglect all consideration of the manner in which the decision of this question will affect their own interests, their own security, their own prospects in life; and I think I might add that Irishmen would be wanting in their duty to Ireland if they were not to look at this subject first, foremost, and mainly from the point of view in which it will affect in the future the prosperity and the progress of Ireland. . . .

Suppose we acknowledge that at the present moment there is a majority in Ireland which has expressed its adhesion to the Separatist policy which was proposed in the last Parliament. I ask, gentlemen, whether the fact is conclusive in the minds even of English Home Rulers? Are they prepared to say that they are ready to grant anything which the Irish majority will ask for? They have distinctly repudiated any such admission. They tell you in every speech they make that if Ireland, if a majority of the Irish people, were to ask for separation or for absolute independence, they would never grant it. They tell you they would not grant Home Rule unless Home Rule were surrounded by safeguards and by checks which would adequately

secure the continued supremacy of Parliament, and which would secure the protection of minorities in Ireland. And therefore, by their admissions, they are not willing to grant everything which the Irish majority may demand, but only that which commends itself to their own judgment. And that being the state of the case, I maintain that it devolves upon them to prove that which they have never yet attempted, or at least attempted successfully — to prove, namely, that the Home Rule which they are willing to grant to Ireland is the thing which the majority of the Irish people are asking for, or that they will satisfy the real desire of the Irish majority by the concession of this limited Home Rule. I should say that all the indications are entirely in the contrary direction. If we look at the speeches and declarations of the leaders of the Separatist party in Ireland before the proposals which were made by Mr Gladstone, if we look at the speeches which even now are made by members of Mr Parnell's party in America, if we look at the declarations and the opinions of the Irish party in America, which exercises so great an influence on the counsels of the Home Rule party in Ireland, we shall come, I think, to the conclusion that the real object for which they have been striving, the real object for which they are striving now, is not for any limited system of Home Rule, not for any limited and subordinate parliamentary government such as is offered to them, but for national independence and for complete separation from Great Britain. And again, gentlemen, if we look at the course of the struggle which is taking place in Ireland itself, if we look at the causes of the resistance to the law which is now going on, we shall find that the struggle partakes far more of an agrarian struggle for the possession of the land than

for any reform or change in the system of the government of Ireland. Well, gentlemen, we shall perhaps be able to obtain some better insight into what is the real nature of the demand of the Irish majority if we attempt to examine for a moment what are the objects for which it appears to be made. We used to hear, and we heard very justly, of Irish grievances; but Mr Gladstone himself declared not very long ago that Irish grievances had been removed, and it is true. Roman Catholic disabilities no longer exist. The Irish Church, which was considered to be an insult to the faith of the great majority of the inhabitants of Ireland, no longer possesses a position of pre-eminence and power. The land laws have been reformed—perhaps not to the extent which all Irishmen would desire, but at all events to a great extent in the direction of popular Irish demand. I can myself recollect when Irish patriots in the House of Commons, pointing to the grievances of the Irish Church and to the inequitable character of the Irish land laws, have promised to the House of Commons that when these grievances were redressed, Irish discontent would cease; and they made those promises with just as much confidence as the Irish patriots who are now promising that Irish discontent will be appeased, and Irish contentment will begin to prevail, as soon as a limited form of Home Rule and national self-government is granted to them.

But perhaps it may be said that Irishmen are asking for Home Rule in order to conclude the not yet settled question of the land. Is the question of the Irish land, in the opinion of the English Home Rule party, a question which is to be left to the arbitrament of an Irish Parliament? On the contrary, it has been declared that the Irish land is a question which cannot be left

to be settled by an Irish Parliament, but which must be preliminarily settled by the Parliament of Great Britain. In that position the Irish Home Rule party have acquiesced by their acceptance of the Government Bills of last year; and I ask you, gentlemen, whether the English Home Rule party and the Irish Home Rule party were not right in that contention, and whether any Irishman honestly believes that the vexed and difficult question of the Irish land can be brought to a satisfactory or a just settlement by the intervention of an Irish Parliament alone? What else, then, is there? What are the subjects which Parliament is unwilling or unable to deal with, and which are to be settled for the benefit of Ireland by an Irish Parliament? We may be told that the agricultural interest in Ireland is depressed; but I ask whether the agricultural interest in Ireland is more depressed than the agricultural interest in England, or, in fact, in every country in Europe? We may be told that the condition of a portion of the west and south of Ireland is deplorable, and I fully admit it. But again I ask, Is there any remedy that has been proposed to Parliament by Irish members, and which Parliament is unwilling to consider? Do you suppose, gentlemen, that there is any remedy for either the agricultural depression which pervades the whole of Ireland, or for its more intensified form which prevails in certain portions of Ireland, which the Parliament of the United Kingdom would not be ready to take up and grapple with if any suggestion of a reasonable character could be made? Are we to suppose, gentlemen, that Mr Parnell and his followers have got some specific remedy for the evils and grievances that prevail, which specific they will not disclose save in an Irish Parliament? No; I be-

lieve that it is doing the people of Ireland the greatest injury, and anything but good service, to induce them to believe that evils which are of a purely economic character can be redressed by the action of any political changes. Whatever may have been the case in the past, I believe that the present democratic Parliament of Great Britain is ready and only too anxious to listen to any proposals which may be made which will have the effect of improving the material condition of Ireland or any part of Ireland; and it is idle for the Separatist Irish members to attempt to persuade the people of Ireland or the people of Great Britain that they have remedies which could be adopted by an Irish Parliament which a British Parliament is unwilling to consider. I think that before we are asked to assent to so great a change we ought to be told something more definite as to the grounds upon which the majority of the Irish people are desiring this change. I could understand a people asking for absolute independence, but that is the very thing we are told the Irish people are not now asking for. I could understand a majority of the people of Ireland asking for an agrarian revolution, but that is the very thing which the English Home Rulers are telling us they will not grant. I can understand that there may be a number of extremely able and distinguished politicians who are seeking for places and for power who think that a change in the system of government might open the Civil Service, the Bar, and the professions to their abilities, and that there are many offices that can be discharged more fitly than by those who now occupy them. All these suppositions I could understand; but what I feel a difficulty and an impossibility in understanding is, that a whole people should

be supposed to be enthusiastic in the support of something which is not national independence, which is not agrarian revolution, and which is only a small modification of the system of government under which they at present live. I proceed to ask how far this majority of the Irish people has a claim to speak in the name of Ireland? If this majority were really representative of the whole people of Ireland—if it were representative not of any one class alone, but of all classes—if it were really representative of the intelligence, the education and industry, the conscience, and the deliberate opinion of Ireland, the demand which that majority makes would present itself in a very different way to us. It might be our duty to imperial considerations, it might be our duty as British citizens, even then to refuse a demand which we believe to be dangerous to the interests of the empire as a whole. But as regards Ireland itself, the demand would come before us in a very different form from that in which it now presents itself. At all events, in such a case we should be able to say to a nation which as a nation really demands self-government, "Upon you and upon your children, in whose name you speak, be the responsibility. You have asked for this thing, foreseeing, foreknowing all the consequences of it; and if it fails, upon you will rest the responsibility." But, gentlemen, are we in a position to say anything of the kind at the present time? Can we point to a demand that is made in the name of Ireland as a nation? And if the policy should fail, can we say that it will have been done without protest from Ireland, without resistance worthy of consideration from Ireland itself? Gentlemen, I would rather say that if this demand should now be conceded, it would be conceded in deference to the pressure of one class of

the community, and in opposition to the wishes of, and in defiance of the protest of, every other class which has authority to speak in the name of Irish interests. It is perfectly true, as I have admitted before, that the class which is asking for this change is probably the most numerous; but if we look at Ireland as we are asked to look at her, as a nation, are we going to look at the interest of one class alone?

Is any Irishman content to look forward to an Irish future which shall be that of Ireland as a purely agricultural country, dependent solely upon the agricultural produce, dependent on her competition with the world on what she may be able to produce from a soil not more fertile than the soils of many other countries, and a climate which is certainly inferior to many climates in other parts of the world? If Ireland is going to remain for ever a purely agricultural country, you may settle the land question as you like; you may expel the landlords from Ireland if you please; you may hope whatever you like from the stimulus to agricultural industry which, not very reasonably, you expect to follow the process of an act of confiscation; you may hope what you like from agricultural changes and agrarian changes. But I maintain that if Ireland would remain for ever dependent upon her agricultural industry alone, Ireland must remain for ever a poor country. If her population is maintained at its present level, she must remain a discontented, disaffected country; and if her population is reduced in proportion to the means of subsistence, she must remain for ever a weak, an insignificant country. No patriotic Irishman is satisfied with such a prospect as this; and if every patriotic Irishman desires, as he does, to see Ireland no longer dependent on one industry alone, to see her

population increasing instead of diminishing, to see her means of subsistence for that population increasing more than in proportion to the population itself; if he expects and desires to see the quick brains and the undoubted industry of the Irish people taking their proper place in the future competitions of the world—what is he to look to, what is he to hope for, except that Ireland shall cease to be purely dependent upon agriculture, and that she shall include within her borders the manufactures and the industries which have raised the neighbouring countries of the world? If you want to see Irish industrial enterprise and manufactures and commerce developed in Ireland, have not manufacturers, have not capitalists, have not traders and merchants, have not the leaders of your great industrial enterprises something to say to it? If you are going altogether to neglect the opinions of these men, if you are going to ridicule their fears, perhaps to cast them out from among you, to deprive them of any share of influence in the government of your country, do you think that that will be an inducement to them to employ their capital, their intellect, and their labour in the service of the country which treats their advice and their fears in this manner? I maintain that the minority which is opposed to this policy largely includes those classes upon which the future prosperity of Ireland mainly depends. . . .

I believe, then, that you are perfectly justified not only in resisting the measures which were introduced last year, but in refusing your assent to any supposition that any partial modification or changes of those measures can render them at once acceptable to the majority of the Irish people and at the same time consistent with the benefits of the maintenance of the

British connection. I have on other platforms taken up and maintained that position. I have been accused of ignoring, discarding, and insulting Irish national sentiment. I have been accused of going back from what I have said upon the question of the extension of local self-government in Ireland. On the question of local self-government in Ireland I will not detain you to-night, but I say that those who accuse me of ignoring or insulting Irish national opinion, have either not taken the trouble of listening to what I have said or have wilfully misrepresented it. National aspirations, national sentiment, national patriotism, do not necessarily require a separate Parliament or an inferior and subordinate system of parliamentary government in order to give expression to them. We have an instance of this within the limits of the United Kingdom. No one can deny the existence of national feeling and national aspirations in the kingdom of Scotland. No one can say that the love of Scotland and the pride in Scottish traditions and Scottish history burn less strongly in the hearts of Scotchmen than the love of Ireland does in the hearts of Irish patriots. But Scotch national sentiment does not require a separate Parliament or Government in order to give effect to its aspirations. In the case of Scotland, one Parliament and one Executive Government has been found to be compatible with the existence of a totally independent system of law, with an independent and separate national Church, with an independent and distinct system of national education, and with the administration of all Scotch offices by Scotchmen ; and the only condition which has been attached to this recognition of national feeling and national sentiment, even, it may be, of national prejudice of Scotland, is that Scotchmen

should acknowledge one Parliament as the supreme legislative authority, and one Government as the supreme Executive. If the case has been very different in Ireland, if less deference has been paid in the case of Ireland to the opinions and the feelings of Irishmen, and if they have had less influence in the councils of the Imperial Parliament, if they have less influence in the administration of their own affairs, that has arisen mainly, I believe, from the fact that Irishmen have in times past, as they are, unfortunately, doing now, shown their unwillingness to conform to the law of Parliament, even when it is a just law, or to respect the authority of the Imperial Executive Government. But, gentlemen, whatever may have been the case in times past, I believe that now—when the democracy of Great Britain is fully and fairly represented in the Imperial Parliament, when no other desire exists in the mind of any subject of Great Britain than to do fair and equal justice to Ireland—it is in the power of Ireland and of the leaders of the Irish people to obtain for themselves and for their constituencies equal deference to their opinions and an equal share in the government of their own country, equal attention to their own grievances, equal attention to every representation which they may make, not by means of rebellion, not by means of forcible resistance to the law, not by obstruction in Parliament, but by simply acknowledging the existence of facts which have taken place and which are irrevocable, and by reposing in the people of the sister island that full measure of confidence which we, on our part, are only too willing and too ready to extend in a full measure to the people of Ireland. . . .

DECEMBER 1887.

It seems in the opinion of some that are opposed to us that the Unionist party love coercion for itself, and take an absolute pleasure in the suppression of free speech and in the suppression of a free press, and that it is one of their greatest enjoyments if they are able to place a trusted leader of any portion of the people in prison on account of his political opinions. I may say on behalf of the Unionist party, and I believe I may say it as truly on behalf of the Conservative section of that party as on the part of the Liberal Unionists, that we hate—we detest—any unnecessary interference with the ordinary law of the country, and that there is nothing we desire more than that Ireland should be governed by the same system of law and should possess to a full degree equal rights and equal liberties to those which are enjoyed by the people of the rest of the United Empire. But if we detest coercion, there is one thing which we detest still more, and that is the impunity of crime, the suppression of private liberty, of the right of individuals to conduct their own business and to carry on their own affairs according to their own wish without tyrannical interference by any secret and irresponsible association. We deny altogether that we, the Unionist party, are responsible for the necessity of the Coercion Act. We say that the true responsibility for these Acts rests, in the first place, upon the Separatist party, who have made them a necessity; and in the second place, and in scarcely an inferior degree, upon those statesmen who have, as we think, weakly surrendered to the policy which has been forced upon them by the Irish Separatists. For some years past the policy of the Irish Separatist

party has not been concealed. It has been a policy of forcing upon the British Legislature by compulsion a measure which they could not persuade the British Legislature to adopt by argument, by means of the obstruction in Parliament of which, I believe, the leader of the Irish Home Rule party, Mr Parnell, was the first chief inventor. Obstruction in Parliament is part of precisely the same policy as resistance to the law in Ireland and the tyranny of boycotting. These are all arms of the League and of the Separatist party used to the one end of endeavouring to prove that the government of Ireland under the law of the Imperial Parliament and by the Imperial Government is an impossibility. And I say, gentlemen, that the policy has not been concealed, but has with cynical frankness been admitted by the leaders of the Separatist party. . . .

The policy of proving the government of Ireland to be impossible had already had the effect of converting the leaders and the great proportion of the Liberal party, and it remained to be seen whether the persistence in that policy might not still have the effect of converting the whole people of the British Islands. The policy was announced at once without delay of proving to demonstration that that government was impossible; and hence we had a renewal, a fresh outbreak, of resistance to the law, a fresh outbreak of obstruction in Parliament, a fresh outbreak of persecution of every individual in Ireland who was willing to obey or to respect the law. Gentlemen, it is against an organised policy such as this that Bills which are stigmatised as Coercion Bills are necessary. Our ordinary law is sufficient and is competent to deal with the ordinary cases of scattered, isolated, and individual

crime; but it need not be a matter of surprise to any one of us that the ordinary law, which is intended for a peaceful and law-abiding country, should be insufficient to cope with a conspiracy which is directly intended to prove that a portion of the United Kingdom should be ungovernable by the ordinary law of the country. And I say that the task of creating and promoting this resistance to the law was not so difficult or so arduous as it might appear. We have the authority of Mr Gladstone himself for the statement. But a very short time ago, in a great speech which Mr Gladstone made upon the Irish question, he declared that if you wanted to demoralise a people and to preach the doctrines of public plunder, it did not require superhuman ability to obtain a considerable number of adherents for such a policy. And it is under exactly the same circumstances as those which were denounced by Mr Gladstone in 1881 that we are called upon to contend to-day, and the same necessity has arisen in 1887 to deal with what are called measures of coercion as in 1881. But, gentlemen, the responsibility for bringing Coercion Acts on our country is not the only one which rests on Mr Parnell and the Home Rule party. It is they also, as has been explained in the able speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who are responsible if the extension of larger powers of local self-government should be delayed beyond the time when that extension might properly take place. The task is a difficult one for any Government to undertake when it meets with no supporters among those who profess to lead, and do, indeed, exercise a large influence on a large portion of the population. The task of bringing forward a measure of local self-government is a difficult one for a Govern-

ment in the position of the present Government, engaged as it is in the first duty of any Government, in an endeavour to enforce the law. But apart from these difficulties, I believe it to be the desire of every Unionist that equal privileges and equal facilities for self-government should be extended to the whole of the empire. The difficulties, as I have said, are great, and the temptation may be great to rely for the maintenance of the Union solely upon force and solely upon exceptional law. But I believe that the sooner the Unionist party finds itself in a position to deal in terms of perfect equality with the people of Ireland, as compared with those of Great Britain, the easier will our task become, and the more firmly shall we secure the maintenance of the Union between Great Britain and Ireland. Gentlemen, in both those tasks, both in the preservation of the legislative union that now exists, and in the extension of equal liberties to Ireland as compared with those of Great Britain, we in England cannot act alone. We are powerless without the co-operation of the loyal party in Ireland. To you we look for support. We trust to you to enable us to show our fellow-countrymen in Great Britain that there is another party in Ireland as deeply attached to our institutions and our laws as any of them are ourselves. To you we look to prove to them that you are equally willing to trust your fellow-countrymen and to extend to them equal liberties and equal laws.

HARTINGTON.

THE CONTROL OF THE IRISH LAW COURTS AND POLICE.

BY

LORD SELBORNE.

It was proposed, in 1886, to place the whole judicature (except the Court of Exchequer) and the whole police force of Ireland under the control of the Irish Legislature and the Irish Executive, which the Bill of that year would have created—not indeed immediately, but after an interval of two years. The interposition of that interval may have been proposed under the idea that the transition would so be made easier, but there was more reason for apprehending from it the contrary effect. It may safely be said, in view of the tone adopted by the organs of the Nationalist movement towards the police, that a paralysis must have at once fallen upon the efficacy of that force for its proper purpose. And although the holders of judicial office might have done their duty without fear or favour, it is impossible that a sentence of condemnation, practically

passed upon them, and upon the system of law and government which they were bound to administer, could, during that two years' respite, have left their authority unimpaired.

Upon this point, however, it is unnecessary to dwell. Whether, in any new measure of the same kind, the transfer of power over the judicature and the police force from imperial to Irish hands might be immediate or postponed, its effect, when it came into operation, would be substantially the same. And it may be regarded as certain, that this transfer itself will form part of every scheme for establishing an Irish Parliament, with an Irish Executive responsible to the Irish Parliament and not to the Parliament of the United Kingdom.

Upon the supposition of a complete and acknowledged separation between Great Britain and Ireland, such as would take place if the legislative power of the Irish Parliament, with an Irish Executive responsible to it, were as absolute and unlimited as that conceded to Grattan's Parliament by the Act of 1783, Ireland would be (so far as an Act of the Imperial Parliament could make it) an independent nation. The authority of the Crown could not be used so as practically to qualify that independence, without a departure from the principles of constitutional government; and this could not take place without an indirect resumption, by the Imperial Legislature, of the practice of interference in the internal affairs of Ireland, which would have been in principle renounced. But the scheme of 1886 gave not an absolute but a qualified and conditional independence, with important exceptions and reservations; and I assume that, in any future scheme which its authors might again propose, there would be exceptions and reservations more or less similar.

There is no possible way of securing public and private liberty in any State, and especially in a State where factions run high (as in Ireland has always been the case, and is always likely to be), without an independent, impartial, and sufficiently strong administration of the law. For this purpose it is essential that the judicature should be free from control or interference by the Executive, either direct or through any legislative body in which the power of the persons administering the Executive Government is generally predominant; and also, that the police force (in itself forming part of the Executive) should be assistant and subsidiary to the judicature, enforcing and executing its decrees, and acting, under legal responsibility, for the prevention and repression of lawlessness and crime. It ought not to be in the power of the Executive authorities, without incurring the responsibility, public and private, of wrong-doers, to withhold the assistance of the police when necessary for the execution of the judgments of the Courts, or to make use of that force for purposes not warranted by law. Behind the police, in cases of emergency rendering the use of extraordinary force necessary, there must stand the military power; which, again, ought to be subject to civil responsibility when acting without warrant of law.

In the United States this balance of forces is secured, partly by the universal limitation of all legislative powers —both those of the Federal Congress and those of the States—and partly by making the judgments of the Supreme Court of the United States conclusive as to the transgression of those limitations by any legislature. That Court has to judge, not merely of the construction and application, but also of the validity of all legislative acts, whether of Congress or of any State

legislature. And there is present everywhere, not only a police force subject to the law and Executive Government of each particular State, but a force subject to the direct authority of the Federal Government, capable of executing, and bound in due course of law to execute, the judgments of the Supreme Court.

In the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland the independence of the judicature, and the assistance and subordination of the police and the military force to law, are secured by other means. The judges of the different Courts hold their offices on terms defined by law, and during good behaviour—those of the higher Courts can only be removed by a concurrent vote of both Houses of Parliament. There is one final Court of appeal—to the House of Lords—from all the higher Courts of the United Kingdom, and this ultimate tribunal is itself independent of the Executive power. Any Minister of State who might interfere to prevent the police from giving to the judgments of the Courts in favour of private litigants the assistance necessary for their execution in the course of law, would incur civil liability, and might be exposed to the penalties of contempt against the Courts. If any Minister were to employ the police force or the military for unlawful purposes, he might (according to the nature of the case) incur criminal responsibilities also. Of these safeguards for law, freedom, and justice, none can be altered without new legislation, in which both Houses of Parliament must concur.

Let it now be considered how these matters would stand under a new constitution for Ireland, transferring to an Irish Parliament, with an Irish Executive responsible to it, the whole control over the judicature and the police force, and at the same time placing some

limitations and restrictions upon the powers of the Irish Parliament. Let it also be assumed that the Irish Parliament would not have any military force placed directly at its disposal, but that the control of the army would remain with the British Government, responsible to an Imperial Parliament, by whatever name called, or however constituted.

The very existence of restrictions and limitations upon the legislative powers of the new Irish Parliament would naturally lead to such an exercise of those powers, within their assigned limits (I do not now enter into the question how long or how far those limits would be ostensibly observed), as to fortify them, and to strengthen the hands of the Irish Executive, against the checks upon the popular will contemplated by those limitations. And there could be no more obvious way of doing this than by keeping the judicature and the police in a position of greater dependence upon the popular will than is consistent with the guarantees necessary in a well-ordered State for the supremacy of law, for private rights, and for individual freedom.

Against those who, as judges, had honestly and fearlessly administered laws unpopular with, or which had been actively resisted by, the new ruling powers, and against those who, as members of the police force, had incurred the animosity of the same powers by doing their duty in obedience to law, the question would be approached with feelings not favourable to the maintenance of their authority and independence. Powers which had been won by a successful crusade against private rights of property, carried on by the pressure of organised combinations, to compel the unwilling as well as the willing to attack those rights, and join in the crusade, and to resist both Courts and police when

opposing those combinations, would certainly not be used so as to condemn and suppress the methods which had been employed to obtain them; at all events, they would not be so used until those private rights which were the subject of attack had been destroyed. It would be almost a necessity of the position, that when the Courts of law and the police were put absolutely under the control of the new Government—that control should be used to weaken and not strengthen the authority of the law and the independence of its administration on all points on which it had been previously resisted. And this might be done, not only by reserving discretionary powers, more or less indefinite, to the Executive, and by altering the conditions and tenure of the higher judicial offices, but also by manipulating the *personnel*, the jurisdiction, the mode of appointment, and the tenure of office of the inferior judges and magistracy throughout Ireland. By such means any reservation of powers to collect customs duties, or rents and annual payments reserved under a general scheme of land redemption or purchase, might also (at the pleasure of the new rulers) be impeded or practically defeated.

The new form of parliamentary government could not reproduce the guarantees afforded by the present constitution of the United Kingdom for the independence of the judicature. Even if two Houses of Parliament were set up in Ireland (which was proposed in 1886, though in a manner so weak as to make it tolerably certain that the proposal will not be repeated in the same form), both would rest entirely upon the basis of popular election; and in case of any difference, even upon such a question as that of the removal of judges, or of a change by law in the conditions and tenure of judicial offices, the voice of the more popular assembly

would be sure to prevail. Neither assembly would have any judicial habits or traditions. The first question must be, Whether those superior judges who are now removable only upon a joint address from both branches of the Imperial Legislature to the Crown should, in Ireland, be removable by the Executive Government at its pleasure, or by the Executive Government with the assent, or subject to the veto, of the more popular assembly (supposing there to be two branches) of the Irish Legislature? The power of removal in either of those forms would practically destroy the independence of the judicature. Even if (which is not probable) the concurrence of both Houses were required, it is unlikely that a senate popularly elected would oppose the will of the more powerful assembly. There would not be in Ireland under its new constitution any power or influence, either of property or of station, sufficiently strong to furnish a constituency which would return a senate representing interests, opinions, or desires substantially distinct from those represented by the more powerful body elected under the wider suffrage. For an indefinite time all the forces of influence, combination, and intimidation, which had succeeded in obtaining the control of the government of Ireland, would be still under the command of the same leaders, and would practically govern both the electoral bodies. Their operation at this moment is to place in the hands of those leaders —I might probably say with truth in the hands of a single man—the nomination of *all* the representatives of the Nationalist party in Ireland; and if anything in the world is certain, it is that so vast a power would not be soon or willingly relinquished when the government of all Ireland was in those hands. The total want of experience in legislation or government would be a

reason for not surrendering it, the plausibility of which no man could deny. Even if the autocrat of the moment were willing to lay it down, it could only be to give place to some bolder successor or rival.

That the British House of Lords would not, under such an Irish constitution, continue to be the Court of final appeal, or retain any judicial power in Irish cases, civil or criminal, may be assumed as certain. How would it be replaced? If by an appeal to a senate elected in Ireland by popular suffrage, or to an Irish Privy Council, nominated upon the advice of the new Executive Government, there would be an end of all security for the firmness, consistency, or impartiality of the administration of justice.

Whatever laws might be passed by the new Legislature—however subversive of the rights of property, however unjust or oppressive towards classes or individuals, however odious to those who had been loyalists and opposed to the policy of the new rulers (for example, to the great majority of the people of Ulster) —the police, under the command of the new Executive Government, would be as much bound to enforce them as they are now to enforce the laws enacted by the Imperial Parliament; and unless all ordinary constitutional principles were departed from, the whole military force of the Crown stationed in Ireland (notwithstanding the formal exception of military matters from the control of the Irish Parliament) must be disposable for the same purpose, when the power of the police is found insufficient. Every coercive power now wielded by the Parliament of the United Kingdom would be available to compel the obedience of the hitherto loyal minority to any laws which the new Irish Parliament might enact.

So far I have been proceeding upon the supposition that the new Irish Parliament would confine itself within the limits prescribed by the law of its creation. But the opposite contingency must also be considered. Those limits must, from the necessity of the case, be defined in general terms; the line cannot be so sharply and clearly drawn as to exclude, on the one side or the other, debatable ground; and it may be assumed as certain, that all such debatable ground would be treated, practically, by the Irish Parliament as within its powers. With the judicature and all the forces of Executive Government, except the direct command of troops, under their control, the laws passed by that Parliament, whether *intra vires* or not, could be put in force in Ireland; and the Imperial Parliament and Government could do nothing to prevent it, except by war. Nothing can be more futile than the notion that decisions of a British Privy Council would be accepted or acquiesced in as settling such questions, or that the royal assent could in such cases always be withheld, without bringing everything to a dead-lock. With all the powers of government locally available in Ireland in the hands of the leaders of the parliamentary party there, the British Government would be under difficulties practically insuperable without war; and the Irish Government would have the strongest possible vantage-ground for getting rid of all obnoxious restraints. If any device could be imagined to aggravate the difficulty, it would be that of putting some of the judges, over whom the Irish Executive or Legislature would have power, in the position of taking part, as members of the British Privy Council, in the decision of such questions. Either they would concur or they would not. If they did, it would be thought in-

tolerable that a small minority of Irish judges, sitting in England, should have power to nullify Acts of the Irish Legislature. If they did not, it would be thought more intolerable still, that, in spite of the dissent of the only members of the Irish judicature who were allowed any voice in the matter, the opinions of British Privy Councillors should prevail. The case would be altogether unlike that of appeals from the Colonies, involving questions as to the validity of Acts passed by Colonial Legislatures with limited powers. From those Colonies, the Judicial Committee of the British Privy Council (or, to speak with more technical precision, her Majesty in Council) is the ordinary Court of final appeal in all cases civil and criminal; and it is only in the exercise of that general appellate jurisdiction that any questions incidentally arising as to the validity of the Acts of Colonial Legislatures can be determined by that tribunal. But the Judicial Committee and the Queen in Council would have no general appellate jurisdiction over any decisions of the Irish Courts. Nor would there be any executive power capable of enforcing decisions of the British Privy Council in Ireland against the whole force of Government, judicature, and police, in the hands of those asserting the competency of the Irish Legislature and the validity of its Acts. In a colony such as Canada, where the legislative power is distributed between the Dominion Parliament and Provincial Parliaments, a decision that one legislature is incompetent affirms the competency of another, and both have their own means of enforcing, upon the spot, by proper judicial and administrative authority, decisions practically in their power. But no such conditions would exist in Ireland under the contemplated new constitution.

It follows that, to hand over the whole judicature and executive to a Government responsible only to a local Parliament with limited powers, and having any inducement to abuse or to exceed those powers, would be to arm it with the means of employing all the machinery of law against law, and of forcing the hand of the Imperial Parliament, whenever it might be desired to make a serious attempt to get rid of unpopular limitations, or to take a further stage in the road towards absolute independence.

SELBORNE.

A SEPARATE EXECUTIVE FOR IRELAND IMPRACTICABLE.

BY

LORD BASING.

THERE is, it must be admitted, something plausible an attractive in the name and idea of Home Rule, and even, to put the matter more closely, in the suggestion that the Irish people should have, if they desire it, an Irish Parliament for the discussion and settlement of their own affairs. No one, moreover, who has been in the habit of attending or taking part in public meetings of a political character during the last two years while the great controversy has been raging, can have failed to experience some embarrassment in contending against that proposition; especially before a simple and uncultivated audience, who are apt to take things literally, and who would feel in no way injured by the concession of such a boon—if boon it be considered—to people with whom they have little in common, and no natural ground of quarrel or occasion for jealousy.

Politicians, in arguing this question from the Unionist point of view, are naturally conscious of this difficulty, and seem inclined to meet it, for the most part, by an expression of their eagerness to concede, or even to advocate, any amount of local self-government in Ireland, such as they would be prepared for in Scotland or in England. But it must be evident to those who use such arguments that they are, as it were, beating the air; while their listeners are instinctively sensible that little, if anything, is contributed by them towards a solution of the problem at issue; that they have, in fact, no practical bearing on the subject. Trained and experienced politicians, by which term is meant not merely members of the Legislature, but all who habitually read, write, speak, or think on the public questions of the day, appreciate more keenly how this is, and can measure the immense difference which really exists between any such concessions as local self-government, and the Home Rule of Mr Gladstone and Mr Parnell, but few perhaps stop to inquire, and certainly few trouble themselves to expound to others, the real underlying principle which separates so widely propositions and descriptions which are, *primâ facie*, so nearly akin. It seems easier to fly off at once to a denunciation of the evils of separation and repeal, than to examine more closely the constitutional reasons why a separate legislature, carrying with it, as it must (and as is intended), a separate Executive Government, is altogether inadmissible. It may be useful, therefore, even at this late period, to set out some of the reasons why such an innovation would be not only mischievous in itself and intolerable in its results, but would be founded upon a false analogy with our existing system of parliamentary control.

Every one, indeed, can see, when they have been once pointed out and considered, the gross absurdities which are involved in the plan of a separate Executive Government for Ireland, created by and responsible to the Parliament of that country under the provisions of the Home Rule Bill of 1886. That the Queen should have ministers on this and on the other side of the Irish Channel entertaining the most divergent, or even incompatible, views on matters of high policy, is obviously inconvenient, but that an English Prime Minister, supported by majorities in the English Parliament, representing fairly the prevailing opinion and sentiment of the British Empire, carrying with him the favour of the Crown and the goodwill of the people at large, should find himself thwarted by the action of the same Queen's Government in Ireland, and be unable to advise the Queen to dismiss such a Government or to dissolve such a Parliament, presents a picture almost impossible to realise, whether the conflict were to have arisen on great subjects of transcendent importance—such as questions of peace and war—or whether upon matters of internal administration, such as commercial freedom or religious equality. Let it not be said that by careful drafting of the Act of Parliament under which Home Rule is to be conceded all such subjects of possible conflict may be eliminated, expressly or under general definitions. Attempts to this effect were made in the Home Rule Bill, and others might conceivably be attempted, but all would be in vain. We know the ability, the ingenuity, and the resources of the Irish race; we know also the impossibility—such a concession as Home Rule once made—of repressing free speech in that country or in any representative body of that country. Assuming, for a moment (as was

proposed), that it would be practicable to preclude the Irish Parliament from dealing legislatively with any given subject, such as the coinage, religious liberty, or the like, what could prevent motions being made or resolutions being proposed, debated, and adopted as to the expediency of changes or alterations in this or that direction in respect of such subject-matters? Or again, take the more burning question of our foreign relations, with the issues of peace or war hanging, as it were, in the balance, what more conceivable than violent and almost unanimous expressions of opinion taking place in the Irish Parliament directly challenging the conduct of the British Government, to the comfort and support of the declared enemies of the empire? Such a state of things is not only not impossible, but the likelihood of it might be illustrated by numberless speeches and public utterances made in the House of Commons and elsewhere even during the comparatively insignificant war-time which the country lately experienced in Egypt.

But a Cabinet in Ireland—for that is what was meant and provided for, *sub rosâ*, in Mr Gladstone's Bill—would not, and could not, be constituted in any but the most superficial manner on the model or according to the analogy of the English Cabinet. Not to mention the immense difference involved in the fact that there are, according to our existing constitution, two legislative bodies in England as compared with one to be set up in Ireland, out of which the Cabinet for Great Britain must be constructed, we have likewise here the important function of the Sovereign as regards its composition, and especially as regards selection of the First Minister,—a function to the exercise of which on a very recent occasion all parties looked with satis-

faction, and in which they thankfully acquiesced. Be it observed, however, that there was a remarkable omission in the Home Rule Bill to provide in detail how the Government or Cabinet should be put together, and of what elements it should consist, or how the public service should be departmentally organised. These matters, of the first interest and importance to the inhabitants of Ireland, were almost ostentatiously ignored, on the plea that they were to be settled by the wisdom of the Irish Parliament itself. But the consequence of this omission would be that the Irish Parliament, on meeting after its election, would find itself unable to enter on the exercise of its practical work as a legislative body, and must of necessity be charged in the first instance with the duties and functions of a "Constituent assembly," with power, practically unrestrained, to mould and manipulate the constitution of the Government and of the public service in the manner most agreeable to the will, and in the interests, of the majority—that is, of the disloyal and Separatist majority of the representatives of Ireland in the present House of Commons.

The constitution, as we know it, in this country grew up in a very different way. Modified—largely and fundamentally, no doubt, but gradually—during three centuries, by the accumulated wisdom and experience of public men, acting with and supported by public opinion, it is open to no imputation of having been concocted by a party with a view to special or exclusive interests. If we proceed to criticise more closely, we might point to the swamping of the Irish peerage as a proceeding without justification or precedent as regards any supposed or pretended analogy between the British system of the past and the Irish system of the future.

Again, the majority of the Irish Parliament being what we know it would be, and the Executive Government being (by the hypothesis) not only its creature, but the exponent of its will and the agent of its policy, what sort of judicial machinery or civil service establishment could be brought into existence which would bear the faintest resemblance to the sober, steady, and uniform administration with which we are familiar in this country, and which exercises its wholesome and dispassionate agency unaffected for the most part by the changes which from time to time occur in the political supervision of affairs? Can it be conceived that such a service would be created under the proposed Home Rule arrangements? On the contrary, we have almost formal notice that the public departments, which have been for years covered with obloquy as savouring of the "Castle," would be disestablished, the judiciary removed or reduced to dependence on the will of the majority, the police broken up, and a new order of things introduced and administered by the substitution of partisans for trained officials. What a prospect for the minorities!—the minority, that is, of the landowners, who have been vilified and despoiled; of the capitalists who have developed such industries as are yet to be found in Dublin and Belfast; and of the loyal farmers and peasants of Ulster.

On the other hand, greatly as all these developments would differ from existing institutions, there need be little fear but that the vices and extravagances of our public life, in the development of which the Irish members have borne so conspicuous a part, would survive and flourish without let or hindrance. The party manœuvres, the wire-pulling, the arts of obstruction, the prolixities of debate, the encroachments by the legis-

lature on the executive function,—from all of which evils we have so grievously suffered,—would be greedily copied, and would find a congenial home in the Irish assembly; but what steadying power, whether of historical tradition through hereditary rank or status, of respect for property, landed or commercial, could be found as a makeweight against the overwhelming influences of the *popularis aura?* No one will dispute that these makeweights still exist, and have value for us in England, highly democratised though we be; nor that they still control our tendencies to excess, and give confidence to our minorities in the justice of our imperial administration. What shall we say, then, of the recklessness of a solemn proposal by the foremost politician of his time to let all such securities and safeguards go by the board, leaving the fortunes—nay, the future existence—of Ireland as a nation, to be manipulated at will by those who have shown such intolerance of all that law-abiding citizens should respect and cherish?

There was, indeed, in the Home Rule Bill the fantastic and far-fetched expedient of a double system of election to the legislative body, for the workability of which no one had a word to say, but which was accepted by the Irish members at the time in a manner highly significant of their real opinion of its worthlessness. But the Davitts and Fords have quite recently rejected and openly pronounced against any such contrivances as wholly unnecessary and uncalled for; while the phantom of the Viceroyalty, which was nominally preserved as a connecting link between the Governments of the two countries, could not really have been maintained, so great and universal is the discredit which has been cast upon that institution, without a complete change in its position and attitude. In other words,

the Lord Lieutenant, if he were to enter on his task with any prospect of success, or hope of popularity, must surrender his position as nominee of the sovereign for that of an official designated if not elected by the popular vote. In all these points, and in many more which might be particularised, a thoughtful examination into the probable working of the Home Rule Bill, the only programme which has been yet put forward with any pretence to authority, will surely convince the impartial inquirer that the term inadmissible is not too strong for application to the project of a separate Executive for Ireland, dependent on a separate Parliament.

All parties in the State are perhaps responsible, in greater or less degree, for the weakness and want of perception which has brought our common country into this great complication of trouble and difficulty. People in these days are apt to let things drift, where statesmen of old would have acted with foresight, courage, and decision. But, however that may be, it cannot but be useful to have inquired, even briefly and superficially, into the probable working out of schemes which, however flimsy and shadowy as they are thus found to be, are, nevertheless, the only ones which have been seriously propounded for the establishment of Home Rule in Ireland.

BASING.

WHY I AM NOT A HOME RULER.[1]

BY

W. E. H. LECKY.

I HAVE often wondered whether those gentlemen who assure us that Ireland will be satisfied with nothing less than Grattan's Parliament have ever seriously reflected what Grattan's Parliament under the Constitution of 1782 really was. It consisted, of course, of two Houses—a House of Lords as well as a House of Commons. It was altogether Protestant. It was elected exclusively by Protestants, though, towards the close of its career, it, with signal liberality, admitted the Catholics to the franchise. It was drawn entirely from the section of the community which was indisputably loyal, and it was probably more eminently and specially the representative of property than any legislature that is now existing in the world. But in order still further to secure a constant concurrence

[1] A portion of this article appeared originally in the 'Nineteenth Century,' and is reprinted by the permission of the Editor.

between this Legislature and the Legislature of Great Britain, the Government steadily upheld a system of representation under which about two-thirds of the members of the Irish Parliament sat for nomination boroughs, a great proportion of which were at the absolute disposal of the Government. Yet, in spite of all these securities, the task of making the two Legislatures work in harmony was not found to be an easy one, and it was on the great danger that might result from their collision that Pitt chiefly based his argument for the Union. The Constitution of 1782, he said, had established no "solid, permanent system of connection between the two countries." Experience had shown "how inadequate it was to the great object of cementing the connection and placing it beyond the danger of being dissolved."

Grattan, it is true, desired to introduce considerable changes into this Parliament. He wished to diminish the corrupt influence exercised by the Crown in the shape of excessive patronage and rotten boroughs; and he wished to admit into the two Houses that small body of Catholic gentry who were then, as they are now, among the most loyal and useful elements of Irish national life. But it is a perfect delusion to suppose that he ever contemplated or desired an Irish Parliament which was not essentially under the guidance of the landed gentry of the country. A purely democratic Parliament was, it is true, the ideal of the United Irishmen who represented the ideas of the French Revolution, but their scheme of "personal representation" found in Grattan the most unflinching opponent. It was a scheme, he said, which would "destroy the influence of landed property," and thus give up "the vital and fundamental articles of the

British Constitution;" and he painted in vivid colours what in the conditions of Irish life a democratic Parliament was likely to be. "This plan of personal representation," he said, "from a revolution of power would speedily lead to a revolution of property, and become a plan of plunder as well as a scene of confusion. For, if you transfer the power of the State to those who have nothing in the country, they will afterwards transfer the property. . . . Of such a representation, the first ordinance would be robbery, accompanied with the circumstance incidental to robbery, murder." "The shout of whisky," he said on another occasion, "will return the members of the senate, and elect a felonious representation."

It is sufficiently evident from this sketch that no Parliament even remotely resembling that which was abolished in 1800, or that which was contemplated by Grattan, could now by any possibility be established in Ireland; and that arguments from the merits or demerits of the Parliament of the eighteenth century can have very little bearing on modern controversies. It is equally evident that, while the old Parliament was essentially the Parliament of the Irish loyalists, the Parliament which is now desired would be essentially a Parliament of the disaffected. It would be, in all probability, a single democratic chamber, elected chiefly by an anti-English peasantry, completely sundered from the great interests of property in the country, and consisting mainly of nominees of the National League. The relation of the different classes in Ireland to the Home Rule scheme is perfectly unambiguous. The whole body of the Protestants, with scarcely an exception, have declared themselves against it. They form nearly a million and a quarter

of the population, and contain far more than their numerical proportion of its wealth, intelligence, and energy. They comprise not only more than ninety per cent of the proprietors of the soil, but also the flower of the industrial population. It is they who have mainly made Belfast one of the greatest and most prosperous cities in the empire; who have made the linen manufacture the one flourishing industry of Ireland; who have raised a great part of Ulster to a level of civilisation, order, and prosperity worthy of any portion of the empire. Anglicans, Presbyterians, and Methodists, differing in creed and differing in English party politics, they have declared, with a unanimity and emphasis which it is impossible to mistake, that any Irish Parliament which could now be set up would be ruinous to the country, the precursor of anarchy, and probably of civil war. They are not, however, more opposed to it than the Catholic gentry. This class, who in a healthy state of society would occupy a conspicuous if not a dominant place in Irish politics, have, by the action of the National League, been driven almost absolutely out of public life; and if it had not been that a few of their number sit in the House of Lords, they would be reduced to the most complete impotence. The overwhelming majority of the leaders of industry, whether Protestant or Catholic, are on the same side. It is only necessary to examine the list of Mr Parnell's members of Parliament to perceive how entirely the representative names in Irish industry are excluded from it. The bankers, the large merchants and shopkeepers, the directors of railways, the men who have risen to eminence in the professions, the great employers of labour, the great organisers of industry, are conspicuously absent. The few men of this kind who were connected

with the movement when it was guided by Mr Butt, have almost all fallen away since it has passed under the control of Mr Parnell, and they look upon Home Rule with undisguised alarm. All those classes in Ireland who are indisputably loyal to the English connection are as indisputably opposed to an Irish Parliament.

It is this profound division of classes in Ireland that makes all arguments derived from the example of federal governments, either in Europe or America, so utterly fallacious. The first question to be asked before setting up a local legislature is, Who are the men who are likely to control it? On this point there is no real difference of opinion in Ireland. No argument of the smallest weight has ever been brought forward to show that the men who now predominate in the Irish representation in the Imperial Parliament, would not equally predominate in an Irish Parliament. They would be elected by the same classes. They would come to the poll with the prestige of a great victory. The simple effect of Home Rule would be to confer legislative powers upon the National League.

And what are the sentiments of these men towards Great Britain? To do them justice they have never concealed them. They are men at whose public banquets the toast of the Queen is systematically suppressed. At their great demonstrations the American flag is everywhere flaunted, and cheers are given for every real or supposed enemy of England. The harp without the crown is their favourite symbol. One of their most conspicuous members organised the demonstration on the platform of Mallow to insult the Prince of Wales. Another—a Lord Mayor of Dublin—distinguished himself by refusing to allow British soldiers at his inaugural procession. More than one

have been deeply mixed in the Fenian conspiracy, and Fenian heroes have again and again been made the subjects of popular demonstrations of enthusiasm. The leader himself assured an American audience that he would not be satisfied till his party had destroyed "the last link which keeps Ireland bound to England." The newspapers and the popular literature which support and represent the party have for years been educating the Irish people in the most inveterate, unqualified hatred of the British Empire, and have looked on every event in Europe with favour just in proportion as it was supposed to be injurious to British power. Every one who has given any real attention to that press will admit that this statement is the simple, unexaggerated truth. It is not, however, the whole truth. The National League is a tree of which the root is in America, where an avowed and savage conspiracy against the British Empire exists, directed by men who have abundantly shown, both by their words and by their acts, that they would shrink from no crime to attain their ends. It is from America that the parliamentary fund of the National League mainly comes. Its members in Parliament are as literally paid from the exchequer of a foreign anti-English conspiracy as the British Ministers are from the Consolidated Fund.

Considered also in their domestic policy, the case is not less strong. The conduct of the leaders of the party in Parliament, in the law courts, in every local body in which they have obtained an ascendancy, is sufficiently evident. It is an incontestable truth that for many years their habitual methods of political action have been systematic defiance and violation of the law; systematic abuse of those who are engaged in adminis-

tering it; systematic repudiation of the obligations of contract. They are the authors of the naked dishonesty of the "No-Rent Manifesto" and the "Plan of Campaign"; and scarcely a week passes in which some of their conspicuous members do not advocate the repudiation of private debts as a means of attaining political ends. Appeals to dishonesty and cupidity have been their favourite weapons, and they have taught great masses of the Irish people to look upon politics mainly as a means of breaking contracts, evading pecuniary obligations, and obtaining personal advantages. They have also, under the name of boycotting, organised a system of tyranny perhaps as merciless and crushing as any that now exists upon the globe. The first and most elementary form of liberty, and the most essential condition of national prosperity, is that peaceful and law-abiding men should be able to live in their own country unmolested and unintimidated — to choose their friends, to pursue their business, to make, fulfil, and enforce their contracts. Where such a state of society does not exist, there can be no real progress and no settled industry. Through the action of the National League there is less of this kind of liberty in some counties of Ireland than in the most barbarous provinces of Russia and Turkey. It must be added that most of the leaders of the movement are professional agitators—men who live by agitation, and whose whole occupation would cease if they did not succeed in stimulating an appetite for it among the people.

These are the men with whom English Ministers have to do; and what is the demand which they make? It is that the whole internal government of Ireland should be placed in their hands, not only in times of peace and prosperity, but also in times of difficulty,

danger, and war; that they should be given the command of that noble army of more than 12,000 constabulary, who have displayed during the last terrible years such an admirable fidelity and loyalty; that they should be authorised to arm volunteers; that they should be intrusted with the protection of industry and property, and of the loyal subjects of the Crown, with the power of taxation, and with all the influences of patronage and control that belong to a legislative body. That such a surrender to such men should be seriously contemplated, not on the morrow of some crushing military disaster like Jena or Sedan, but by men who have been Ministers of a great and powerful empire, is surely a shameful illustration of how recklessly and unscrupulously the game of party and of place has of late been played, and how seriously the character of English public men has been impaired. There are three millions of disaffected in a population of about thirty-six millions; eighty-six disaffected members in a Parliament of six hundred and seventy. It is under these conditions that resistance is said to be impossible, and the dismemberment of the empire inevitable! Parliamentary government, the Prince Consort once said, is now on its trial. If this be the end of British government of Ireland, the historian will have little hesitation in pronouncing that it has not only been tried but condemned.

The case against Home Rule has, as it appears to me, been argued too much upon mere grounds of machinery or legal technicalities. It is, as I understand it, before all things a question of confidence and character. Every Englishman who advocates it on a platform should be asked this simple question—Are you prepared to declare on your honour that you be-

lieve the men into whose hands you propose to surrender the government of Ireland to be men to whom such a trust can be safely and righteously conceded? There is no greater crime that a public man can commit than to attempt to place the government of a nation in the hands of dishonest and disloyal men, and every legislative change which has the effect of placing it in such hands is necessarily an evil. It is difficult to describe in too strong terms either the absurdity or the wickedness of the contention that, because England in a remote past committed many injustices in Ireland, she ought now to hand over the administration of that country to the tender mercies of the National League.

It is no doubt true that limitations might be imposed by law upon an Irish Parliament, but it is difficult to see how they could be enforced except by war; and it needs little sagacity to predict that the immediate sequel to the establishment of Home Rule would be a movement to abolish them. Upon the first conflict with England they would be abrogated by a declaration of rights. The precedents of 1641, of 1689, and of 1782 are there to justify such a course. The Irish question, instead of being settled, would be immensely aggravated by the enormously increased power given to the disloyal. The strain on the connection, and the anarchy in Ireland would both become intolerable. It would soon be found necessary to go forwards to complete separation or to go backwards, probably to the abolition of all representation, and whichever course was taken, it would almost certainly be accompanied with bloodshed. To govern Ireland as a part of the empire by a democratic Parliament formed of the elements which are now predominating in that country, is the most hopeless of impossibilities.

And of all solutions that could be conceived, none could be more evidently destitute of the element of permanence than that of Mr Gladstone. One of its leading features was that Ireland was to be excluded from all part and lot in the administration of the empire, and was at the same time to be reduced to a tributary State, burdened with a heavy subsidy for imperial purposes. Can any one who has the smallest knowledge of the kind of influences that are now dominant in Ireland doubt for a moment that a great popular agitation against this tribute would immediately follow? Until near the close of the eighteenth century the national debt of Ireland was extremely small, and the taxation of the country was, in consequence, very low. One of the strongest arguments against the Union was the fear that it would raise Irish taxation to the English level. Under Mr Gladstone's scheme taxation would be much heavier than at present; and as Home Rule would certainly be followed by a rapid emigration of the richer classes and of capital, and probably by great repressive measures in Ulster, the pressure would soon be overwhelming.

One other prediction may be safely made. It is that the effects of a surrender such as has been proposed would not be confined to the relations between England and Ireland. The most distinguished men who are, or have lately been connected with the government of India, have been watching with keen anxiety the progress of Irish disaffection, on account of the influence it is likely to have on that country. It will be felt there, and in every other part of the Queen's dominions, and it will be felt in every country in Europe in the changed estimate of England. Great empires cannot humiliate themselves with impunity. I know

no clearer sign of a declining nation than that its statesmen are unable or unwilling to protect peaceful subjects within a few hours of the metropolis, and are prepared to carry on government by compacts with fomenters of outrage. Anarchy is the most contagious of all political diseases, and if it triumphs in one part of the empire it will assuredly spread to others. If the surrender of Ireland to the disloyal be ever accomplished, it will be known throughout Europe that the old governing and imperial spirit which made England what it is has departed; that the days of the empire are numbered; and that the handwriting is already on the wall.

I have spoken of the extreme absurdity of comparing any Parliament that could now be established, with the old Parliament of the gentlemen of Ireland—a Parliament to which I am not ashamed to say I look back with a feeling of very considerable sympathy and respect. I may add that the present movement differs widely from that of O'Connell. The Repeal agitation of O'Connell was not supported by the subsidies of foreign conspirators, and it was not accompanied to any great extent by that class warfare, and especially by that war against property, which has given its distinctive character and its special danger to the present movement. O'Connell was himself a considerable landlord. There was in his day no anti-rent agitation, and one of the most creditable incidents in his life was the courage with which he risked his popularity in opposing trade outrages. O'Connell was also frankly loyal to the Crown. His early experience of the horrors of the French Revolution had given him a strong bias in favour of monarchy; cheers for the Queen were constantly given at the Repeal meetings, and he even pushed his view of the prerogative so far as to maintain

that it was in the power of the sovereign, without the intervention of the Imperial Parliament, to convene a parliament in Dublin.

But although the Repeal movement of O'Connell was much less dangerous than the present one, it is well known how it was regarded by the greatest English statesmen of every party. Few English public men have known Ireland better than the Duke of Wellington, and he wrote that "Repeal must occasion the dissolution of the connection with Great Britain," and he predicted that its inevitable issue in Ireland would be a religious war. Sir R. Peel, who had served as Chief Secretary for Ireland, and was thoroughly acquainted with the conditions of Irish life, was even more emphatic. "Repeal of the Union," he said, "must lead to the dismemberment of this great empire, and must render Great Britain a fourth-rate power in Europe." Lord Althorp, who then led the Whigs in the House of Commons, echoed the argument of Peel, that in the existing state of Ireland a distinct Parliament must necessarily lead to separation; and Lord Grey, the leader of the party, who had in his youth been a strenuous opponent of the Union, declared that "the effect of its repeal would be ruin to both countries."

That Home Rule in any form in which it is now likely to be attained would be ruinous to Ireland is not difficult to prove. The policy of Mr Gladstone and the agitation of Mr Parnell have together so completely shattered the social type which had existed for generations; they have so effectually destroyed all the old relations of classes and all the more healthy forms of influence and reverence by which Irish society cohered; and they have diffused so widely through three provinces the belief that outrage and violence are the

natural means of attaining political ends,—that Ireland is at present probably less fitted for prosperous self-government than at any period within the memory of man. Mr Gladstone and his colleagues have, indeed, achieved with a curious completeness the end which more than fifty years ago Sir Robert Peel foresaw and dreaded as "a great, perhaps an irreparable misfortune" —the total "severance of the connection between the constituent body of Ireland and the natural aristocracy of the country." If Irish public opinion moved under the direction of men who had the responsibility of property, who were sincerely attached to the connection, and who were animated by a genuine love of individual liberty and a genuine respect for law, a large measure of self-government might, I believe, be profitably granted. But no reasonable man can fail to see how lamentably these essential conditions are now wanting, and it would be difficult to conceive a worse fate that could befall a nation than to be governed by the kind of men who form the present majority of the Irish representatives. That such men, supported by the votes of an ignorant and priest-driven peasantry, could govern the great Protestant population of the North is, to me at least, absolutely incredible. The experiment could only lead to prolonged and acute anarchy—probably to civil war; certainly to a fierce revival of those religious passions which have of late years been happily subsiding.

In the meantime industrial ruin is rapidly advancing. If you crown Anarchy for your king, whatever else you may have you will certainly not have industrial prosperity under his sceptre. If the ruling power in Ireland is given to men whose whole political action has consisted of a series of attacks upon property and upon

the principles on which property is based, capital will most certainly not visit the country. The expropriation of landlords may perhaps settle on a permanent basis the Land question; but it is a strange comment on the character of the legislature which English statesmen propose to create, that it is believed, probably with excellent reason, that such a measure is necessary to prevent that legislature from beginning its career by a course of wholesale plunder. But the contagion of anarchy is no longer confined to land. We have seen attacks upon the Bank of Ireland; attacks upon an Irish Steam Company because it performed services which it was not only authorised but bound by law to perform; violent resistance to the payment of rates; constant interference between employers and labourers; constant boycotting of shopkeepers who have for any reason incurred the animosity of the League; a constantly increasing difficulty in collecting ordinary trade debts. The House League for breaking contracts between house-owners and lodgers is another illustration of the same spirit, and the conflict between farmers and landlords will probably soon be reproduced in the conflict between labourers and farmers. The result of all this is inevitable. Every banker knows that capital has of late years been steadily passing out of the country. Who would found a manufacture in Ireland? Who would invest money in the improvement of land? Who would engage in any industrial enterprise which depended for its success on the fulfilment of contracts in a distant future? Insurance offices no longer lend on Irish property. Wholesale dealers restrict their Irish orders. At the first intimation of Mr Gladstone's probable conversion to Home Rule there was a great fall in Irish investments. In Ulster the elements of order

are so strong that the evil may be arrested, but in the other provinces this impoverishment has been steadily continuing. Shopkeepers on the verge of ruin, labourers unemployed, industrial enterprises withering rapidly away, are the natural and evident results of lawless and protracted agitation. One inestimable advantage it is true Ireland still has. She shares, and largely shares, in the credit of the empire—the best credit in the world. It is not difficult to foresee what would be the credit of a Government composed of men who had made the repudiation of contracts and the systematic practice of fraudulent bankruptcy one of their chief methods of political action.

And what advantage can Home Rule offer to counteract these evils? It is supposed by some that it would check absenteeism. A larger proportion of wealthy Irish gentlemen are said to have lived in Ireland in the days of the old Parliament when the whole government of the country was in their hands than at present. Is it likely that a larger proportion would live there when they were expropriated from their properties, driven out of every form of public life, and placed under a Government which they detested? One form of absenteeism might indeed be diminished, for a flight of Irish-American conspirators would no doubt speedily come over to share the spoils.

I know that the notion has been long and deeply rooted in the Irish mind that a native legislature might foster native industries by protective laws. It is probable that if Home Rule were established, the first conflict with England would be on this ground. But whatever justice there may be in the doctrine that in the early stage of manufactures protective laws are of real advantage, a war of tariffs with England in the

existing circumstances of Ireland seems to me the most hopeless of policies. A poor country, with very little capital, and that capital rapidly disappearing, permeated with agitations and subversive principles utterly incompatible with industrial prosperity, Ireland is placed by nature in such a geographical position that England is her only market. America will take nothing from her but men. With the continent of Europe her commercial relations are wholly insignificant. England could at any moment reduce her farming industry to absolute ruin by simply excluding Irish cattle from her market. There was a time when such a measure would have been impossible, for England depended very largely on Ireland for her supply of meat. But the extension of pasture in England, and the immense importation of cattle from America and Australia, have now made it perfectly easy for England to dispense with the Irish supply. With separate and hostile legislatures, and with a desire for protection rising among the British farmers, such a measure would be not only possible but probable.

Much has of late been said about the necessity of conceding Home Rule in order to satisfy the national aspirations of Ireland. On this subject I may perhaps write with some measure of authority, for long before Mr Parnell became a leader or Mr Gladstone a Home Ruler, I dwelt upon the force and the reality of that feeling. In a book which appeared as early as 1871,[1] I pointed out clearly the evils that would result from any attempt to establish an Irish Parliament; but I at the same time urged the importance of "calling into

[1] 'The Leaders of Public Opinion in Ireland.' This little book first appeared in 1861, when the author was very young; but I quote from the introduction to the edition of 1871.

being a strong local political feeling, directed by men who have the responsibility of property, who are attached to the connection, and who, at the same time, possess the confidence of the Irish people." "To call into active political life the upper class of Irishmen," I then wrote, "and to enlarge the sphere of their political power—to give, in a word, to Ireland the greatest amount of self-government that is compatible with the unity and the security of the empire—should be the aim of every statesman." "It is only," I continued, "by slow, cautious, and gradual steps that self-government can be in some degree restored. By steadily opposing the tendency to centralisation, . . . by transferring private business from the overworked Parliament of the empire to cheaper and perhaps more competent tribunals, by gradually enlarging the sphere of local government, and by encouraging and bringing into activity the political talent of the country, a sound political opinion may be slowly formed." Looking back on these words after the lapse of seventeen years, they do not appear to me to have been untruly or unwisely written; but the policy of establishing local institutions is obviously subordinate to the necessity of securing the elementary conditions of good government and national prosperity. These essential conditions are, the unity of the empire, the security of property, the due observance of law, the protection of peaceable and law-abiding subjects, the reasonable probability that the administration of affairs will be in the hands of loyal, trustworthy, honest, and competent men. Every extension of local government which is consistent with these conditions will, I believe, be a benefit; every step in that direction which is likely to be incompatible with them will prove an evil.

I said in the book to which I have referred, that "the three great requisites of good government for Ireland are, that it should be strong, that it should be just, and that it should be national," and these words have been strangely quoted as a justification of the Home Rule scheme. As if a Government was likely to be "just" which was composed of the leaders of the National League and the other chief authors of boycotting and intimidation! As if a Government was likely to be "strong" whose credit would probably be on a level with that of Mexico and Honduras, and which would be in violent opposition to Protestant Ulster and to the most powerful industrial energies of the nation! As if a Government could even be called in the true sense "national" which could only be established at the imminent risk of civil war, and which, though it might be supported by a majority of ignorant peasantry, would be alienated from all the elements that, in every healthy nationality, are the guiding influences of national life!

It is impossible also to deny that the last seventeen years have witnessed a complete change in the character of Irish national movements. The Home Rule agitation is not now, essentially or mainly, a question of nationality. It has taken much more the character of a war against property and contract. The leaders of the movement having signally failed to enlist the Irish farmers in a struggle on national grounds, resolved to appeal to their personal interest, by making the movement an agrarian one, aiming at the abolition or great reduction of rents. A period of keen agricultural depression and the land legislation of Mr Gladstone assisted them, and they had the double object of winning the support of a great class who were very indifferent to Home Rule, and of breaking the power

of another great class who were firmly devoted to the Union. With the bulk of the farmer class the land has always been the real question, and if that question were finally settled they would probably become very passive. There are evident signs that the Nationalist leaders foresee and dread the effects of such a settlement, while the larger and more prosperous farmers are beginning to look on the prospect of Home Rule with a well-founded alarm, and the great grass farmers have been made the objects of more than one significant menace. At the same time American Fenianism has changed the character of Irish Nationalism. There has long, indeed, been in Ireland among large classes an instinctive, passionate, unreasoning hatred of England, formed in the national character by influences which have been in operation for centuries, and are much too strong to be effaced by any mere constitutional changes.

Fenianism has given it a new power and organisation and guiding influence, which is not the less real because the leaders are for a time content to co-operate in a struggle for a local legislature as a stepping-stone to their ultimate end. Take from the present movement the agrarian element, which may be settled without Home Rule, and the Fenian element, which will never be satisfied without separation, and those who know Ireland best believe that the residuum would be very small.

Much of the movement, however, is of a more superficial character, and without the timidity and vacillation of successive Governments, it would never have reached its present height. American subsidies have made professional agitation a lucrative trade, on which, in many different ways and forms, great numbers of clever, needy, and unscrupulous men subsist. Like most trades, it will continue while it is profitable—so long

and no longer. Intimidation, skilfully and unscrupulously exercised, has driven into the League multitudes of inoffensive men who have no more real sympathy for outrage and spoliation than the Sicilian proprietor who secures his property by paying blackmail to the bandit chief. "It is all very well for your honour to talk," said an Irish farmer, when remonstrated with for subscribing to a League which he detested; "but when things become very bad, you can go to England —I must remain here." Peaceful men will naturally seek a quiet life by paying tribute to the government *de facto*, and it is a shameful truth that in many parts of Ireland this government has not of late been the Government of the Queen. The conduct of the priests has been governed by other motives, and the attitude of the majority of them towards Great Britain immediately after the Imperial Parliament had abolished the last vestige of Protestant ascendancy is one of the most instructive and significant facts in the agitation. It is, however, very explicable. Many share the passions and sentiments of the peasant class from which they spring; others look forward to the probable extinction of Protestantism in great districts, and to the subjugation of the whole education of Ireland to sacerdotal control, and whether they look for money or popularity or influence, the strongest motives of personal interest draw this class to the side of their congregations. At the same time, the longing for change, which grows up in periods of poverty and depression, the constant preaching of incendiary newspapers, a large amount of a vague and not very powerful poetic sentiment, class animosities and jealousies, and many petty questions of patronage and place, have all in their different ways borne their part in swelling the torrent.

But, in addition to these things, the present agitation owes its power to long-continued and unexpected success; to the encouragement of Irish disloyalty by English politicians; to the manifest bargaining on both sides for the Irish vote; to the signal failure of the Land Act of 1881; to such speeches as that in which Mr Gladstone attributed the disestablishment of the Irish Church to the Clerkenwell outrage; to recent transformation scenes which have profoundly shaken all confidence in the stability of English politics, and in the character of English statesmen.

It is not surprising that it should have been so, for no more astonishing spectacle has been exhibited in modern politics. We have seen a great party leader going to the country at a general election without giving the faintest intimation, either to his colleagues or to the electors, that he contemplated a policy of Home Rule; asking for a large majority in order that he might be independent of the Parnellite vote; and then when he found that vote required to give him a clear majority, entering into alliance with men whom he had himself described as aiming at "public plunder" and "the disintegration of the empire"; proposing to hand over to them the administration of justice and the government of Ireland; attempting by his individual action to reverse the uniform tradition of English policy for more than eighty years, and subordinating to this end every other question of imperial policy. We have seen him, in the pursuit of this enterprise, descending to all the arts of the most unscrupulous and transparent demagogism; trying to sow in the newly enfranchised democracy the seeds of class warfare by setting the poor against the rich, and to rekindle smouldering provincial jealousies between England and other portions

of the island; attacking Irish judges and the Irish police; making speeches which every plain man must see were deliberately intended, in a time of great difficulty and danger, to strengthen Irish anarchy and to discredit English law; putting up questions of the utmost intrinsic importance, such as the Church establishments in Wales and Scotland, to a kind of auction, by intimating not obscurely that their solution depended on the number of Home Rulers Wales and Scotland would send into Parliament to support him.

And in the pursuit of this policy Mr Gladstone has carried with him the bulk of the machinery of a great English party, and men who have held high offices under the Crown, and among them one who only a few months before had, as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, been rallying the Irish loyalists against the very men to whose government he is now endeavouring to consign them. English history for many generations has had no such shameful page, and the evil consequences that flow from it will not speedily be exhausted. The effects of a degradation of the standard of political morality will be felt in every part of the empire, but they will be nowhere felt so powerfully as in those parts which are most disturbed and disorganised. Nothing could be more fatal to the prospect of good government in Ireland than the conviction that English statesmanship was passing permanently into a lower plane of character and honour.

It would be idle to deny how seriously these things have aggravated the Irish difficulty, but in England as in Ireland the signs of the time are far from being altogether discouraging. The ablest and most trusted of Mr Gladstone's former colleagues have taken the course which might have been expected from their characters

and from their past, and at the sacrifice of many things that men hold most dear, have refused to take any part in the policy of dismemberment, while the country has condemned it with a voice that cannot be mistaken. No one who realises the immense power which party ties and names exercise in England can be blind to the deep significance of the election of 1886. Mr Gladstone was very lately incomparably the most popular statesman in England, and even apart from his popularity the Liberal party was by far the strongest in the State. But although Mr Gladstone has secured the votes of eighty-six detached members, who are ostentatiously indifferent both to imperial interests and to the interests of English parties, and also the Irish vote in the great towns, he is now defeated by majorities of nearly 100 in the House of Commons. So great a displacement of the balance of power could only be due to a genuine, earnest, and widespread condemnation of his policy, and although it could hardly be expected that so wide a deviation from the normal division of parties should remain entirely unmodified—although it is not surprising that some voters, and even a few constituencies, should have relapsed into their accustomed grooves — there is, I believe, no reason to fear that the deliberate conviction of the country has been in any degree shaken. It has become evident that England must for some time be governed either by an alliance of Conservatives and Liberal Unionists, or by an alliance of Gladstonians and Parnellites. Unless the former commit some egregious mistake, it seems hardly doubtful which alternative she will prefer. "In England," as Mr Dicey truly says, "the party of morality and of conduct has always in the long-run been the possessor of popularity and of power."

Declamation and strategy, bids for the support of many interests, and unscrupulous appeals to subversive passions, may, no doubt, do much in democracies, but there has hitherto always been, and I trust there still is, in the constituencies of Great Britain a controlling element of moderate men who place patriotism above party, and who desire beyond all things sober, temperate, and consistent statesmanship, conducted by Ministers whose characters and judgments they can respect. Many things must happen before these electors are likely to wish for a Government directed by Mr Gladstone, and with Sir William Harcourt and Sir George Trevelyan among its leading luminaries.

It would be difficult to conceive a policy more opposed than the Home Rule policy to the best tendencies of the time. In the lifetime of those who have attained middle age three great works have been accomplished in the world which far transcend all others in importance, and of which it is probably no exaggeration to say that the memory can never pass while the human race remains upon this planet. One of them, which is connected with the great name of Cavour, was the movement of unification by which the old and illustrious, but weak because divided, States of Italy were drawn together and fused into one great and prosperous kingdom. Another, which is chiefly connected with the name of Bismarck, was that movement of unification which has made Germany the most powerful nation upon the Continent. The third, which may, I believe, one day be thought the most important of the three, was due much less to the genius of any statesman than to the patriotism and courage of a great democracy. It was the contest of America with the spirit of secession which had arisen within its border;

and although that spirit was spread over a far larger area than Ireland, although it existed over that area in a far larger proportion of the population than in Ireland, and was supported by an immeasurably greater amount of earnestness and self-sacrifice, it has now disappeared, and the present generation of Americans have in all human probability secured for centuries the unity of the great Republic of the West. These great works of consolidation have been the contributions of other nations to the history of the nineteenth century. Shall it be said of English statesmen that their most prolific and most characteristic work has been to introduce the principle of dissolution into the very heart of their empire?

W. E. H. LECKY.

COLONIAL SELF-GOVERNMENT.[1]

BY

GEORGE BADEN-POWELL, K.C.M.G., M.P.

ONE of Mr Gladstone's trump cards, that he has played in his endeavour to win the Home Rule game, is "the successful experience of granting self-government to our colonies"; and this lead of his has been persistently taken up by his lieutenants. But this argument he has introduced is altogether fallacious, inapplicable, and misleading.

On a previous occasion, when he sought to recommend *clôture*, on the plea that it had been "adopted in our colonies, which value freedom not less than we value it," Mr Gladstone was speedily convicted, not only of ignorance, but of what some did not hesitate to call culpable ignorance. And it is pertinent to the present occasion to remind the public of this previous instance in which the late Prime Minister advocated a

[1] Republished, by the kind permission of the Editor, from the 'National Review' for July 1886.

thoroughly un-English measure, on the special plea of appealing to the successful experience of our colonies, when such an appeal was fallacious and misleading, because absolutely unfounded in fact.

This precedent may be briefly stated. On February 14, 1882, Mr Gladstone rose in the House of Commons to propose a rule of *clôture*, specially advocating it on the plea that our colonies had adopted it. But in the previous November he had addressed a circular despatch to all our colonies, asking for specific information as to *clôture*. The replies were all to hand in the following January, and were printed and circulated by February 2. From these it was conclusively evident that only in one out of all the Colonial Legislative Assemblies was there in existence any form of *clôture* whatever.

Precisely similar ignorance has Mr Gladstone exhibited in urging his Home Rule Bill for acceptance, by appealing to the successful experience of our colonies.

It is true he commenced his appeal by reminding the House that his experience of colonial affairs was great, and dated from fifty-one years ago; and he described that at that date the relations between mother country and colonies were much strained, but that all had been set right by grants of self-government.

Unfortunately for this glib argument, it so happens that fifty-one years ago, on the one hand, out of the nine colonies that now have responsible government, only one—Canada—had emerged into the position of a colony, or was, as 28 & 29 Vict. c. 63 phrases it, one of "her Majesty's possessions in which there exists a Legislature." Queensland, New Zealand, Victoria, and South Australia were not in existence as

separate communities. New South Wales, Tasmania, Newfoundland, and Cape Colony were small struggling settlements, of which little was hoped or expected.

On the other hand, there were many colonies, among our more important in those days but small by comparison now, chiefly in the West Indies, which have since that time, and for their own good, surrendered their self-contained Legislatures.

It is perfectly true that since that day large powers of self-government have been delegated to our colonies outside the tropics, as they successively sprang into existence; and it is perfectly true that enormous success has attended this policy. But, in the first place, the reasons for such grants, and, in the second, the condition and circumstances of these settlements, differ so radically from the motive and the environments of the Irish case, as to render it logically true that what suited them will not suit Ireland.

One word as to the precedent afforded by Canada. Mr Gladstone tells us that Canada affords a case, "not parallel but analogous," and one "embracing the whole controversy." It is a great pity Mr Gladstone, before applying this precedent, did not make himself acquainted with its leading details. He expected the House of Commons to believe that Canada was governed from Downing Street until the year 1838, and that all things by then had come to a hopeless dead-lock, which was happily solved by the grant of Home Rule. That is Mr Gladstone's story; but it is one not less inconsistent with actual fact than the story he told three years ago as to the *clôture*. In reality, Canada had its elected representative Legislature from 1791 up to 1838; the executive being mostly in the hands of representatives of the Crown—as was the case at the time in

England itself. "Government from Downing Street," as we now understand it, was not possible, seeing that in those days there was no telegraph, and sailing vessels occupied weeks in crossing to the other side of the Atlantic. There were local troubles in the Canadas, and these assumed an acute phase over the local question of State endowments for the Church. These troubles culminated in the rebellion of '38.

The Legislature *was* in local hands and the executive in the charge of officials appointed from the mother country. Lord Durham succinctly suggested — "Let them not only make their own laws but execute them;" and to carry out this idea he saw at once that the provinces could not be left to their own independent devices. The two Canadas were united in 1840 under one Government and Legislature; and responsible government was instituted. But in a few years this ill-assorted combination of two antagonistic provinces —the one Protestant by faith and English and Scotch in race, and the other Catholic and French—proved unworkable, and the two provinces were again separated. Have we not in Ireland a somewhat close parallel? In the north-east is there not a province Protestant by faith and Scotch in race? And are there not, in the south and west, two provinces Catholic by faith and Celtic in race? Does not Canadian experience only prove that the amalgamation in a separate constitution and administration of the two incongruous provinces of Ireland merely promises to result in similar failure? No lasting settlement was arrived at until, in 1867, all our various provinces on the North American continent were locally federated into one united Dominion—one great Union.

In this policy was found a satisfactory remedy for

years of trouble. But the cardinal principle was not the grant of Home Rule, but the *uniting* together of the different provinces under one supreme Legislature and Executive. It was comprehensive and intimate union, and not division and subdivision, which inaugurated in Canada that grand era of prosperity which set in as a result of Lord Durham's wise statesmanship.

Very similar troubles occurred in New Zealand, although it enjoyed a representative constitution, before the six provincial governments were amalgamated (1875) into one general Legislature and Executive.

But as with Canada and New Zealand, so with the Australasian and Cape colonies, the circumstances and conditions are the very reverse of those of Ireland. In their case we have distant, young, and rapidly growing colonies, proud of their common nationality, eager to absorb the surplus capital and population of the mother country, and wisely bent on maintaining as close a union as possible with an empire that is the pledge of their security and their liberties. Also, as I have already pointed out, in those days there were no telegraphs, and communication was as a rule by sailing-ships, which occupied weeks, and to Australia, months, in the voyage, to and fro.

But there is another vital and essential difference which is strangely ignored by Mr Gladstone and all his lieutenants—ignored, indeed, by all the speakers who have introduced the colonial analogy. It is a difference which overshadows all the others. It is the fundamental fact that these colonies were at the time not represented in the Imperial Parliament; whereas Ireland is. The instances taken from European, not less than from colonial history, all lack this one vital feature. Ireland is already as fully represented in the

Parliament and Government of the country as any other part of the United Kingdom.

To the British colonial communities, thus differing, and diametrically differing, in every essential attribute from Ireland, there was conceded that form of constitution known as responsible government. But with self-government was conceded full responsibility and full control. The constitution granted in each case, as may be seen in any of the Acts, was assimilated as closely as circumstances allowed to that of the United Kingdom. The supremacy of the Crown, two Houses of Legislature, full power over the purse, full responsibility for internal law and order, and for defence against external aggression: these were the five fundamental principles of the new colonial constitutions, and only the first of these five enters into Mr Gladstone's scheme for Ireland. And the reasons for granting these Home Rule constitutions were the physical obstacles of distance, and the fact that the colonies were not represented in the Imperial Parliament, two reasons which do not exist in the case of Ireland. And yet this is the case which Mr Gladstone brings forward as his great precedent for granting Home Rule to Ireland, to a country close to Great Britain, and populated and civilised for ages, and decaying and not growing—at least so the Parnellites tell us. Mr Gladstone will also, perhaps, remember the motive avowed by the leading men of one great party, at all events, in granting this colonial Home Rule. These concessions were avowedly made because they "paved the way to eventual separation," because they opened the door to a breaking up of the empire. In this respect, also, the present offer of Home Rule to Ireland is, we must hope, distinct and different from

of Home Rule to the colonies. Or does Mr
one in this respect also see a close ar nd
dent? In 'Oceana,' Mr Froude well su is
licy of separation" in the words,—"They were
ed they were as birds in nests, whose parer
ged with them only till they could provi
for thei ives."

But e colonies, with that practical stat ip
(an eak a not inconsiderable personal e
peri wl been their special product, and
product that w be of incalculable advanta e to t
whole nation, have replied with no uncerta d:
"It is best for us, it is best for you, it is b ll,
that we continually draw closer and closer the bon
of union, the ties of communion—social, intellectu
commercial, and political, that now so happily
The reply of the colonies to the disintegrat nt
of self-government is a request that will, and e,
acceded to, for a reuniting of the powers and forc
of the empire in some closer union.

To sum up, colonial Home Rule differs y
possible Irish Home Rule, in the followin g
other points:—

1. It was granted to pave the way to separation.
2. It has resulted in creating a warm demand fo
   closer union.
3. The colonies were not represented in the l
   Parliamen
4. lonies eparat weeks or month
   sea-voyage from London, and there
   tele
   The c were ly unpopulated
   and rapidly progressive countries.
6. The colonies never tired of asserting their pride

in their common nationality, and their determination to remain integral portions of the British Empire.

7. The colonies have the common-sense to see, and the practical statesmanship to act up to the wise conviction, that the closest union means for the whole empire enhanced credit and absolute security against all internal or external danger to liberties or rights.
8. The colonies have a vivid conception of their duties and obligations as citizens of a great empire.

In addition to all this, Mr Gladstone, as I have shown, appealing to the successful experience of our colonies, proceeds to offer Ireland precisely what was not offered to the colonies. He asks Ireland to accept Home Rule, and then he defines Home Rule in his Bill, from the main lines and purport of which he will not depart even one hair's-breadth.

In brief, this Bill says to Ireland, "You may have Home Rule; you may have a Parliament in Dublin; but you must have no permanent representatives in the Imperial Parliament; no control over customs and excise—the two great items of purse; no control over your own defence; no full responsibility for law and order; no command over the liberties of your people or industries." In short, Ireland, according to the principle of Mr Gladstone's Bill, is to be deprived of all present share in the Imperial Government, and of most of the powers of self-government. The English taxpayer is to take all the ultimate responsibility and control. Ireland is merely to contribute a fixed sum, to be forcibly collected by England. Even the proposed Irish Legislature is to be on an entirely new

model—viz., a single chamber—in which the representatives of education and property are merely to have the right to be always in the minority, and with less powers in many respects than the councils even in Crown colonies, "ruled by the paternal despotism of Downing Street." Indeed, this new and strange Legislature would not enjoy even the rights or powers possessed by the subordinate Legislatures of the provinces of Canada, and there would be no permanent representation in the Imperial Parliament. Ireland would thus have inferior powers and rights to any other province of any nation of European stock. This is what Mr Gladstone offers to Ireland, and what the Parnellite lieutenants assert will be accepted as final by Ireland. To others in Ireland, this proposal comes in the light of an insult and a degradation—as a proposal which would settle nothing, but which would open the door to endless complications, and make possible every manner of dispute or difficulty. In conclusion, I will add that this Union, which has proved good and useful and vital to Great Britain and to Greater Britain, to the thirty millions in England and Wales and Scotland, to the two million Ulster men and commercial men in Ireland, and to the ten million British citizens of European stock in the North American, South African, Australian, and other provinces of the nation, is not lightly to be cast to the winds because an ephemeral majority of three million of the less educated and less substantial of the inhabitants of Ireland have been misled into supposing that, "to direct their course by themselves among the nations of the world," will freely give to some Irishmen the land now belonging to others.

This demand for Home Rule, as a stepping-stone

towards separation, is a passing craze, on which agitators may batten, and by which true patriots may be blinded and misled; but it is opposed, even in this the hour of its zenith, by the good sense and successful experience of at least forty-two out of the forty-five millions of British citizens of European stock.

Mr Gladstone's peculiar scheme has been sprung upon the public by the latest pervert to this strange dogma; and the country has not yet had time to become familiar with the question; but as it gradually does so, there will grow up an overpowering conviction that Mr Gladstone's proposals, even if they were practicable, which they are not, would undoubtedly threaten the prosperity and integrity of the whole empire, and certainly compass the ruin of Ireland.

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